This article was originally published by the Circle of Ancient Iranian Studies (CAIS SOAS).

 

Abstract

The following discourse provides a succinct exploration of the historical evolution of the terms “Aryan” and “Aryan identity,” examining how Achaemenid-era Iranians adopted this designation from Zoroastrian and Avestan-era Iranians, where it originally bore no racial connotation. Subsequently, the term migrated to Buddhism in India and then Europe, where it was reconfigured into a racial category before being reintroduced to Iran in its modern, dehumanising European form.

 

 

European Nationalism and Iranian Patriotism: A Comparative Civilisational Analysis

Iranians occupy a pre-eminent position as progenitors and custodians of global civilisation, their cultural and historical achievements being of such magnitude as to defy comprehensive summation within limited textual parameters. A salient characteristic of Iranian civilisation, however, has consistently been its repudiation of racial exceptionalism, with its cultural identity intrinsically rejecting racism, supremacist ideologies, and dehumanising doctrines. Paradoxically, contemporary Iranian society exhibits a problematic appropriation of Aryan ancestral pride–not through indigenous historical frameworks, but via Eurocentric racial constructs imported during the 20th century.

 

The conceptual amalgamation of nationalism and state sovereignty within Western political paradigms constitutes a historically contingent development, its origins traceable to the geopolitical reordering initiated by the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which instituted territorial sovereignty as the foundation of interstate relations (Gross, 1948). This catalysed the transition from medieval Christendom’s transnational hierarchies to territorially bounded états. However, Europe’s lack of longue durée civilisational continuity–in stark contrast to Iran’s unbroken 3,000-year imperial tradition or China’s dynastic records since the Shang (c. 1600 BCE)–precipitated a crisis of historical legitimacy following the Industrial Revolution. As Hodgson (1993: 97–125) observes, this “civilisational discontinuity” compelled European powers to fabricate pseudomorphic genealogies, most notably through the mythologisation of a fictitious ‘ancient Greece’.

 

This evolution responded directly to the epistemological crises engendered by Europe’s dual revolutions, industrial and political. As Hobsbawm (1992: 14-45) observes, the emergent bourgeois classes of post-Napoleonic Europe required historical narratives to legitimise their ascendancy within the new international order. The resultant invention of tradition, to use Hobsbawm’s formulation, manifested most conspicuously in the Hellenic appropriation movement.  Despite the historical reality that Classical Greece comprised over 130 autonomous poleis (city-states) with distinct dialects (Attic, Doric, Aeolic), political systems (Athenian democracy, Spartan diarchy), and religious practices (Delphic Amphictyony vs Eleusinian Mysteries), 19th-century European philhellenes constructed an idealised pan-Hellenic identity (Marchand, 1996: 3-35), as Europe’s “civilisational cradle.”

 

The modern Greek state, established in 1832 under Bavarian monarch Otto I, was an artificial amalgamation of Ottoman provinces (Peloponnese, Cyclades) and klephtic mountain communities, strategically rebranded as the heir to Periclean Athens (Kitromilides, 2013: 23–47). This geopolitical artifice included linguistic engineering through the replacement of Demotic Greek with Katharevousa, an artificial “purified” language mimicking Attic Greek (Mackridge, 2009: 157–189), and architectural erasure via neoclassical urban planning in Athens that overwrote Byzantine-Ottoman layers (Hamilakis, 2007: 83–112).

 

The Bavarian monarchy nevertheless falsely claimed continuity with Periclean Athens and ruled over a populace still self-identifying as Romaioi (Byzantine Romans) further underscored the absurdity of this imposed identity (Beaton, 2019: 214–247). Bernal’s (1987: 1–72) Black Athena thesis elucidates how 18th–19th-century scholars systematically erased Egypto-Levantine influences on Greek culture to fabricate an “Aryan” Hellenism–a scholarly forgery providing Europe with an autochthonous Urkultur rivalling Eastern civilisations.  This strategic essentialism served dual purposes: providing Europe with a civilisational urheimat while justifying colonial interventions under the guise of classical preservation (Hamilakis, 2007: 83-112).

 

The Romanticist conception of Volksgeist (Herder, 1784-1791/2002: 43-64)–the notion that each ethnic group possesses an immutable spiritual essence–became operationalised through state apparatuses following the 1848 revolutions, transforming post-Westphalian states into culturopolitical organisms. With language standardisation (e.g., France’s 1794 Abbé Grégoire Report suppressing regional patois) and invented historiographies (e.g., British Arthurian legends popularised by Tennyson) serving as ethnic boundary markers.

 

This institutionalisation of identity precipitated Balibar’s (1991: 86–109) “fictive ethnicity”, the paradoxical construction of nations as both primordial communities and modern political projects, manifesting in exclusionary legal frameworks such as Germany’s 1913 Reichs-und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (bloodline citizenship), France’s 1889 Loi sur la nationalité privileging European migrants over colonial subjects (Weil, 2008: 44–67), and the 1924 US Immigration Act’s racial quotas (Higham, 1955: 264–299).

 

These policies, rooted in the Romanticist ethnosovereignty principle, rendered modern nationalism synonymous with institutionalised racism, observable in every aspect of Western culture, from politics to literature, from visual art to popular media.

 

In politics, for instance, we witness xenophobic movements such as the Front National’s La préférence nationale (national preference) and the AfD’s völkisch populism, which represent modern iterations of the Romanticist ethnosovereignty principle, now amplified through digital ethnoscapes (Appadurai, 1996: 178–199).

 

Since the 19th century, Western literature has featured thousands of books and articles addressing Greek philosophy, art, literature, medicine, and related fields, the majority of which constitute nothing but falsification and exaggeration. This has led Western audiences to believe that civilisation originated with the Greeks and that modern Westerners, as their heirs, bear the responsibility to perpetuate and safeguard this legacy.

 

A further example lies in how modern cultural productions perpetuate the Hellenic mythos to reinforce Eurocentric exceptionalism. The 2006 film 300 (directed by Zack Snyder) epitomises this ideological endeavour through its Eurocentric binary portrayal of Xerxes I as a despotic “Other” juxtaposed against Leonidas’s “freedom-loving” Spartans, reviving Hegel’s (1837) dialectic of “European rationality” versus “Asiatic despotism”. Historical inaccuracies proliferate, including the misrepresentation of Sparta’s rigid agoge system as democratic rather than totalitarian (Finley, 1968: 144–166) and the depiction of Achaemenid Immortals as faceless hordes, contrary to Herodotus’ detailed accounts (Histories 7.83).

 

Such falsifications underscore the artificial construction of modern Greek statehood, exposing Europe’s fabricated historiography as a response to its perceived civilisational inferiority relative to Eastern polities.

 

In contrast to European nationalism’s exclusionary ethos, Iranian patriotism embodies three millennia of continuous civilisation. This patriotism embodies what might be termed ‘civilisational humanism’, a form of national pride emphasising shared values and symbiotic international relations. Adherents typically demonstrate:

1. Affection for national heritage without ethnic chauvinism;

2. Commitment to peaceful coexistence and multilateralism;

3. Receptivity to constructive criticism and societal improvement;

4. Respect for other nations’ sovereignty and cultural parity.

 

Thus, where Western nationalism frequently advocates zero-sum civilisational dominance, Iranian patriotism promotes non-exclusive cultural stewardship.

 

For instance, Cyrus the Great’s establishment of the ‘Empire of Hearts and Minds’ (Axworthy, 2008) stemmed from his demonstration of tolerance, freedom, and equality towards subjects of diverse colours, religions, and creeds, principles that were not only unprecedented in antiquity but remain unparalleled even today. Similarly, Darius the Great’s titular proclamation as “King of countries containing all kinds of men” (xšāyaθiya dahyūnām vispazanānām) reflects Achaemenid multiculturalism, while Safavid-era philosophical debates (e.g., Mulla Sadra’s transcendent theosophy) exemplify an intellectual dynamism absent in Eurocentric nationalism.

 

 

The Impact of European Nationalist Paradigms on Iranian Patriotic Identity

The infiltration of European reactionary nationalist ideologies into contemporary Iranian society, displacing indigenous forms of patriotism rooted in three millennia of civilisational continuity, represents a complex sociopolitical phenomenon inextricably linked to the Islamic regime’s post-1979 nation-building project.

 

This project has systematically pursued de-Iranianisation policies aimed at supplanting the concept of the melat (Iranian nation) with an Arab-centric Ummah (global Islamic community) through linguistic Arabisation, historical revisionism, and cultural erasure. Paradoxically, these policies have catalysed a resurgence of Iranian patriotism inflected by Eurocentric ethnonationalist frameworks, a dynamic mirroring 19th-century European patterns where Romanticist Volksgeist ideologies emerged as reactions to Napoleonic universalism (Smith, 1991: 72–99).

