1. THE QUESTION OF THE IMPERIAL CROWN

During a virtual meeting in March 2021, His Imperial Highness the Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi was reported to have expressed an interest in a republican form of government for Iran. The discussion subsequently circulated more widely, unsettling assumptions among supporters of an Imperial constitutional settlement. His precise intentions remain his to explain. The Imperial constitutional project must have a credible future even if the person widely regarded as its prospective sovereign declines the Crown.

 

An Imperial constitution cannot depend on the political preferences, personal circumstances, or availability of a single individual. Nor should the question of Iran's future government be reduced to a quarrel over a title. The essential constitutional issue is the distribution of authority. A republic can concentrate power behind an elected presidency, just as a monarchy can place a Crown above ordinary government without assigning it the power to govern. The name of a head of state settles neither the liberty of citizens nor their capacity to hold government to account.

 

Expert-Executive Direct Democracy (EEDD), first advanced in 2004 and refined in 2012, addresses that issue by vesting ordinary national law-making in the citizenry and entrusting its execution to nationally elected, suitably qualified officials subject to scrutiny, judicial restraint, and recall (Suren-Pahlav, 2004). Citizens authorise the law; public officials carry it out. Constitutional rights protect individuals and minorities against arbitrary state action and unjustified majority decisions. An Imperial Crown or a republican head of state must operate within those limits.

 

If Iranians choose to retain or restore the Imperial Crown, it must represent national continuity without becoming a rival source of government. An Elective-Empire offers such a settlement: an Imperial institution founded upon hereditary succession, with each designated successor subject to national confirmation and the sovereign's functions strictly prescribed by law. The public would confirm or reject a dynastic successor, rather than choose a governing monarch from competing political candidates.

 

 

2. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION

The fundamental argument for EEDD was established in Designing a Democracy That Works for Iran: Expert-Executive Direct Democracy (2004; refined in 2012). Elections alone cannot ensure that the people retain authority over the laws made in their name. The distinction between representation and direct legislative sovereignty has a long history: representative government has never been synonymous with citizens exercising law-making power themselves (Manin, 1997). EEDD therefore assigns ordinary legislation to citizens while requiring qualified executives to administer it under public scrutiny and independent justice (Suren-Pahlav, 2004). Truth and justice, rather than manufactured confidence in office-holders, must determine the standards by which authority is judged.

 

An Elective-Empire would not create a second legislature, an Imperial executive, or a rival source of sovereign law. Its constitutional provisions would govern the Crown's political neutrality, national confirmation of hereditary succession, the designation of a substitute heir, and regency where necessary. The Crown would perform formal acts of investiture and constitutional continuity, while professional executive office-holders would remain subject to defined appointment procedures, scrutiny, recall, and legal accountability.

 

The distinction must remain absolute. A settlement described as parliamentary or Imperial must not quietly return law-making to a parliament, a cabinet, or the Crown. EEDD already provides for recall, judicial review, and professional eligibility for executive office. The Imperial constitution would place the Crown within those constraints, not above them. The National Scrutiny Council would investigate, question officials, and report publicly; it would not enact ordinary legislation. The citizenry would remain the legislative authority.[1]

 

Iran would remain a unitary state, with one national legislative order. Provinces and municipalities could administer a broad range of public responsibilities under national law, with accountable budgets and substantial room to respond to local conditions. They would not exercise a separate legislative sovereignty. Decentralising administration must not be confused with dividing the nation's constitutional authority.

 

 

3. THE CROWN AS A CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICE, NOT A GOVERNMENT

The King of Kings, or Queen of Queens where succession brings a woman to the throne, would be the head of state and a symbol of Iran's historical continuity. The office would have neither an electoral programme nor authority to direct domestic or foreign policy. It would be prohibited from sponsoring political parties, selecting public policies, dismissing elected executives at personal discretion, or exercising an independent legislative veto. Its dignity would depend on strict separation from the ordinary contests of government.

 

That separation must be institutional rather than sentimental. Monarchical impartiality cannot rest upon the hope that every future sovereign will possess an admirable temperament. Powers, duties, restrictions, and remedies must be specified in the constitution. The Crown would represent the state at official ceremonies, receive diplomatic credentials, confer honours pursuant to law, mark national transitions, and undertake other public functions consistent with political neutrality. It would not govern through advisers, private audiences, or the Royal Household.

