1. INTRODUCTION

 

Almost Two and half month have passed since a British Muslim, orchestrated a sinister amalgamation of vehicular assault and knife-based terrorism. This heinous act culminated in the ruthless murder of five individuals, among whom was a police officer stationed outside the House of Parliament in London. However, the United Kingdom finds itself once again grappling with the ominous spectre of terrorism, as evidenced by a harrowing incident on the 3rd of June. In this latest episode, three individuals of the Muslim faith, comprising one of Pakistani origin and two from North Africa, precipitated carnage by deliberately ramming a van into pedestrians on London Bridge, subsequently resorting to indiscriminate stabbing. The toll exacted by this nefarious act amounted to the loss of eight innocent lives and left 48 individuals injured.

 

The aftermath of these terrorist incidents, spanning back to the notorious 2007 event, has elicited a wave of criticism from segments of the British society directed towards the perceived inadequacies of the country's security apparatus. Notwithstanding such censure, the stark reality persists that, irrespective of the proficiency exhibited by MI5 in its operational mandate, the capacity to predict each and every terrorist incursion remains an elusive pursuit. The anticipation of such malevolent occurrences, however, is well within the purview of this intelligence agency.

 

Contemplating a hypothetical scenario wherein MI5 possesses the capability to prognosticate these acts of terror and pre-emptively intervene prompts consideration. The prospect of preventing attacks that render the last three incidents a mere stroll in the park, attacks capable of bringing the United Kingdom and Europe to their knees, is a matter of notable import.

 

The potential remedy, it is contended, resides in the cessation of operations of the Islamic Centre of England, the acknowledged propaganda conduit of the Islamic regime in Iran. Remarkably, this facet has been conspicuously disregarded by British authorities, ostensibly harbouring the hope that this perilous association will not turn adversarial in its implications for the nation.

 

 

2. THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS IN THE UK

 

In 2000, during my academic life at SOAS, I successfully secured funding for six archaeology students to visit Iran and gain excavation experience. While fundraising proved to be a manageable task, obtaining visas for them posed a formidable obstacle. This challenge arose not only due to my lack of favourable relations with the regime's bases in the UK but also because any involvement on my part could potentially result in the rejection of their visa applications.

 

In addressing this predicament, I engaged in a conversation with Dr Geoffrey King, a reader in Islamic Art and Archaeology. He apprised me of an Iranian acquaintance with notable influence in Iran, purporting to be a Safavid Prince who could assist in this matter. The assertion of princely lineage from the Safavid dynasty struck me as peculiar enough to cast doubt on the authenticity of his friend's claim, raising suspicions that he might be another operative aligned with the regime. It seemed plausible that such individuals, instrumental in the exploitation of the nation's resources, were now seeking to embellish their legacy with a veneer of cultural heritage. My conjecture soon found validation when, upon encountering him at SOAS, he presented me with his business card where his name was stated as 'S. Safavi', and he claimed the directorship of the Institute of Islamic Studies, affiliated with the Islamic Centre of England. From the outset, the mere association with the name 'Islamic Centre of England' was sufficient to ascertain his deep connection with the tyrannical regime. Nonetheless, in the ensuing days, I further unveiled his true identity, his actual name was ‘Seyed Ghahreman Homamai, and he was the younger brother of Seyed Yahya Rahim Safavi Homami, the former chief commander of the brutal regime's ‘Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps,’ and current special military advisor to Ali Khamenei, the despotic ruler of the Islamic Regime. Despite both brothers carrying the Safavi surname, their origins trace back to a humble village called Homām, in the Isfahan province. Contrary to any princely connection, they, akin to numerous individuals who aligned themselves with the regime in its early days, succeeded in amassing power and notable wealth through the exploitation of the nation's resources.

 

Despite our encounter being a singular and final occurrence, he managed to uncover my identity as a political and cultural activist against the regime when I declined his invitation to meet him at the Islamic Centre of England. While I consider myself courageous for opposing the Islamic regime from its inception, I am not foolhardy enough to venture into a potential terrorist haven, risking my safety. Consequently, the students under consideration failed to secure the required visas. Nevertheless, this incident catalysed a notable outcome, prompting my investigation into the motivations behind the Chief of the Islamic Regime’s Revolutionary Guards' brother concealing his true identity and the purpose of his presence in the UK. It swiftly became evident that he was overseeing a complex network involving the Islamic regime’s propaganda and infiltration in the UK.