 

Historically, the Safavid dynasty (1501–1736) provides a critical counterpoint to the current regime’s antagonism toward Iran’s pre-Islamic heritage. Recognising the necessity of grounding Twelver Shi’ism within Iran’s civilisational matrix, Shah Ismail I and his successors consciously positioned themselves as inheritors of the Sasanian imperial tradition (Savory, 2007: 45–48). This synthesising project manifested through linguistic patronage, notably the adoption of Persian as the court language in administrative and literary contexts; architectural continuity, incorporating pre-Islamic motifs like ayvāns and chahār-tāq structures into Safavid mosques and palaces; and historiographical legitimation, exemplified by the Tārīkh-i ʿĀlam-ārā-yi ʿAbbāsī, which framed Safavid sovereignty as the culmination of Iranian kingship. Such strategic accommodation enabled Shi’ism to become “Iranianised”, ensuring its survival as a majority faith without severing ties to Iran’s ancient past, a lesson disregarded by the current regime.

 

In contrast, the Islamic regime’s cultural policies constitute what Hobsbawm (1983: 1–14) terms “invented discontinuity”, systematically dismantling markers of Iranian identity. Linguistic Arabisation has involved the mandatory replacement of Persian lexemes with Arabic equivalents in state media and education[1], and the suppression of Nowruz celebrations through fatwas denouncing it as “pagan.” Historiographical revisionism is evident in state-sanctioned textbooks that minimise pre-Islamic history, reducing Cyrus the Great’s legacy to footnotes, and in official discourses recasting archaeological sites like Persepolis as symbols of “tyrannical monarchy.” Sociocultural repression includes banning Zoroastrian cultural associations under Article 13 of the Constitution and criminalising pre-Islamic-inspired art under “propagation of pagan culture” laws.

 

These policies have precipitated what Anderson (2006: 24–27) identifies as “reactionary cultural nationalism”, manifested through a patriotic reawakening marked by underground Zoroastrian study circles among youth. Concurrently, far-right co-option has emerged, advocating ethnic purification of the Iranian nation from foreign elements (anIrani, derived from the Achaemenid term anarya- meaning Non-Aryan/Non-Iranian).

 

However, the Safavid and Islamic regime’s approaches to nation-building contrast sharply: where the Safavids synthesised religious identity with Iranian culture, the current regime supplants Iranian identity in favour of an alien Arabic-derived identity; where Safavid linguistic policy championed Persian and commissioned the execution of one of the most opulent Shahnameh manuscripts (the Tāmasbī Shāhnāmeh), the Islamic regime enforces Arabisation and abhors Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh; where Safavid historiography emphasised continuity with the pre-Islamic past, the current regime imposes discontinuity; and where Safavids engaged youth through artistic patronage (e.g., Reza Abbasi’s miniatures), the Islamic regime criminalises heritage activism. This dialectic, state-enforced de-Iranianisation breeding ethnonationalist backlash, underscores the cyclical nature of nationalist ideologies, wherein attempts to erase cultural memory inadvertently fuel its reification through oppositional frameworks, whether 16th-century Safavid Persia or 21st-century Iran.

 

The Safavids’ political acumen lay in synthesising Islam with Iran’s civilisational soul, a strategy that preserved both. The Islamic regime’s ideological idiocy, erasing that soul to impose an alien creed, has all but guaranteed Islam’s demise. When this regime collapses, Iranian cultural identity will endure; only the regime’s suicidal fanaticism and its bastardised Islam will perish.

 

Notwithstanding this distinction, the aforementioned Eurocentric Aryanism distortion persists within modern Iranian society. The question arises: why do Iranians call themselves Aryan? This stems from the deliberate revival of the term Aryan (āryā) in Iranian nomenclature during the Pahlavi era (1925–1979), a state-driven policy aimed at resuscitating the Iranian national identity from beneath what was perceived as the suffocating ashes of clerical-imposed backwardness and superstition. This period coincided with the broader geopolitical exploitation termed the Great Game (Hopkirk, 1990: 45–67), during which British and Russian powers systematically dismembered Iran’s historic territories. Within a century, half of Iran’s domains were severed, including the modern Central Asian states (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan); Caucasus regions (Georgia, Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan); southeastern territories (Pakistani Baluchistan); western lands (Iraqi Kurdistan and Basra); and southern Persian Gulf territories (Bahrain, Oman, and coastal regions of Saudi Arabia). The Pahlavi policy of national revival, in fact, represented the culmination, or, more precisely, the completion, of the ideological project initiated by the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1906–1911, which sought to reconcile Iran’s ancient heritage with modern statehood.

 

However, the Pahlavi era also witnessed a surge of Iranian scholars with patriotic leanings, who emerged as key actors in reconstructing the national narrative. Figures such as Ebrahim Pourdavood and Sadeq Hedayat spearheaded efforts to translate and reinterpret critical texts related to Iran’s pre-Islamic heritage, with Zoroastrianism positioned at the heart of this cultural renaissance (Stausberg, 2008: 203–207). Concurrently, under Reza Shah the Great kingship (1925–1941), the Zoroastrian community, which had faced centuries of marginalisation, suppression, and episodic persecution under Islamic rule, experienced unprecedented rehabilitation. Zoroastrians regained prominence in public life, with figures like Senator Kaykhosrow Shahrokh appointed as parliamentary representatives and advisors to the imperial crown (Boyce, 2001: 331–335). This revival of Zoroastrian influence dovetailed with the scholarly rediscovery of Achaemenid royal inscriptions, such as the Behistun reliefs, which reinvigorated academic and public interest in the term Aryan (ariya-) as used in Old Persian texts (Schmitt, 1991: 21–25).

 

Regrettably, this revival coincided with the global propagation of Nazis in Germany and its racial ideologies, which falsely appropriated the term Aryan to construct a pseudoscientific hierarchy of European racial supremacy (Poliakov, 1974: 213–219). The misinterpretation of Achaemenid epigraphic evidence, particularly Darius the Great’s Naqsh-e Rostam inscription (DNa), where he declares, “Adam Dārayavauš… Ariya, Ariya-ciça” (“I am Darius… an Aryan, of Aryan lineage”), became entangled with these Eurocentric distortions. While the Old Persian ariya- explicitly denoted Zoroastrian religious affiliation, forming a binary with anarya- (non-Zoroastrian “demon-worshippers”), some Nazi-aligned pseudo-scholars recast it as a racial category (Herzfeld, 1937: 70–73).

 

This confluence of intellectual currents created an illusory “aurora of Arianism” in Iran, erroneously conflating linguistic, religious, and cultural identity with racial essentialism, a distortion that continues to haunt Iranian identity politics to this date.

 

 

‘Aryans’, the People of Prophet Zoroaster

Contrary to the widespread misconception that “Aryan” denotes a race, a fallacy perpetuated by the racist propaganda of 18th- and 19th-century European ideologues (addressed above), the term, meaning ‘noble’, originally referred to an Avestan ethnic group (Bailey, CAIS, 1987), belonging to the Eastern Iranian branch, that contrasted with other ethnic groups (Tūirya, Sairim, Dāha, Sāinu or Sāini) and with the outer world of the an-airya (non-Aryan) (Ibid). The great Iranian prophet Ašo Zaraθuštra (Zoroaster), who lived around the eighteenth century BCE (Basirov, CAIS, 2000), emerged from this ethnic group, which inhabited Airyanəm Vaēǰah (Land of the Aryans), where he received the religion from the Creator, Ahura Mazdā.

 

While the precise location of Avestan Ayryanəm Vaēǰah (Parthian Aryānwēžan, Middle Persian Ērān-wēz) remains uncertain and continues to provoke scholarly debate among Iranologists and Zoroastrian studies experts, linguistic evidence confirms its position within “the Eastern Iranian steppes of ancient Sogdiana, Chorasmia, and Bactria and the adjacent area to the north of them (between the lower Volga and Kazakhstan) as the original habitat of the nomadic Proto-Aryans” (Schmitt, Iranica, Aryans). Accepting this theory as factual allows for a plausible hypothesis regarding the Turanians. In Zoroastrian sacred texts, the Turanians are portrayed as adversaries of the Aryans (Iranians), despite their familial connection as cousins. They are described as inhabiting regions adjacent to the Aryan homeland. This description aligns with the characteristics of the Tocharians, who also spoke an Eastern Iranian language and resided in what is now recognised as the Tarim Basin (situated in present-day Xinjiang, China).

 

However, the Vendidad (or Videvdat) identifies Ayryanəm Vaēǰah as the first of sixteen territories created by Ahura Mazda (Hutter, Iranica, 2009 and Razi, 1967: 99). Notably, though the Vendidad is now classified among Zoroastrian sacred texts, linguists universally concur that its origins predate Prophet Zoroaster and that it was initially a non-Zoroastrian work. The Vendidad describes Ayryanəm Vaēǰah as a frigid region enduring ten months of winter and two months of summer. Consequently, Iranologists such as Marquart have posited Khwarazm, south of the Aral Sea, as the probable site of Ayryanəm Vaēǰah , a theory gaining increasing scholarly traction and likely accurate (Razi, 1967: 102). This hypothesis is further reinforced by the Parthian-era Iranian designation of Khwarazm as Ariana Vaejah, revered as a sacred land and the birthplace of Prophet Zoroaster. The Parthians’ emphasis on this nomenclature alone substantiates Marquart’s thesis notablely.