 

The Crown would also have defined procedural duties. After an election for an executive portfolio has been certified by the independent electoral authority, the sovereign would carry out the formal investiture required by law. Once citizens enact a valid law, promulgation would be a constitutional duty. If a court has suspended the measure on a specified legal ground, the relevant judicial decision, not the sovereign's independent judgement, would determine the lawful next step. The Crown should never acquire a personal power to frustrate legislation by describing its objection as a matter of constitutional concern.

 

An independent Constitutional Secretariat would maintain the record of required formal acts, legal deadlines, notices, and the sovereign's constitutional correspondence. Where an executive fails to supply a legally required report, respond to a scrutiny finding, or meet a statutory deadline, the Crown could issue a formal notice, through the Secretariat, recording the apparent non-compliance and referring it to the legally competent scrutiny body or court. Such a notice would neither establish guilt nor create a new governing power. A judge, not the Palace, must determine contested legality.

 

The Council of the Crown, composed of suitably qualified constitutional and judicial officers, would advise on the lawfulness of Imperial acts and on the continuity of the institution. Its advice, with lawful protection for genuinely confidential material, would be published. Neither the Council nor the Secretariat would possess legislative authority. They would exist to prevent a ceremonial office from becoming an unaccountable centre of private influence.

 

The Imperial Household would be funded under transparent public law, subject to independent audit and clear restrictions upon patronage, outside financial interests, and partisan engagement. The Crown's official acts would remain open to judicial review. Personal inviolability, if retained for the sovereign's ceremonial position, could not place Imperial decisions beyond the law or obstruct a constitutionally prescribed removal process.

 

An Emperor who acts as a political commander would defeat the purpose of this settlement. The proposed Crown is an institution of continuity, not a substitute for the citizens' authority or the competence of their elected executives.

 

 

4. HEREDITARY SUCCESSION SUBJECT TO NATIONAL CONFIRMATION

The clearest distinction between the proposed Elective-Empire and an ordinary hereditary monarchy concerns succession. Descent would establish the order of prospective claimants, but would not itself complete the constitutional entitlement to reign. A designated successor would require confirmation by the nation in a legally supervised ballot before accession. The public would not be choosing a governing party or endorsing a programme; it would be asked whether the designated person should hold a politically neutral constitutional office.

 

Succession would follow absolute primogeniture, without preference between sons and daughters, subject to specific eligibility conditions for the Imperial office. The Heir Apparent would be heterosexual and enter into a lawful, monogamous marriage with a person of the opposite sex. The heir and spouse would be expected to continue the Imperial line through children; if that proved medically impossible, alternative arrangements would require the exceptional statutory approval prescribed by the constitution. The heir's mother would have to be an Iranian national, born in Iran to two Iranian parents, and must never have possessed another nationality. Maternal biological lineage would be verified through a legally supervised DNA procedure, while nationality and birthplace would be established from appropriate records (Oray and Katsanis, 2021).[2] These conditions would govern eligibility for the Imperial office, without restricting the civic rights or access to other public offices of those who do not meet them.

 

The reigning sovereign would designate the Heir Apparent in accordance with the lawful order of succession, with that designation independently examined and referred to a national confirmation ballot. A public vetting panel would assess the candidate against defined standards of citizenship, legal capacity, integrity, and fitness to discharge the functions of the office. Its findings would be accompanied by reasons; the candidate would have the opportunity to answer adverse material and to challenge procedural errors before an independent court. Any genuinely private medical information would be handled according to law rather than exposed for political entertainment.

 

The candidate would issue a Declaration of Service undertaking to observe the constitution, refrain from party politics, and respect the limits of the Crown. The ballot would be conducted by an independent electoral authority under published rules. A refusal of confirmation would not authorise the sovereign to ignore the electorate or nominate indefinitely until a compliant answer was obtained. The constitution would establish the procedure for the next eligible candidate and the limits upon repeated nominations.

 

A Substitute Heir would be designated and confirmed by the same process. This is more than a ceremonial precaution. It supplies continuity if the Heir Apparent dies, declines the position, is disqualified for cause, or cannot lawfully accede. Where neither confirmed candidate remains available, an Accession Council composed of judicial, constitutional, and provincial representatives would administer a temporary succession procedure until new candidates could be submitted to the nation. The Council would not govern Iran, amend succession law, or confer a permanent Crown by its own vote.