 

Safavi,[[1]] in collaboration with his younger brother Mostafa[[2]] and his wife Mahvash Alavi,[[3]] has methodically orchestrated a network of businesses[[3, 4, 5]] and propaganda hubs, shrewdly concealed under the pretext of cultural and religious research. Through the course of the investigation, it became evident that this network is of such magnitude that only a national security agency possesses the capability to interlink its various components, given that although headquartered in the UK, it has extended its influence across the expanse of Europe.

 

Nevertheless, over the span of a few years, he underwent a notable transformation, changing his forename from ‘Gahreman’ to ‘Salman’ and adopting the appearance of a cleric by donning a longer beard, a mullah's turban, and cloak. Subsequently, he began introducing himself as Hujjat al-Islam Seyed Salman Safavi, engaging in the teaching of Shia fundamentalism and assuming the role of leading Friday prayers at the Islamic Centre of Europe. (photo below)

 

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in fact, the presence of the brother of the former Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and current Supreme Military Advisor to Ali Khamenei in the UK strongly suggests that the Islamic Centre of England should be considered an extension of the Revolutionary Guards within the country. A momentary contemplation of the potential damage this organisation can inflict on UK national security leads to a stark conclusion: the three past terrorist incidents pale in comparison to the potential repercussions that may yet transpire.

 

3. THE ISLAMIC CENTRE OF ENGLAND

In the unveiling of the intricacies inherent in the affiliation between the Islamic Centre of England and the promulgation of the Islamic Regime on an international scale, a disquieting reality surfaces, a surreptitious portal leading to a pervasive to UK security threat. This discourse is dedicated to accentuating the exigency of subjecting the activities of this institution to meticulous scrutiny, with a comprehensive exploration of the labyrinthine network of its connections that palpably imperil the security fabric of the United Kingdom and, by extension, the global community.

 

The establishment of the centre is attributed to a hardline cleric named Mohsen Araki. For the establishment of the centre, he was personally dispatched to the UK by Ali Khamenei, where an undisclosed amount was transferred for Its founding. According to official records, the regime acquired the building for the centre in 1996, at a cost of £1,200,000. The building is a 1913 Grade II Listed, former 1,001-seat cinema, recognised as the Maida Vale Picture House, where the regime paid in excess of £500,000 to convert it into an Islamic centre.

 

 

3.1. Who is Mohsen Mohammadi Eraqi?

Mohsen Araki, akin to many leaders of the Islamic regime in Iran, is not of Iranian birth and heritage. He was born as ‘Mohsen Mohammad Al-Iraqi’ on 6th January 1956 in Najaf, Iraq, and subsequently altered his name to assume an Iranian identity. The alteration of name and identity ensued in response to the tumultuous events of 1974, wherein Saddam Hussein forcefully expelled a notable Shia population from Southern Iraq, compelling their migration across the Iran-Iraq border. Swiftly responding to this humanitarian crisis, the Shah of Iran extended refuge to the displaced Shias, accommodating them within the Iranian province of Khuzestan and its contiguous territories. Mohsen Araki, accompanied by his family, became one of the many beneficiaries of this refuge, choosing to relocate to Iran.

 

However, a pivotal shift occurred in 1978. Following Saddam's expulsion of Ruhollah Khomeini from Iraq, Khomeini found asylum in Paris under the Carter administration, ostensibly to prepare as an opposition figure against the Imperial government. Paradoxically, Mohsen Araki, rather than expressing gratitude to Iran and particularly to the Shah for extending refuge and providing a new life, turned against the very benefactors. Araki orchestrated mobs, directing them to assail governmental edifices and financial institutions, with the apparent intent of sowing chaos and instability in Iran.

 

In the subsequent ascendancy of the Islamic regime to power, Araki assumed pivotal roles, initially as the head of revolutionary courts in Abadan and Khorramshahr, and later in the Khuzestan Province. Occupying these positions, he orchestrated the execution of thousands of Iranians, specifically targeting members of the armed forces and elites on charges of being counter-revolutionary. This marked a dark chapter in Araki's trajectory, culminating in his appointment as the director of the Khuzestan Province Justice Department.