 

Nevertheless, the precise chronology of the Zoroastrian religion’s dissemination across the central and western Iranian plateau remains uncertain, though it undoubtedly unfolded incrementally prior to its semi-official adoption as a state religion under the Achaemenid King of Kings (Boyce, 1975: 34–37). A persistent scholarly question centres on when Western Iranians adopted Zoroastrianism.

 

Proponents of the Iranian mass migration hypothesis, notably Roman Ghirshman (1977: 89–94), argue that Western Iranians (Medes and Persians) migrated en masse from the eastern steppes to the western and central Iranian Plateau during the late second millennium BCE (circa 1000–1100 BCE). However, this hypothesis remains unsupported by contemporaneous documentary or archaeological evidence. Current scholarship, drawing on interdisciplinary studies, increasingly emphasises the long-term indigeneity of Iranian populations across the plateau’s western, central, and eastern regions (Pourshariati, 2008: 12–15; Quintana-Murci et al., 2004: 827–830).

 

Advances in archaeogenetics, particularly analyses of mitochondrial DNA and Y-chromosomal haplogroups, have reinforced arguments for Iranian autochthony. For example, genome-wide studies demonstrate that modern Iranian populations retain ancestral genetic components dating to the Early Neolithic period (circa 8000–6000 BCE), with minimal contribution from Bronze Age steppe populations (Lazaridis et al., 2016: 214–218; Broushaki et al., 2016: 4–7). This challenges earlier models positing large-scale Bronze Age migrations into Iran.

 

Nevertheless, genetic research has clarified that deeper ancestral connections between Iranian, Indian, and European populations extend to prehistoric migrations predating the 3rd millennium BCE. Shared genetic ancestry among these groups traces to at least 45,000 years ago, when a Basal Eurasian lineage diverged from other non-African populations (Lazaridis et al., 2016: 214). A second critical component, Ancient North Eurasian (ANE) ancestry (present in Iranian, European, and South Asian gene pools), is attested by the 24,000-year-old Mal’ta boy fossil from Siberia (Raghavan et al., 2014: 89–91). During the Last Glacial Maximum (26,500–19,000 BCE), population fragmentation in refugia (e.g., the Iranian Plateau and South Caucasus) fostered genetic differentiation. Post-glacial expansions (from 15,000 BCE onwards) and Neolithic demographic transitions (10,000–4000 BCE) subsequently facilitated admixture between these groups (Lazaridis et al., 2016: 214–216; Fernández et al., 2014: 3–5).

 

Bronze Age migrations (3300–1200 BCE), including movements associated with Indo-Iranian linguistic dispersals, further shaped regional genetic profiles. Y-haplogroups such as R1a1-M417 (linked to pastoralist expansions) and J2-M172 (associated with early agriculturalists) occur at varying frequencies across Iranian, Indian, and European populations (Underhill et al., 2015: 125–128; Poznik et al., 2016: 4–6). Autosomal DNA analyses reveal a genetic cline from Europe to South Asia, with northern Indian populations exhibiting closer affinities to Iranians and Central Asians than to southern Indians (Reich et al., 2009: 489–492). These patterns reflect millennia of bidirectional migration, isolation, and cultural exchange rather than unilateral population replacements.

 

Consequently, the migration of the Indic branch of Indo-Iranian speakers into the Indian subcontinent likely represents a protracted process beginning by 3300 BCE, rather than a discrete 2nd-millennium BCE event. This supports arguments for the deep-rooted continuity of both Iranian and Indian populations, with shared linguistic and ritual traditions (e.g., Old Avestan and Vedic parallels) emerging through sustained contact between neighbouring communities. As Pierre Briant (2001: 130–131) notes:

'The oldest part of the Avesta... is linguistically and culturally very close to the material preserved in the Rigveda... There seems to be economic and religious interaction and perhaps rivalry operating here, which justifies scholars in placing the Vedic and Avestan worlds in close chronological, geographical and cultural proximity to each other, not far removed from a joint Indo-Iranian period.'

 

 

The Concept of ‘Aryan’ in Achaemenid Ideology and the Starting Point of the ‘Iranian National Identity’

The term Aryan (ariya-) is attested in multiple Achaemenid epigraphic sources, collectively termed the Royal Inscriptions, most notably the Naqš-e Rostam inscription (DNa [2]). In this text, Darius the Great proclaims:

“Adam Dārayavauš xšāyaθiya vazraka, xšāyaθiya xšāyaθiyānām, xšāyaθiya dahyūnām vispazanānām, xšāyaθiya ahyāyā bu- miyā vazrakāyā dūraiy apiy, Vištāspahyā puça, Haxāmanišiya, Pārsa, Pārsahyā puça, Ariya, Ariya-ciça.”

[Translation: “I am Darius the Great King, King of Kings, King of all inhabited lands, King of this vast earth, son of Hystaspes, an Achaemenid, a Persian, son of a Persian, an Aryan, of Aryan lineage.”]

 

Contemporary racial essentialists erroneously interpret this declaration as proto-nationalist ethnic exceptionalism. However, the Old Persian term ariya- denotes Zoroastrian religious affiliation rather than racial categorisation, forming a binary opposition with anarya- (non-Zoroastrians) who engage in daivā- (demonic or idolatrous) worship (Boyce, 1982: 45–48).

 

In other words, Darius the Great’s assertion of being an Aryan of Aryan lineage constitutes a declaration of adherence to Zoroastrian religion (Daēnā Vanuhi, New Persian Behdin, meaning the ‘Good Religion’–Suren-Pahlav, CAIS, 2000) and ancestral fidelity to its tenets. This interpretation is corroborated by inscription at Naqš-e Rostam (DNa) uses ariya- as a Zoroastrian religious marker, as well as in Behistun (Elamite section 62), where Darius the Great declares 'Ahuramazdā, God of the Aryans,' as well as the XPh inscription where Xerxes I, reiterates his Aryan lineage and elaborates on its theological significance:

“Baga vazrka uramazdā, haya imām būmīm adā, haya avam asmānam adā, haya martiyam adā, haya šiyātim adā martiyahyā, haya Xšayaršām xšāyaθiyam akunauš, aivam parūnām xšāyaθiyam, aivam parūnām framātāram.'

[Translation: “The great god is Ahuramazda, who created this earth, who created yonder heaven, who created humankind, who created blissful happiness for humankind, who made Xerxes king, one king of many, one master of many.”]

 

In the seventh line, Xerxes clarifies:

“mām uramazdā pātu hacā gastā utamai viθam utā imam dahyāvam.”

(Translation: “May Ahuramazda protect me from daivā [evil, false gods, or, according to Herzfeld (1937: 70ff), idols], and my palace and this land.”)

 

Scholarly debate surrounds the term daivā. Kent (1953: 214–215) interprets it narrowly as foreign religions, while Herzfeld (1937: 70ff) argues that the XPh inscription reflects religious tensions under Darius and Xerxes, likely instigated by Median Magi, the priestly class whose authority was undermined by the imposition of a reformed Zoroastrianism. This state-sanctioned orthodoxy rejected syncretic practices, such as animal sacrifices influenced by Babylonian and Assyrian traditions, which contravened Zarathustra’s teachings (Gnoli, 1989: 76–79; Briant, 2002: 503–506). The Achaemenid promotion of ariya- identity thus served dual purposes: consolidating imperial religious unity and distinguishing Iranian spiritual praxis from neighbouring Semitic cults.

 

Therefore, interpreting ariya- as a racial designation constitutes a mistransliteration, to which some pseudo-historians are party. This sacerdotal dichotomy fundamentally differs from modern racial taxonomies, underscoring Iranian identity’s traditional emphasis on spiritual rather than biological criteria (Boyce, 1982: 51–53).

 

Yet, it is reasonable to posit the theory that it was during the Achaemenid dynasty that a ‘national consciousness’ among the Iranian nation crystallised, laying the foundations for what would become the ‘Iranian identity’. Consequently, when the Achaemenids referred to themselves as Aryan (ariya-), they were, in fact, articulating their identity as Zoroastrians, where being Aryan equated to adherence to Zoroastrian religion (Gnoli, 1989: 82–85; Shahbazi, 2005: 39–41).

 

This may also signify an effort to link the Achaemenid dynasty’s origins to Zoroaster’s ethnicity, a strategy paralleled in other historical contexts. For instance, as mentioned above, the Bavarian monarchs of 19th-century Greece fabricated genealogical ties to ancient Athens, while modern European nationalists constructed fictive lineages to Greco-Roman antiquity despite their forebears being classified as barbaroi (barbarians) in classical sources (Poliakov, 1974: 213–219). Similarly, Iranian sayyids (clerics with black turbans) claim descent from the Ahl al-Bayt (Muhammad’s household), despite many tracing their Arab ancestry to families relocated from southern Lebanon during Safavid dynasty (Abisaab, 2004: 89–93). It is thus plausible that Darius sought to sacralise his sovereignty by associating his lineage with Prophet Zoroaster (Shahbazi, 2005: 33–37).

 

To substantiate this theory, one may refer to Old Persian cuneiform inscriptions in which the Achaemenids designated their script as ‘Aryan’ (DB4.89; Schmitt, 1991: 21–25). Notably, the language of Zoroastrian sacred texts, namely Avestan, a distinct eastern Iranian language, contrasts with Old Persian, which belongs to the western Iranian branch (Skjærvø, 2009: 43–47). In other words, by naming his newly created Old Persian script as Aryan, Darius the Great not only emphasised its role as a script crafted for his Zoroastrian nation but also framed it as a symbolic link to the Prophet Zoroaster and divine authority.