 

The office of Prince Regent would arise only under constitutionally defined circumstances of incapacity or minority. A regent would perform the limited formal duties necessary to preserve continuity, without acquiring executive or legislative power. Medical findings, the duration of regency, and the resumption of the sovereign's functions would be independently reviewable. Regency is a remedy for interruption of the constitutional office, not an opportunity to establish an alternative government.

 

National confirmation must also be distinguished from continuing immunity. If credible evidence indicates grave misconduct, improper foreign allegiance or influence, deliberate breach of political neutrality, or another legally defined ground for removal, a constitutionally authorised body or a qualifying citizen initiative could trigger an independent judicial assessment. The constitutional court would determine whether the prescribed ground and evidentiary threshold for a recall ballot had been met. If the nation voted for removal under the applicable constitutional rule, the confirmed successor would accede, subject to the ordinary legal requirements. The sovereign's refusal to accept removal would have no constitutional effect.

 

Dynastic continuity would therefore operate within constitutional limits. The hereditary line would identify those eligible to be considered; national confirmation would decide who could accede. Neither ancestry nor ceremonial dignity would exempt the sovereign from the duties of office or the possibility of removal through lawful public judgement.

 

 

5. A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT THAT DOES NOT BELONG TO A PARTY

EEDD treats the National Government as a continuing institution of administration. Its officers are replaceable; its public duties do not disappear whenever one of them is removed. That distinction matters particularly for a country emerging from authoritarian government, when administrative purges, factional possession of ministries, and the destruction of institutional records could make an already difficult reconstruction still more precarious.

 

Each principal executive portfolio would be held by an individual elected nationally from among candidates meeting publicly defined professional eligibility standards. The constitution would require an independent and appealable assessment of those standards, so that 'expertise' could not become a respectable name for political exclusion. Successful candidates would be invested formally by the Crown after certification of the election, not selected by it. Their authority would arise from the constitution and the citizens' election, rather than Imperial favour.

 

Executives would administer the laws enacted by citizens, publish policy proposals with supporting evidence, account for public expenditure, and answer to independent scrutiny. Office-holders would not hold simultaneous party leadership positions, use the public service as a campaign machine, or exchange appointments for factional support. Political disagreement would remain legitimate; official control of the institutions through which laws are implemented would not become party property.

 

Professional secretariats would preserve records, technical knowledge, and administrative continuity. Deputies would be identified in advance and independently qualified to perform temporary duties. A portfolio-holder's resignation, incapacity, or recall would therefore not require the collapse of the entire National Government. The law would determine the powers of the temporary office-holder, the time allowed for a replacement election, and the exceptional commitments that could not be undertaken without further citizen authorisation.

 

The Crown would mark these transitions through formal commissions and investitures. It would have no discretion to substitute a preferred candidate for the person lawfully chosen by citizens or appointed through a binding constitutional procedure. A constitution that made expert executives answerable to an Emperor rather than to public law would merely change the identity of their patron.

 

 

6. RECALL, INVESTIGATION, AND CONTINUITY OF PUBLIC SERVICE

Recall is a necessary part of EEDD, but it must be exercised without interrupting essential services or turning ordinary political disagreement into an allegation of misconduct. The machinery of accountability should be capable of removing an executive without dismantling the administration that executive was elected to lead.

 

A recall process might begin with a verified citizen petition meeting constitutional thresholds, a serious audit finding, a failure to discharge a specified legal duty, or evidence of corruption or abuse of office. An independent Constitutional Accountability Commission would examine the initiating material, require the executive to respond, and distinguish remediable failure from conduct warranting removal or prosecution. Its findings would be subject to prompt judicial review, and the citizens would have access to the reasons supporting any proposed recall vote.

 

A government programme may fail without its responsible officer committing an offence. In such a case, a published corrective plan, independent performance review, or legally enforceable improvement requirement may be more appropriate than immediate removal. Where the failure is grave, repeated, or accompanied by deliberate deception or misconduct, the constitution must permit citizens to terminate the mandate. No elected executive should be able to argue that a previous electoral victory constitutes immunity until the next ordinary election.