 

Following the demise of Khomeini and the ascent of Ali Khamenei to power orchestrated by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Araki further entrenched himself in the corridors of power. His allegiance to Khamenei solidified, resulting in his appointment as Khamenei's representative to the Badr Brigades, an Islamist militant group under the control of the Quds Force ('Jerusalem Force'), one of the five branches of the regime’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iraq, lead by Qasem Solimani. Subsequently, he founded the militia wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, also known as the '9th Badr Corps,’ directly under the supervision of IRGC and Khamenei himself. This military arm of IRGC is divided into 48 militant groups in Iraq and 28 groups in Lebanon to assist Hezbollah.

 

Therefore, drawing upon the expertise acquired through the establishment of the military and political infrastructure of the regime in Iraq and Lebanon, he was deployed to the UK as Khamenei’s special representative in 1994. In the subsequent year, he founded the Islamic Centre of England ostensibly under the banner of Islamic teaching. However, it is not difficult to deduce that the centre is aligned with the structures he had previously orchestrated in tandem with the militant groups in Iraq and Lebanon.

 

Nevertheless, recent revelations have brought to light a perplexing facet of Araki's narrative, a potential possession of British nationality [[5]]. In one of the Companies House documents, Araki's nationality is recorded as British. Whether this information is falsely provided by Araki, constituting a breach of Companies House regulations, or if he genuinely holds British citizenship, is a pivotal question. The accountant responsible for submitting the accounts to Companies House, in affirming Araki's British nationality, may have been prompted by Araki himself, thereby potentially revealing his citizenship status in the UK.

 

If proven to be the case, this revelation engenders profound inquiries, particularly in light of Araki's standing as a member of the regime's assembly of experts. Notably, members of this assembly are restricted from holding any nationality other than Iranian. Moreover, Araki, identified as a hardliner aligning with the prevailing sentiment among hardline clerics, vehemently denounces the West and monarchism as political systems. Consequently, the acquisition of British citizenship by Araki presents a perplexing and seemingly counterintuitive development. Yet, it is anticipated that an individual like Araki, specifically a mullah, would manifest an inherent disdain for the monarchy within the Iranian context. This sentiment coalesces with the Persian metaphorical adage that 'flies thrive in a swamp', symbolising an anticipated aversion to established institutions, such as the Islamic regime, capable of exploiting the country at their discretion. It is also unsurprising that the proclivity to engage in duplicity and lead a bifurcated existence resonates with the core ethos of 'lies and deception', elucidating why there is no hesitation in pledging allegiance[[6]] to the British Monarchy.

 

However, a paramount concern emerges regarding the efficacy of the British authorities' scrutiny. This inadequacy is particularly disconcerting when considering the conferral of citizenship upon an individual with a documented history intertwined with crimes against humanity and the espousal of Islamist extremist ideologies. This juncture demands not merely contemplation but a well-contextualised scrutiny is imperative to prevent the inadvertent embrace of individuals whose affiliations pose a palpable threat to the British national security and ethical standards.

 

 

4. THE ISLAMIC CENTRE OF ENGLAND: A NEW OVERSEAS COMMAND HUB OF THE AUTHORITARIAN ISLAMIC REGIME

 

4.1. Anti-Semitism, Radicalisation, and the Impact on the Socio-political Landscape

The reverberations of the Islamic Centre of England on the socio-political landscape of the United Kingdom are notably underscored by the institution's introduction of Quds Day (Jerusalem Day) to the country. Originating shortly after the ascent of the Islamic regime to power, this event is characterised by widespread rallies and marches, during which senior leaders of the regime deliver impassioned speeches, often culminating in fervent chants of 'Death to Israel and Death to America.'

 

These demonstrations, conventionally orchestrated under the aegis of the Hezbollah terrorist group in Lebanon, have been instrumental in fomenting animosity and contributing to the escalation of antisemitic and anti-Israeli sentiments within the United Kingdom. The systematic targeting of British Muslims for the purpose of radicalisation during these events has intermittently precipitated a state of tumultuous unrest in the thoroughfares of London. This pernicious influence has not merely sown the seeds of discord but has also insinuated itself deeply into the intricate tapestry of societal dynamics, thereby perpetuating a deleterious impact on communal harmony.

 

 

4.2. A Branch of the Revolutionary Guards in the UK

A meticulous exploration into the intricacies characterising the interplay involving Safavi, Araki, and their nexus with Khamenei, in conjunction with their alignment with the infamous Islamic Revolutionary Guards, as previously explicated, incontrovertibly underscores that the Centre not only operates under the auspices of Ali Khamenei as a regime-propaganda nexus but, with heightened profundity, assumes the role of a substantive branch of the Revolutionary Guards Corps within the United Kingdom. This multifaceted affiliation extends beyond mere ideological alignment, manifesting itself as a potent amalgamation of militant and political facets, thereby solidifying its position as an integral arm of the Revolutionary Guards operating on British soil.