 

It is therefore plausible to assume that the Achaemenids, like later Iranian dynasties (e.g., the Parthians and Sasanians, who translated Avestan texts into Pahlavi and Middle Persian), also translated the sacred texts into Old Persian. Given that Avestan, particularly Old or Gathic Avestan, the language of the Gāθās (meaning hymns, modes and metres), posed notable linguistic challenges, these translations likely facilitated broader accessibility (Cantera, 2015: 112–116).

 

This national phenomenon not only persisted through the Parthian (247 BCE–224 CE) and Sasanian (224–651 CE) eras but also flourished, giving birth to the term Ērānšahr (Land of the Aryans/Iranians) as a geopolitical and cultural construct. Within this framework, Aryan (ariya-) became etymologically and ideologically synonymous with Iran.

 

Before proceeding further, it is essential to address a critical matter: the transmission of the Avesta from its origins to the Achaemenid Empire and subsequently to the later Iranian dynastic empires, namely the Parthian and Sasanian.

 

 

The Avesta: Oral Tradition versus Written Codification

Scholars adamantly contest that a written version of the Avesta existed during the Achaemenid era, insisting instead that these sacred texts were transmitted solely through oral tradition. Yet, a persistent argument posits that the Avesta existed as a corpus during this period, given its literary magnitude, of which only a quarter survives today.

 

While modern Western academia has categorically dismissed this claim and insists that the Avesta, prior to being committed to writing during the Sasanian era, was transmitted purely orally, such dismissal arguably stems not from empirical evidence or reasoned analysis but from inherent bias and Eurocentric historiographical revisionism. Critically, the sheer scale of the surviving Avestan corpus, even fragmentary, poses insurmountable challenges to the plausibility of purely oral transmission over two millennia. Comparative studies of oral traditions, such as the Homeric epics or the Vedas, demonstrate that even meticulously preserved texts rarely exceed 20,000–30,000 words without notable alteration or loss (Lord 1960: 124–128; Ong 1982: 60–65). By contrast, the Avesta, as described in the Denkard, purportedly encompassed 21 nasks (divisions) covering theology, law, and cosmology, a corpus far exceeding the mnemonic capacity of oral cultures, even with priestly specialization. Linguistic analysis further reveals that the Old Avestan Gāthās, composed in a archaic dialect distinct from Younger Avestan, would have required extraordinary fidelity to avoid phonetic and semantic drift over centuries (Hintze 2009: 15–19; Cantera 2015: 77–83). The preservation of such linguistic precision, alongside intricate liturgical formulae, strongly implies the use of written aids long before the Sasanian period.

 

Proponents of this dismissal contend that the term ‘Avesta’ is absent from Achaemenid inscriptions and that no contemporaneous written scriptural texts are attested archaeologically. They assert that a text of such scale would logically have been cited in imperial inscriptions or Greek historical accounts. Furthermore, they attribute the codification of the Avesta to later Zoroastrian tradition, specifically Middle Persian texts compiled centuries after the Achaemenid period (Kellens 1998: 34–37). Paradoxically, these scholars exhibit selective scepticism: for instance, Herodotus, writing a century after the Achaemenids, claims that Xerxes I’s invasion force against the Greek city-states exceeded 1,000,000 troops. While some Western academics question the numerical accuracy, the invasion itself is never dismissed (Briant 2002: 523–528; Kuhrt 2007: 238–240), despite the absence of corroborating Achaemenid inscriptions or archaeological evidence. Consequently, the mere absence of written documentation cannot justify definitively rejecting the Avesta’s existence during this period.

 

Later Zoroastrian traditions attribute the loss of the Avestan codex to the destruction of Persian imperial archives by Alexander III of Macedon, a figure lauded as “the Great” [3] exclusively within European historiography. The Denkard (Book 3, Chapters 419–421), Bundahishn (Chapter 33.12), and Zand-i Wahman Yasn describe the Avesta as inscribed on 12,000 cowhides in gold ink. While the quantity may be hyperbolic, the core assertion cannot be wholly disregarded: non-Iranian sources confirm the existence, and subsequent destruction, of Achaemenid archives under Alexander (Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca Historica 17.70.1–3; Plutarch, Life of Alexander 37.5; Strabo, Geographica 15.3.18). Some scholars speculate that these texts were translated into Greek and later subsumed into Hellenic intellectual traditions, obscuring their Iranian origins (Wiesehöfer 1996: 108–112; Stoneman 2015: 45–49).

 

The first group of evidence confirming the existence of an Achaemenid depository includes accounts by Ctesias of Cnidus (c. 400 BCE), a physician at the Achaemenid court, who references “royal records” in his Persica; Xenophon’s Cyropaedia (4th century BCE) details Persian administrative reliance on “written documents”; Aristotle (4th century BCE) praises Persian bureaucratic efficiency, noting “written reports” dispatched from satrapies to the imperial centre; Herodotus (Histories 1.131) alludes to royal scribes maintaining administrative archives; Diodorus Siculus (1st century BCE) records the incineration of Persian palace archives by Alexander (Bibliotheca Historica 17.70.1–3); and Josephus (Antiquities of the Jews 11.1–3, 1st century CE) cites Persian kings’ preservation of decrees, notably Cyrus the Great’s edict permitting Jewish repatriation to Jerusalem (Ezra 1:1–4).

 

The second group comprises Aramaic administrative documents from Achaemenid Bactria and Elephantine (Egypt), which further attest to a sophisticated imperial writing culture. Biblical texts, such as Ezra 6:1–2, reference a “royal archive in Ecbatana” storing Cyrus’ decree on the Jerusalem Temple. The Persepolis Fortification Tablets, over 20,000 clay administrative records, underscore the likelihood of a centralised imperial repository, which may have housed religious texts like the Avesta. If composed on perishable media such as papyrus or parchment, materials highly vulnerable to environmental decay, deliberate destruction, or displacement, such texts would have been irretrievably lost (Brosius 2003: 122–125; Henkelman 2008: 65–68).

 

The Achaemenids’ creation of Old Persian cuneiform, and their designation of it as ‘Aryan’ (Kent, 1953: 15–18; Boyce, 1982: 67–69), further underscores this intentional cultural synthesis: a script devised by Aryans (Zoroastrians) for Aryans (Zoroastrians). It is plausible that a corpus was also compiled by the Achaemenids under this designation. Alternatively, there may have been an Avestan corpus, composed in an undeciphered script, that was similarly termed ‘Aryan’. The Achaemenids might have inherited this corpus, which was subsequently destroyed during the conquests of Alexander III. This scenario could explain why the Achaemenids also referred to the new Old Persian script as ‘Aryan’, aligning it linguistically and culturally with the pre-existing tradition.

 

To illustrate the antiquity of Zoroastrian textual traditions, the oldest surviving Zoroastrian scripture discovered to date is a prayer fragment (Ashem vohu). This fragment was uncovered by Aurel Stein in 1907 within the Mogao Caves of China and has been dated to the 9th century CE (Stein, 1921: vol. 2, 844). Intriguingly, while the text is inscribed in Sogdian (a Middle Iranian language), the liturgical language of the prayer itself is neither Sogdian nor standard Avestan. Instead, it is rendered in a notablely older Iranian dialect, potentially representing an archaic precursor to Avestan (Grenet, 2006: 243–247).

 

 

The Concept of ‘Aryan’ in Parthian era and Its Legacy

The Parthian Arsacid dynasty (247 BCE–224 CE), inheritors of the Achaemenid ideological legacy, recontextualised the concept of Aryan (ariya-) within a dual framework of political sovereignty and religious continuity.  While the Achaemenids had anchored ariya- identity in Zoroastrian affiliation, the Parthians expanded its scope to encompass a pan-Iranian geopolitical consciousness.  This adaptation fostered unity among the empire’s ethnically and culturally diverse populace under a broad Iranian cultural identity, deliberately avoiding rigid religious exclusivity (Pourshariati 2008: 45–47; Boyce 1984: 65–68).

 

Critically, the Parthians’ syncretic approach, blending Zoroastrian cosmology with localised cultic practices, allowed Aryan identity to adapt to their heterogeneous empire. Numismatic evidence, such as drachms minted under Mithradates II, the Great (124–88 BCE), depicts the sovereign adorned with Zoroastrian symbols (fire altars, farr divine glory), visually reinforcing the Arsacids’ dual role as Aryan King of Kings and custodians of Iranian spirituality (Sellwood, 1980: 45–49; Sarkhosh Curtis, 2016: 102–105). This ideological flexibility ensured the persistence of Aryan as a unifying construct even as the empire assimilated some Hellenistic, and Mesopotamian influences.