 

The right of recall also requires safeguards against abuse. Petitions must be verifiable, the allegations must be stated fairly, affected individuals must be able to answer them, and the voting process must not be controlled by the executive under examination. A citizen's right to demand accountability is not a licence to condemn an office-holder without evidence. Nor should recall be used to punish an executive merely for implementing a lawful measure that citizens themselves enacted; disagreement with the law belongs in the legislative revision process.

 

Where recall succeeds, the designated deputy would maintain essential administration until a new nationally elected portfolio-holder takes office. The Crown would perform the necessary formal acts. Independent courts would determine any criminal or civil liability arising from proven misconduct. Political removal and criminal punishment are distinct constitutional processes. The first concerns the continuing authority to hold public office; the second concerns legal guilt established through evidence and due process.

 

This structure aims to make correction routine without making administration unstable. An executive may be removed; the law, the public records, the professional service, and the citizens' legislative authority remain.

 

 

7. APPOINTMENT OF SENIOR STATE OFFICIALS

An Imperial settlement can place the Crown above political competition without granting it control over the armed forces, intelligence agencies, courts, diplomatic service, or independent regulators. The distinction must be explicit in law. Ceremonial investiture is not an appointment power to be exercised according to personal preference, still less a private chain of command.

 

The National Government would nominate the senior commanders of the armed forces under published professional criteria and independent assessment. An appropriate appointments board would examine qualifications, record conflicts of interest, and provide reasons for its recommendation. The sovereign would confer the required commission once the lawful appointment had been made. Operational authority would remain with the civilian executive under laws enacted by citizens. The King of Kings would not direct military operations. Emergency powers would be narrowly defined, subject to independent review, and incapable of becoming a permanent alternative to national legislative authority.

 

Intelligence and security appointments would require additional protections against secrecy becoming a means of escaping accountability. Shortlists would undergo professional and integrity scrutiny, and a security-cleared oversight body would assess the legal suitability of candidates. Intelligence services would operate under statute, judicially authorised intrusive powers, and independent inspection. Public disclosure would be restricted only where lawful and necessary, with classified material accessible to properly authorised reviewers. The use of the sovereign's name in an oath or formal instrument would give no personal authority over an intelligence officer.

 

The Foreign Affairs portfolio would propose ambassadors through a professional selection procedure. An independent Diplomatic Appointments Commission would examine competence, conflicts of interest, and integrity before the formal appointment. The Crown would accredit ambassadors and receive foreign representatives as head of state. Treaties and diplomatic policy would remain within the constitutional responsibilities of the executive, courts, and citizens, as appropriate to the subject. The sovereign would represent Iran abroad without conducting a separate foreign policy.

 

For regulators, public agencies, state-owned enterprises, and critical infrastructure bodies, an independent Public Appointments Commission would operate a competitive process, publish criteria, and issue reasoned recommendations. Ministers would choose only within the legal procedure. Fixed terms, defined grounds for removal, and protection from punitive budgetary interference would be necessary where an office must act independently of the executive it oversees. An audited public appointments system should make patronage more difficult, not reproduce it through another set of committees whose members are themselves beyond examination.

 

Judicial appointments require an even firmer separation. An independent Judicial Appointments Commission would assess candidates, while a Judicial Council would administer professional discipline and protect judicial independence. The Crown might make formal appointments and preside at ceremonial openings of the legal year, but could not select judges at personal discretion, reverse their decisions, or direct a prosecution. Judges would apply citizen-made law and the constitution, not Imperial wishes. Protected tenure, lawful discipline, and adequate financial independence would be constitutional safeguards rather than favours granted by a minister.

 

The National Scrutiny Council would investigate the conduct of these processes and report to the public. It would neither legislate nor become an alternative executive cabinet. Its scrutiny must likewise be subject to public standards, judicial restraint, and disclosure. The accountability of powerful institutions cannot be left to institutions whose own authority is unquestionable.

 

 

8. RIGHTS, TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, AND THE LIMITS OF THE CROWN

This settlement depends upon the rights that protect citizens from both executive arbitrariness and unjustified action by a temporary majority. Freedom of conscience, association, expression, peaceful political opposition, and access to independent courts would not depend upon loyalty to the Imperial House. The Crown would represent the state without imposing a religious identity upon it or privileging a political faction. Citizens who prefer a republic would retain the same rights as those who support the monarchy.