 

 

4.3. Money Laundering and Evasion of Sanctions

Beyond the purview of this centre, it is an established fact that the Islamic Regime maintains additional establishments ostensibly operating under the guise of Islamic teachings, primarily engaging in the illicit practice of money laundering.

 

A meticulous examination during the composition of this article has revealed a plethora of opaque commercial enterprises linked to individuals of diverse nationalities, encompassing Iranian, British, Pakistani, Iraqi, and Italian descent. This cursory revelation only serves to scratch the surface, delineating the contours of a complex network comprising a multitude of individuals and entities.

 

While it is an incontrovertible truth that a network of such intricacy, if conceived within the realms of a private enterprise, would ostensibly harbour objectives of fraudulent activity and a breach of financial trust, the involvement of a government, particularly one characterised as one of the world's most ruthless regimes, deeply immersed in networks associated with terrorism, murder, and money laundering, lends credence to a disconcerting inference. This suggests the orchestration of a clandestine network of sleeper cells, headquartered within the United Kingdom, poised to expand its influence and potentially cast a pall of turmoil and tyranny across Europe.

 

 

5. CONCLUSION

 

As we navigate the intricate dimensions of this intricate matter, an evolving narrative compels us to advocate for decisive action, particularly in the form of the closure of the aforementioned centre. This imperative arises as an indispensable measure to fortify not only the security interests of the United Kingdom but also within the broader context of global security considerations. The gravity of the situation necessitates an unequivocal stance, endorsing the cessation of activities at the Islamic Centre of England to mitigate the palpable risks it poses to the stability and security of nations.

 

Drawing inspiration from Sir Winston Churchill's sagacious words, 'The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see,' an examination of the historical trajectory of the Islamic regime provides illuminating insights into the potential ramifications of having such a centre in the UK. This retrospective lens serves as a valuable tool for informed decision-making, prompting a thorough consideration of the implications and risks associated with the continued operation of the Islamic Centre of England.

 

Therefore, in the event that the United Kingdom elects to overlook these ominous indicators and fails to respond with due diligence, the prospect of a delayed response carries with it the peril of escalating violence and potential bloodshed resulting from the terrorist activities orchestrated by the Islamic regime. The onus of responsibility for such a catastrophic outcome would, unequivocally, rest squarely upon the shoulders of the British Government and its security apparatus. The gravity of the situation necessitates a judicious and proactive approach, as any lapse in vigilance could precipitate dire consequences for the security and well-being of the nation.

 

Should the UK opt for a course of inaction in the face of the discernible threats emanating from the Islamic Centre of England and its affiliations, the government's failure to take decisive measures to protect and safeguard national security would be tantamount to a dereliction of duty. Such negligence could pave the way for the unrestrained proliferation of terrorist networks, establishing a stronghold within the country's borders and potentially extending their influence across Europe.

 

The adverse outcomes resulting from an inadequate response would not only implicate the British Government in a failure to protect its citizens but could also lead to severe geopolitical ramifications. A failure to address the imminent threat posed by the regime and its clandestine operations within the UK could erode the nation's standing in the international arena, with potential repercussions on diplomatic relations and security cooperation.

 

In essence, the imperative for the British Government and security services to act decisively cannot be overstated. The trajectory of events points towards a critical juncture where swift and resolute action is indispensable to avert potential catastrophe. The responsibility to preclude the impending perils rests squarely on the shoulders of those entrusted with the safety and security of the nation. Ignoring these signs could not only imperil the lives of British citizens but also compromise the fundamental values of security, liberty, and sovereignty that underpin the nation's fabric.

 

Shapour Suren-Pahlav

05 June 2017

 

 

REFERENCES:

 

1,  https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/officers/J2Tp-A0zTX9d88wAjhA-442RbtE/appointments

 

2, https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/officers/s5mAmoIL___rGhDJjTpZkhFGwpE/appointments

 

3, https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/officers/woW1l44a21HRfoTMqLYPCRpiIl8/appointments

 

4, https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/09513349/persons-with-notable-control

 

5, http://tinyurl.com/4maevtfw

 

6, https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/officers/pxU4nFaK_p2m7tGjbtgFcTy-dLY/appointments