 

Concerning the explicit usage of ariya- (Aryan) during the Arsacid period, extant evidence remains limited. Despite ruling over Greater Iran for nearly five centuries, Parthian material culture, particularly textual sources, is disproportionately sparse. Scholarly consensus attributes this lacuna to two principal factors: first, the Arsacids’ reliance on oral traditions for the transmission of historical and cultural narratives (Boyce 2000: 71–73); second, the systematic erasure or suppression of Parthian heritage by the succeeding Sasanian dynasty (224–651 CE), which dismissed the Arsacids as religiously heterodox and politically illegitimate (Pourshariati 2008: 33–35). Nevertheless, this scarcity of evidence does not negate the continuity of the ariya- concept or its associated territorial ideology, specifically, the notion of a “land of Aryans” (i.e., the Land of Zoroastrians), from the Achaemenid through the Parthian era. Scholars such as J. Neusner (Iranica Antiqua 3, 1963: 40-59) and Wolski (1985: 127–131) conclude that the Arsacids maintained a political ideology centred on Iran as a national concept.

 

Here’s the text corrected for spelling and grammar in modern academic British English, retaining all details, formatting, technical terms, and citations:

 

Crucially, the concept of Ērānšahr (New Persian ‘Irānshahr’, the Land of Aryans/Iranians) as a cohesive Iranian polity cannot be regarded as a Sasanian innovation, nor can it be interpreted as a direct revival of Achaemenid ariya- ideology after a five-century hiatus. Instead, its conceptual lineage must be traced through intermediary cultural and literary channels, most notably the Arsacids.

 

Evidence for this assertion is first evidenced in Shapur I’s trilingual inscription at the Kaʿba-ye Zardošt (ŠKZ) at Naqsh-e Rostam. The Parthian-language section of the inscription renders the name of Iran as ’ry’n (aryān), distinct from the Middle Persian transliteration ʾyrʾn (ērān):

“. . . šāhān šāh Ērān, kē čihr až yazdān, puhrēpuhr baγ Pābag šāh, Ērānšahr xwadāy ahēm.”

[Translation: “. . . king of kings of Iran, who is of the lineage of the Yazata, grandson of [His] Majesty king Pābag, [I] am lord of Ērānšahr.”]

 

Similarly, the phrase “ʾryʾn W ʾnʾryʾn” (aryān ut anaryān), in Parthian is rendered in Middle Persian as “ʾyrʾn W ʾnyrʾn” (ērān ud anērān), meaning “Iran and non-Iranian.” On the same inscription, the equivalent term for Sasanian Ērānšahr in the Parthian version is written as ʾryʾn ḥštr (Aryān Šatr).

 

Notably, the Parthian version of the ŠKZ inscription is the only trilingual variant bearing a scribal signature: 'This is the writing by my hand, Hormizd, the scribe, son of Shirak, the scribe.' This confirms that the term “Iran” (’ry’n) existed in the Parthian lexicon. Furthermore, Hormizd, the scribe, was likely of Parthian origin or a Persian proficient in Parthian, given the administrative bilingualism of the era.

 

Secondly, the is Shāhnāmeh (Book of Kings), wherein the term Iran features over 800 times. Ferdowsi’s epic, composed in the early 11th century CE, derived its foundational narratives from the pre-Islamic Khwadāy-Nāmag (Book of Lords/Kings). While some scholars have posited the Khwadāy-Nāmag as a strictly Sasanian text, its absence of overt Zoroastrian doctrinal framing (in contrast to Sasanian royal inscriptions) and its emphasis on regional heroic figures, such as Rostam of Sistan, indicate older, pre-Sasanian origins (Yarshater 1983: 409–412; Pourshariati 2008: 48–50). This underscores the text’s roots in Parthian oral and historiographical traditions, which remained sufficiently entrenched within Iranian collective memory to resist complete eradication or appropriation by the Sasanians.

 

To understand this, it is necessary to examine the nature of the Khwadāy-Nāmag.

 

 

Khwadāy-Nāmag, a Sasanian Book of Parthian Origin

The assertion that the Khwadāy-Nāmag (Book of Lords/Kings) originated within a Parthian cultural milieu, rather than being an exclusively Sasanian creation, is supported by evidence highlighting continuities between Arsacid oral traditions and later textual compilations. Central to this argument is the role of Parthian oral performers, the gōsān, who preserved heroic and royal narratives through recitation, a practice extensively documented by Mary Boyce (1957: 10–15). These itinerant minstrels maintained regional tales celebrating figures such as Rostam, whose legendary association with Sistan, a historical stronghold of the Parthian Suren clan, suggests deep-rooted Arsacid narrative traditions. The Suren clan, instrumental in Parthian military and political dominance (e.g., their leadership at the 53 BCE Battle of Carrhae), likely cultivated these stories during the Arsacid period, later integrating them into the Khwadāy-Nāmag. Scholarly consensus, from Theodor Nöldeke’s 19th-century analyses to modern reassessments by M. Rahim Shayegan (2011: 112–118), increasingly acknowledges the Khwadāy-Nāmag as a Sasanian-era codification of Parthian oral traditions, repurposed for political unity but rooted in Arsacid narrative practices.

 

Linguistic traces further support this synthesis: Middle Persian texts derived from the Khwadāy-Nāmag retain Parthian loanwords (e.g., āzād, “free, noble”) and reflect an epic structure distinct from Sasanian religious or bureaucratic compositions. The cyclical focus on pre-Sasanian kingship, particularly the mythical Kayanian dynasty, aligns with Arsacid-era themes, as noted by Ehsan Yarshater (1983: 420–423), who posited that Sasanian redactors reframed Parthian oral accounts to legitimise their sovereignty while retaining their core heroic ethos. Corroborating this, external sources such as Plutarch’s accounts of Parthian heroics (Life of Crassus) and Armenian chronicles (e.g., Moses of Chorene’s History of Armenia) reference narrative motifs paralleling those in the Khwadāy-Nāmag, implying a shared Arsacid-era cultural substrate. As previously mentioned, while the Sasanian imperial court undoubtedly systematised these kingly and heroic stories, the absence of overtly Zoroastrian doctrinal framing, contrasting with other Sasanian texts, and the prominence of regionally specific heroes point to an older, pre-Sasanian origin. Another plausible conclusion is that Parvaneh Pourshariati’s (2008: 104–107) assertion, that the Sasanian Empire was a confederation of the House of Sasan and Parthian noble families, notably the Surens, explains why these narratives were not omitted from the Sasanian Khwadāy-Nāmag. In this theoretical framework, it follows that the original Parthian Khwadāy-Nāmag likely constituted a larger corpus, parts of which the Sasanians censored or refashioned. Regrettably, due to the passage of time and the socio-political upheavals following the fall of Sasanian Iran to Arab Muslims, these pre-Sasanian traditions were gradually marginalised and forgotten.

 

 

From Aryan to Iran: The Concept of ‘Aryan’ in Sasanian Ideology

The Sasanian dynasty (224–651 CE) later radicalised this Aryan than now in the Middle Persian become Ērān legacy, transforming it into a sacralised imperial doctrine. Ardashir I (224–242 CE), founder of the Sasanian Empire, explicitly claimed descent from the Achaemenids and revived the title šāhān šāh ī ērān (“King of Kings of Iran”), formalising Ērānšahr (Land of the Aryans) as a territorial and theological mandate (Frye, 1984: 287–291). The term formally codified under Shapur I (240–270 CE), institutionalised the Achaemenid-Parthian ariya- ethos as a territorial and theological mandate. The Kaʿba-ye Zardošt inscription (ŠKZ) declares “ērānšahr xwadāy hēm” (“I am the lord of Ērānšahr”), while simultaneously anathematising anērān (non-Aryan/Iranian/Zoroastrian) realm like Rome and the Kushans (Gignoux, 1991: 65–68; Huyse, 1999: 35–39). This binary, ērān (Aryan/Iranian) versus anērān, operated not merely as geopolitical taxonomy but as an eschatological divide, positioning Sasanian kingship as the bulwark of cosmic order (aša) against chaos (druj).

 

Perhaps, underpinning this ideology was the Sasanian priesthood’s systematic revision of Zoroastrian texts, including the translation of Avestan scriptures into Middle Persian (zand), ensuring doctrinal accessibility while preserving Aryan linguistic purity (Cantera, 2015: 112–116). Kartir, the influential mobed under Bahram II (276–293 CE), explicitly linked orthographic reform to spiritual warfare, purging “demonic” (dēwīg) scripts and practices from Ērānšahr (Skjærvø, 2011: 313–317). Thus, by the empire’s fall in 651 CE, Aryan identity had ossified into a hegemonic narrative that survived the Arab conquests, resurfacing in Abbasid-era Iranian revivalist movements like the Shuʿubiyya (Savant, 2013: 88–92).

 

Therefore, the Parthian-Sasanian evolution of Aryan ideology thus represents a millennium-long project of cultural synthesis, transforming a Zoroastrian religious marker into the bedrock of Iranian nationhood. Contemporary Iranologists and linguists specialising in ancient Iranian languages, including Gerardo Gnoli, Harold Bailey, Rüdiger Schmitt, and Neil MacKenzie, unanimously affirm that the modern term “Iran” ultimately derives from the Avestan Airyanəm (or Arya), a concept enshrined in Zoroastrian cosmogony as the airyanəm vaejah (‘Land of the Aryans’) (Gnoli, 1989: 44–47; Schmitt, 2000: 112–115; MacKenzie, 1998: 55–58).