 

The same principle applies to Iran's provinces and municipalities. Administrative responsibilities should be exercised close to the communities they affect, with locally appropriate services and publicly accountable budgets. They would operate within a single national legal order, subject to the rights charter and legislation enacted through EEDD. Local administration must not become an excuse for arbitrary central interference; neither can it become an independent authority to legislate against the nation.

 

The Crown's duty to record a suspected constitutional breach must be distinguished from a court's authority to decide it. A formal notice from the Constitutional Secretariat could bring an official failure before the competent institutions, but only an independent tribunal could determine disputed legal responsibility. Public ceremony must not become a discreet route to influence appointments, military decisions, or public expenditure.

 

None of these limits diminishes the historical meaning of the Imperial institution. They determine whether that meaning can coexist with a constitution in which citizens, rather than a sovereign person, are the source of ordinary national legislation. History can give a state its symbols; it cannot supply a permanent exemption from accountability.

 

 

9. CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND TRANSITION

In a post-Islamic-regime Iran, the nation would decide whether to establish an Imperial constitutional headship or a republic. EEDD could operate under either form of state. An Elective-Empire would become relevant only if the people chose an Imperial settlement; no preference held by a claimant, political movement, or constitutional theorist could override that decision.

 

The transition would require legally protected elections, enforceable constitutional rights, independent courts, reliable civil records, an accountable electoral authority, and a professional public administration. The direct voting and digital verification mechanisms developed for EEDD would need independent security assessment and practical testing before widespread use (Suren-Pahlav, 2004). No technical system deserves constitutional authority merely because its designers claim that it is secure. Citizens must be able to inspect, understand, and challenge the procedures through which their decisions acquire legal force.

 

Constitutional law would specify the thresholds for confirmation and recall, the evidence required to establish eligibility and misconduct, the duration and review of regency, and the appointment and powers of scrutiny bodies. The Council of the Crown and the commissions responsible for appointments would operate under publicly defined duties, with judicial review where their decisions affect rights or lawful office. No institution should acquire a privilege whose limits are left to its own discretion.

 

 

10. CONCLUSION

The future of Iran's Imperial institution cannot be made to depend upon whether one prince wishes to wear the Crown. The question is whether that institution can endure as a constitutional office while leaving legislative sovereignty with citizens and executive authority with those elected to exercise it.

 

EEDD assigns ordinary law-making to citizens, execution to elected experts, and legal judgement to independent courts. Within that order, an Imperial Crown could embody continuity without exercising government. The successor would require national confirmation, and the sovereign's ceremonial and procedural duties would be strictly limited. A permanent, non-partisan National Government would administer the law, while its office-holders remained open to scrutiny, recall, lawful removal, and prosecution where criminal misconduct was established.

 

An Imperial constitutional settlement cannot be a restoration of personal rule under a more accommodating vocabulary. Its legitimacy depends upon whether citizens can exercise the authority claimed in their name, whether officials can be held to account while still in office, and whether constitutional restraints bind the Emperor as surely as they bind every other public institution. Iran may value continuity in the Crown. The right to govern, however, cannot be inherited.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

[1] The description 'parliamentarian' concerns the limited constitutional status of the Imperial Crown. Under EEDD, scrutiny and executive administration do not confer independent ordinary legislative power upon a parliament, the National Scrutiny Council, or the sovereign.

[2] Genetic testing may provide evidence of a biological relationship or maternal ancestry, but cannot itself establish a person's legal nationality, place of birth, or citizenship history. Those matters require legally recognised documentary evidence. The distinction is discussed by Oray and Katsanis (2021).

 

 

REFERENCES

Manin, B. (1997) The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Oray, V. and Katsanis, S.H. (2021) 'Ethical considerations for DNA testing as a proxy for nationality', Global Bioethics, 32(1), pp. 51–66.

Suren-Pahlav, S. (2004) 'Designing a Democracy That Works for Iran: Expert-Executive Direct Democracy', Suren-Pahlav.com, 12 February (republished with editorial refinements, 12 May 2012). Available at: https://www.suren-pahlav.com/en/designing-a-democracy-that-works-for-iran-expert-executive-direct-democracy.html (Accessed: 01 May 2021).