 

This terminological continuity was catalysed by the adoption of Zoroastrianism by western Iranian tribes (Persians and Medes), who institutionalised its theological and ethnolinguistic frameworks during the Achaemenid era (Boyce, 1975: 34–37; Pourshariati, 2008: 72–75). The Sasanian period (224–651 CE) further codified this synthesis, reimagining Aryan identity as a fusion of dynastic legitimacy, territorial sovereignty, and religious orthodoxy, while preserving the Avestan lexicon within Middle Persian inscriptions and Zoroastrian liturgical texts (Gnoli, 1989: 76–79; Boyce, 1982: 45–48). Crucially, this process underscores the interplay between eastern Iranian religious traditions, rooted in the Gāθās, and western Iranian political hegemony, which collectively forged an enduring ‘Iranian’ consciousness transcending regional and dialectal divides.

 

However, the transmutation of the term Aryan, from an Iranian marker of virtue and piety into a doctrine of racial supremacy by Europeans must be scrutinised.  Before that needs to examine why Indians like Europeans claim to be Aryans too?

 

 

The Term “Aryan” in Indian Culture

Since the early 20th century, Western academia has asserted that ‘Aryan’ served as the ‘self-designation’ of peoples in ancient Iran and India who spoke Aryan languages (Schmitt, Encyclopaedia Iranica, 1987). Although such an assertion is unsubstantiated, erroneous, and devoid of historical merit, it gave birth to the term ‘Indo-Aryan’. This resultant term was formulated to differentiate Indo-European languages from non-IE languages spoken in the Indian subcontinent. This inadvertently facilitated the term’s acquisition of racial connotations, paralleling the erroneous European practice of self-identifying as ‘Aryan’, a key factor in Indians later adopting the term.

 

The second justification for Indians associating themselves with Aryan arises from the presence of the word ārya in the Rigveda (Ṛgvedasaṃhitā) and later Buddhist texts.

 

The Rigveda, regarded as the oldest Sanskrit text (composed in Vedic Sanskrit), is dated to the mid-2nd millennium BCE, likely a century or two after the composition of the Gāθās (Old Avestan). Linguistically, Old Avestan exhibits greater archaism and divergence from Vedic Sanskrit in vocabulary, grammar, and syntax. Its markedly archaic features not only position it closer to Proto-Indo-European, but the Gāθās also contain unique religious concepts and terminology absent in early Vedic texts. Despite this, Western scholars have often sought to date the Gāthās after the Rigveda, a stance contradicted by linguistic evidence.

 

Notably, the term ārya and its ethnolinguistic connotations are absent from the Rigveda’s earliest layers (Maṇḍalas 2–7). By contrast, as addressed above, the Avesta explicitly employs Arya (Avestan: airiia-) to denote both the ethnolinguistic identity of Zoroaster’s community and their sacred homeland (airyanəm vaēǰah), a concept foreign to early Vedic literature.

 

Nevertheless, the term ārya emerges in later Vedic texts (e.g., Atharvaveda), coinciding with intensified cultural exchanges between Iranian and Indic groups during the late 2nd millennium BCE (Witzel, 1995: 96–102) which continued for centuries to come. Iranian loanwords in Sanskrit, such as asura (Avestan: ahura) and soma (Avestan: haoma), reflect theological and ritual syncretism predating Zoroastrian orthodoxy’s formalisation (Kellens, 1994: 33–36).

 

Subsequent references to ārya in Indian culture appear in Buddhist texts (6th–4th centuries BCE). Given the Buddha’s lifetime overlapped with Achaemenid Empire, it is probable that Indians encountered the term Aryan via interactions with Achaemenid Iranians and Zoroastrian priests. The Achaemenid Empire’s expansion into the Indian subcontinent (e.g., Gandhara and Sindh) further facilitated cultural influence, including the transmission of terminologies.

 

Crucially, while Aryan in Achaemenid Persia (Old Persian: ariya-) denoted ethnicity, territory, and later language and religion, in Buddhism, ārya assumed metaphorical meaning, signifying spiritual nobility through concepts like  catvāri āryasatyāni  (Four Noble Truths) (Sumedho, 2002).

 

Additionally, in Buddhism, the term ārya, in contrast to its usage in Old Sanskrit, is employed in a manner akin to arya- in Gathic and New Avestan, as well as Old Persian, where it conveys notions of “high-born”, “noble”, or “lord” (Bailey, CAIS, 1987).

 

This raises a critical scholarly question: how did this ancient Iranian term come to permeate Buddhist doctrine and Indian culture?

 

In recent decades, scholars have posited the hypothesis that Buddha was an Iranian prince who migrated to the Indian subcontinent and founded Buddhism. However, lacking archaeological substantiation, this theory remained speculative until 2002, when an Italian archaeological team uncovered a notable cache of Achaemenid cultural artefacts (pottery, jewellery, etc.) in Kapilavastu, Buddha’s birthplace in modern-day Nepal. While this discovery does not conclusively establish Buddha’s Iranian origins, it confirms that his birthplace was either integrated into the Achaemenid Empire (Verardi, 2002) or subject to profound Iranian cultural and religious influence, particularly from the Zoroastrian religion. This finding has thus bolstered the proposition that the region’s inhabitants, including Buddha, were acquainted with Achaemenid culture, religion, and the term Arya.

 

Additionally, Professor Malman, a distinguished French Buddhist scholar, contends that Buddha’s philosophy reflects not only Hindu but also Zoroastrian influences(de Mallmann, 1967: 85–95). Such parallels are particularly evident in doctrines like Saoshyant (the saviour or redeemer at the time of resurrection) and the renewal of the world (Rosenfield, 1967: 227). Consequently, it is plausible that Buddha’s adoption of the term Aryan derived from his exposure to Zoroastrian thought. However, certain scholars, such as the Korean Buddhist academic Bang Kyungil, have extended this argument. In his controversial work ‘Was Buddha a Persian Emperor’?, Kyungil asserts that Buddha was a Persian and an Achaemenid prince who migrated from the empire’s western territories to its eastern provinces, contemporary India.

 

Buddhist texts describe Buddha as a warrior from a distant realm who renounced his martial identity, shaving his head, discarding his armour and sword, and abandoning his name to pursue asceticism. Through this transformation, he purportedly attained divine insight and propagated his new faith.

 

The research of American Buddhist scholar Harvey Kraft has introduced further complexity to this discourse. His analysis of three Achaemenid seals excavated at Parseh (Persepolis), designated PFS 79, PFS 796, and PF 250, suggests that Buddha was a Scythian Iranian of the Gaumata lineage, belonging to the warrior class. Kraft hypothesises that after Gaumata (or the false Bardiya) was overthrown by Darius the Great, Buddha’s family fled initially to Sakastan (the Scythian heartland, corresponding to modern Sistan) and subsequently to India, where Buddhism emerged in the 6th century BCE. Central to Kraft’s thesis is the iconographic resemblance between Buddha’s symbolic imagery and the Achaemenid seal PFS 79.

 

This seal depicts a crowned figure grasping two Homā (mythical creatures with leonine bodies and avian heads), speculated to represent the official emblem of the Gaumata Magus dynasty. Dr Ranajit Pal, a prominent Indian Buddhist scholar, endorses Kraft’s theory and further posits that the lion-and-sun motif constituted Buddha’s familial crest, an Iranian heraldic device transported from Achaemenid Iran to India. Pal argues that Buddha formulated his religious teachings upon Zoroastrian foundations (Pal, Mithras Reader, 2010: 62). Thus, the Avestan terms Arya and Aryan were introduced to Sanskrit via Buddhist texts.

 

 

Arya in Europe: From “Iranian Peoples” to the “Aryan Race”

The first European to introduce the terms Arya and Aryan into European discourse, initially without malicious intent, was Friedrich Max Müller (1823–1900), a British-German philosopher, historian, orientalist, Indologist, and Sanskrit scholar (Müller 1853: 12; cited in Trautmann 1997: 176 and Esleben et al, 2008). These concepts emerged during a period when post-Industrial Revolution Europe, though economically prosperous, grappled with a perceived lack of historical roots.

 

Müller’s intellectual framework was shaped by now-discredited theories (Tyson, 2008: 379), advanced by Karl Wilhelm Friedrich von Schlegel (1772–1829) and the ‘Out of India’ hypothesis (Schlegel 1808). Observing linguistic parallels between Sanskrit and German, Müller posited a shared racial ancestry between Indians and Europeans, proposing a primordial migration from the Indus-Ganges plain to Europe (Müller 1854: 34 and Mallory 1998). During his philological studies of Buddhist texts, Müller encountered the term Arya (Sanskrit: ‘noble’ or ‘honourable’) and interpreted it as a descriptor of the linguistic and religious traditions of Indo-Iranian peoples, encompassing Hinduism, Buddhism, and Zoroastrianism. He explicitly contrasted this with Semitic languages and Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, Islam), framing Arya as a neutral, non-racial category tied to cultural and linguistic heritage (Müller 1861: 89–90 and Bartulin, 2013: 23).

 

In his monumental 50-volume ‘Sacred Books of the East’ (1879–1910), Müller argued that Hinduism and Zoroastrianism represented humanity’s earliest religions, predating Semitic traditions. He contended that Judaism, Christianity, and Islam had assimilated elements from Sumerian and Babylonian mythology, thereby casting Abrahamic faiths as derivative constructs (Müller 1883: 207)[21]. However, Müller’s linguistic framework was co-opted and racialised by his contemporary, Joseph Arthur de Gobineau (1816–1882), a French aristocrat and diplomat. Despite Müller’s repeated public objections to the misappropriation of Aryan as a racial identifier, Gobineau’s reinterpretation gained traction (Müller 1888: 120; Poliakov 1974: 214)[21].

 

Gobineau, influenced by pseudoscientific racial taxonomies of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752–1840) and François-Xavier Bichat (1771–1802), expounded his theories in ‘An Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races’ (Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines, 1853–1855). He posited that civilisation arose exclusively from racial hierarchies, dividing humanity into three races: white (Aryan), yellow, and black. Gobineau’s Aryan category included Germans, Celts, Hellenes, Indians, Iranians, and Slavs, whom he credited with inventing writing, the wheel, and all major cultural advancements (Gobineau 1853, vol. 1: 45–48 and Esleben, 2008).

 

Initially, Gobineau endorsed Schlegel’s ‘Out of India’ theory, asserting that Aryans had migrated from India to establish global civilisations (Gobineau 1853, vol. 2: 112 and Bartulin, 2013: 23). Later, he expanded this claim, alleging that even Egyptian and Chinese civilisations, ostensibly founded by the “yellow race”, were secretly Aryan creations (Gobineau 1855, vol. 4: 76). Paradoxically, after serving as France’s Minister Plenipotentiary in Tehran (1861–1863), Gobineau reclassified Iranians as Semitic, despite his admiration for ancient Persia. He disparaged contemporary Iranians as “degenerate,” attributing their perceived decline to racial mixing with “inferior” Semitic groups. Gobineau concluded that Iran could only regain its “Aryan” status through eugenic purification, a notion later echoed in 20th-century racial ideologies (Gobineau 1869: 231–233).

 

In the second phase of his theoretical framework, following the “purification” of his list of Aryan nations, Gobineau ultimately concluded that only the Germans, encompassing Germans, English, Swedes, Norwegians, Danes, Austrians, Swiss, and Dutch, represented the sole surviving “pure” Aryan race. He categorically dismissed other groups, including Iranians, Greeks, and Romans, as either Semitic or racially hybridised through intermixture with Semitic peoples, while simultaneously asserting that their civilisations had been established by “white European Germans” (Gobineau 1855, vol. 3: 154; Biddiss 1970: 112; Wood, 2013: 107).

 

Gobineau’s ambitions for academic and social prestige drove him to seek membership in the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques and the Académie Française by promoting his radical racial theories. However, both institutions rejected his applications due to the pseudoscientific and extremist nature of his claims (Biddiss 1970: 89; Woodman 2010: 294). In a gesture of defiance, Gobineau self-awarded the aristocratic title of ‘Count’ (Comte) in 1853, a designation lacking formal recognition yet persistently adopted by some Iranian commentators, reflecting an uncritical perpetuation of his self-mythologisation (Gobineau 1855, vol. 1, preface; Woodman 2010: 294).

 

Gobineau’s ideological legacy was advanced by his disciple Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855–1927), a British-German nationalist and son-in-law of renowned German composer Richard Wagner (1813–1883). Though Chamberlain diverged from certain aspects of Gobineau’s theories, he refined and popularised them in his 1899 two-volume treatise Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts (The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century). This work synthesised Gobineau’s racial hierarchy into a cohesive system, becoming the cornerstone of Pan-Germanism, European nationalist movements, and institutionalised antisemitism, particularly in Germany (Chamberlain 1899, vol. 1: 256–260; Field 1981: 145; Calmard, Encyclopaedia Iranica, 2001: 20-24). Kaiser Wilhelm II (1859–1941) mandated the inclusion of Chamberlain’s text in military curricula and all German educational institutions, while libraries nationwide were compelled to stock copies (Röhl 1994: 789; Evans 2003: 33; Chase, 1977: 91-92). By 1938, the treatise had undergone 27 reprints, surpassing one million copies sold (Chase, 1977: 91-92; Stackelberg 2007: 72).

 

Chamberlain’s binary racial taxonomy divided global populations into Semites and Aryans. He designated Northern Europeans (Germans, excluding Finns) as the “true Aryans” and a biologically superior race, while relegating all others, including Iranians, Greeks, and Romans, to the “inferior” Semitic category (Chamberlain 1899, vol. 1: 331; Mosse 1964: 93; Shirer, 1960: 107). Through historical revisionism, Chamberlain recast the Germans, a group he acknowledged as non-urbanised and culturally primitive until recent centuries, as the primordial architects of global civilisation, positing that no notable cultural or technological advancement could have occurred without their influence (Shirer, 1960: 107; Chamberlain, vol. 2, 1899: 45–47; Hutton 2005: 211).

 

The pervasive acceptance of Chamberlain’s theories in industrialising Europe, combined with Gobineau’s earlier work, provided the ideological scaffolding for Adolf Hitler’s racial doctrines and the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP). Hitler explicitly acknowledged Chamberlain’s influence in Mein Kampf (1925), and the Nazi regime institutionalised these theories to justify eugenics, antisemitic policies, and territorial expansion (Kershaw 1998: 135; Stackelberg 2007: 74; Stackelberg et al 2002: 84-85).

 

 

The German Nazi Party and the Theory of Aryanism or the Master Race

Adolf Hitler exhibited particular admiration for Chamberlain, frequently visiting him at Richard Wagner’s residence in Bayreuth alongside Joseph Goebbels (Kershaw 2001: 231; Hamann 2010: 156; Biddiss, 1996: 73-82). Chamberlain’s writings were serialised in Völkischer Beobachter, the Nazi Party’s official newspaper, and his 1899 treatise ‘The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century’ was venerated as the “Bible of the Nazi Movement” (Evans 2005: 232; Stackelberg 2007: 74; Fortier, 1967: 341-350). Following Chamberlain’s death on 9 January 1927, Hitler and senior Nazi officials, including Alfred Rosenberg, attended his funeral, underscoring his ideological significance to the regime (Field 1981: 312; Kershaw 2001: 233; Fortier, 1967: 341-350; Biddiss, 1996: 73--82).

 

Chamberlain’s legacy was perpetuated by Alfred Rosenberg (1893–1946), the Nazi Party’s chief ideologue, and Hans Günther (1891–1968), a eugenicist termed the “Race Pope” (Rassenpapst). Together, they formulated the ‘Master Race’ (Herrenrasse) doctrine, which explicitly rejected Karl Wilhelm Friedrich von Schlegel’s ‘Out of India’ hypothesis. Instead, they asserted that “true Aryans” originated not in Asia but on the North German Plain, purportedly descending from migrants fleeing the mythical island of Atlantis before its submersion (Stackelberg 2002: 84-85; Rosenberg 1930: 45–47; Günther 1925: 89). This pseudoscientific Aryanism, central to Nazi ideology, defined the archetypal Aryan as tall, blonde-haired, and light-eyed (Günther 1922: 34; Proctor 1988: 122). These traits became mandatory for recruitment into the Schutzstaffel (SS) and Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo), with anthropometric measurements well-contextualisedly enforced (Longerich 2012: 177; Weikart 2009: 91).

 

Nazi racial doctrine classified Southern Europeans, including Italians and Greeks, as hybrid populations of Aryan and African descent. Meanwhile, global groups such as Iranians, Jews, and Arabs were categorised as Semitic, with racial interbreeding deemed to cause “blood impurity” (Blutschande) and the decline of the “pure Aryan race” (Field, 1977: 523; Burleigh & Wippermann 1991: 49; Ehrenreich 2007: 67). Exceptions included Finns, Japanese, Ukrainians, and certain Jews collaborating with the regime, who were granted “Honorary Aryan” (Ehrenarier) status, a pragmatic concession to geopolitical alliances (Günther, 1927: 15–16; Mazower 2008: 212; Steinweis 2006: 88).

 

Hans Günther advocated post-war racial “cleansing” (Säuberung) to eliminate “subhuman” (Untermenschen) elements within Germany. These plans were pre-empted by Allied victory and Günther’s post-war trial and execution (Rich, 1974: 400-401; Hutton 2005: 189; Evans 2008: 456). Ironically, a 2010 genetic study of 39 Hitler relatives revealed haplogroup E1b1b, prevalent among North African and Jewish populations, challenging the regime’s racial purity myths (Rich, 1974: 400-401; Vermeeren 2010: 78–79; Connolly 2010).

 

Recent decades have seen claims that “Nazi Germany revered Iranians” or “Hitler identified Iran as the Aryan homeland” proliferate in certain Iranian circles. Such assertions, often uncritically repeated, lack empirical support in primary Nazi documents or Hitler’s writings (Herf 2006: 212). Scholarly consensus dismisses these as apocryphal, reflecting post-war revisionism rather than historical fact.

 

 

Breaking a Taboo and Exposing a Falsehood: The Nazi German and Hitlerian Claim of Calling Iranians Aryan

A politically cordial relationship between two sovereign states does not inherently signify mutual admiration or affection; such alliances are frequently dictated by pragmatic political, economic, and military interests. For example, the United States maintained a strategic partnership with Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1919–1980), yet when its geopolitical objectives were threatened, it collaborated with the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany to facilitate the 1979 Islamic Revolution that deposed him.

 

Similarly, Nazi Germany’s ostensibly amicable relations with Iran under Reza Shah the Great (Pahlavi I, 1878–1944) were rooted in realpolitik, not in any purported ideological affinity or recognition of Iranians as racial kin. This is unequivocally demonstrated by the fact that under the ‘Nuremberg Laws’ (1935), Iranians, alongside Jews, Egyptians, and Iraqis, were prohibited from marrying German citizens. Conversely, Turkish nationals were exempted from these restrictions and explicitly listed among the “civilised nations” (Kulturnationen) in the legislation (Ansari, 2013, 9. 134; Burleigh & Wippermann 1991: 123; Longerich 2010: 89).

 

Nouri Esfandiary (1883–1935), Iran’s ambassador to Ankara, formally protested this exclusion to German diplomatic representatives and instructed Iran’s Berlin embassy to lodge an official complaint with the German Foreign Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt). The Iranian government demanded an explanation for why “Iranians, as founders of the first Aryan civilisation and progenitors of the Aryan peoples,” were excluded from the Nuremberg Laws’ racial categorisations (Ansari, 2013, 9. 134; Herf 2006: 214).

 

The Nazi government dismissed these grievances as “British and French propaganda,” refusing to revise the Nuremberg Laws to include Iranians among the Aryan nations. This exclusion remained in force until the collapse of the Third Reich in 1945.

 

 

Conclusion: A Summary of This Inquiry

All evidentiary records, documentary, historical, and linguistic, confirm that the terms Arya and Aryan, in their original contexts, carry three definitive meanings:

 

a. Arya functioned not as a racial category but as an ‘ethnic designation’ for Eastern Iranian peoples inhabiting the northeastern Iranian Plateau. This is corroborated by Avestan and Old Persian inscriptions, which use Airya (Avestan) and Ariya (Old Persian) to denote specific Iranian ethnic groups (Gnoli 1989: 12; Schmitt 1987: 89).

 

b. Historically, ‘Aryan identity’ constituted a civilisational, cultural, linguistic, and religious continuum recognised since antiquity as the ‘Iranian national identity’. This framework encompassed all ancient Iranian peoples (e.g., Persian, Medes, Parthians, Sogdians, etc.) and endures in modern Iran, irrespective of historical admixture with non-Iranian populations. As such, the ‘only historically and ethnolinguistically continuous Aryan nation is contemporary Iran’ (Frye 1984: 45; Vogelsang 1992: 178).

 

c. The attribution of ‘Aryan identity’ to Indians and Europeans represents a 19th-century Eurocentric fabrication, engineered by scholars such as Friedrich Max Müller and Arthur de Gobineau to legitimise colonial and racial ideologies (Leopold 1974: 34; Trautmann 1997: 212).

 

Modern scientific consensus further invalidates the concept of ‘race’ as a biological reality, identifying it as a pseudoscientific construct rooted in 19th-century racial typologies. Contemporary anthropological genetics demonstrates that variations in human blood groups and phenotypic traits result from prolonged geographic isolation, producing divergent ‘allele’ frequencies, a process unrelated to hierarchical racial classifications (Cavalli-Sforza 1994: 78; Human Genome Project). Critically, the conflation of ‘race’ with ‘ethnicity’, the latter denoting shared cultural, linguistic, and historical affiliations, obscures the fluidity of human identity and perpetuates exclusionary nationalist myths (Eriksen 1993: 4; Banks 1996: 12).

 

This inquiry’s findings hold urgent contemporary relevance. The weaponisation of “Aryan” identity by 20th-century fascism and its lingering echoes in modern far-right movements, from European neo-Nazis to Hindu nationalist reinterpretations of Ārya, demonstrate how pseudohistorical claims can legitimise oppression (Bhatt 2001: 78).

 

Racism, however, is not solely born of ignorance or educational deficits. Psychological insecurities, such as the need for scapegoats during socioeconomic crises (Allport 1954: 67), and authoritarian personality traits, which crave hierarchical dominance (Adorno et al. 1950: 228), fuel dehumanisation. Politicians and demagogues exploit these vulnerabilities, manufacturing racial animus to consolidate power, divert attention from systemic failures, or justify resource extraction (Bonilla-Silva 1997: 34; Mamdani 2001: 12). Colonial regimes, for instance, instrumentalised pseudoscientific racism to rationalise slavery and land dispossession (Mills 1997: 45), while modern populists weaponise xenophobia to mobilise disaffected constituencies (Wodak 2015: 89).

 

Conversely, Iran’s inclusive national identity, rooted in ethnolinguistic continuity rather than racial purity, offers a model for disentangling heritage from exclusionary hierarchies. And ultimately, all humans constitute a single, indivisible species: the ‘human race’ (Homo sapiens sapiens), as affirmed by UNESCO’s 1950 ‘Statement on Race’ (Cavalli-Sforza , 1994; Montagu 1972: 123; Reardon 2005: 21).

 

 

Notes:

1, The establishment of the Islamic regime in Iran, supported by Western states (particularly the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany), has instigated a comprehensive restructuring of Modern Persian across linguistic, sociocultural, and institutional domains. This transformation manifests in five principal dimensions:

A. The spoken register has progressively assimilated linguistic norms associated with the governing clerical, a demographic disproportionately drawn from religiously conservative rural areas with lower educational attainment. While this development has not considerablely compromised the grammatical architecture of Persian, it has intensified the cultural dominance of less educated social groups and devotional texts within linguistic practices. Consequently, this shift has amplified sociolinguistic stratification within Iran's heterogeneous population.

B. A deliberate incorporation of Islamic-Arabic lexicon into common parlance has been systematically implemented. Where such terminology historically remained restricted to theological discourse and ritualistic contexts, state-sponsored ideological campaigns, reinforced by coercive institutional frameworks, have rendered these terms pervasive within mainstream communication channels.

C. The routine deployment of Islamic invocations within casual dialogue has precipitated their transformation into formulaic linguistic devices, increasingly detached from their original sacral connotations through habitual overuse.

D. Pre-revolutionary Iranian society broadly condemned violent linguistic expressions as culturally alien. Post-1979, the normalisation of such discourse has emerged through three interlinked processes: the institutionalisation of state violence (including public executions), the ideological valorisation of armed conflict, and the cultural fetishisation of sacrificial martyrdom. This paradigm shift is evidenced not solely in heightened interpersonal aggression, but equally in the escalating frequency of obscene and scatological language within mundane social exchanges.

E. Regime mandates requiring compulsory Quranic Arabic instruction across all educational tiers (primary through tertiary) have considerablely modified written Persian conventions. This curricular imposition persists despite the language's negligible functional relevance to most citizens' professional or domestic spheres.

Cumulatively, these linguistic developments constitute a radical reconfiguration of Persian's sociolinguistic ecology, serving as both symptom and catalyst of Iran's post-revolutionary sociopolitical metamorphosis. The dialectical relationship between hegemonic power structures and linguistic evolution remains particularly pronounced in this context, exemplifying state-engineered linguistic engineering as an instrument of ideological consolidation.

 

2. The DNa inscription, located at Naqsh-e Rostam, is one of the Achaemenid Royal Inscriptions. The term 'Achaemenid Royal Inscriptions' refers to a collection of 179 texts commissioned by various Achaemenid King of Kings, including Darius the Great (521–486 BCE), Xerxes (485–465 BCE), Artaxerxes I (465–424 BCE), Darius II (423–405 BCE), Artaxerxes II (404–359 BCE), and Artaxerxes III (358–338 BCE). These inscriptions, primarily written in Old Persian cuneiform, document the achievements, governance of these sovereigns, providing valuable insights into the history and administration of the Achaemenid Persian Empire.

 

3. The title ‘the Great’ is perhaps bestowed upon Alexander III for his brutality and savagery by Western culture. Regrettably, the title is often awarded by Western historiographers to figures who committed heinous historical crimes rather than to humanists or constructive leaders. Yet, when some Western historians reluctantly apply the title ‘the Great’ to Cyrus II, founder of the Achaemenid Empire, they acknowledge that it was conferred historically and during his lifetime. However, the majority of Western academia has systematically omitted his title while never referencing Alexander III without the epithet. This double standard inadvertently exposes a form of intellectual inconsistency, wherein scholars resort to historical revisionism to reinforce Eurocentric narratives. Hypothetically, if global survival beyond the next millennium necessitates resisting Western expansionist greed, a potential catalyst for World War III, it might not be surprising to see figures like Tony Blair and George W. Bush posthumously labelled ‘the Great’ for their militaristic interventions in the Middle East, framed under the pretext of defending democracy. This reflects a civilisational contrast: Western tradition, rooted in conquest and pillage, contrasts with Eastern civilisations (excluding Islam, which shares a similarly martial early history), where ‘the Great’ is reserved for figures advancing humanistic ideals.

 

 

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