Introduction

Amidst the geopolitical landscape characterised by regional tensions, a notable trend has emerged within Iranian sentiment towards Israel. The visit of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, a historic milestone as the highest-ranking Iranian dignitary to traverse Israeli soil, signalled a shift in perceptions. Subsequent engagements, notably a meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu, galvanised Iranian support for Israel's defensive stance against the Hamas terrorist entity.

 

This surge in support reflects a nuanced perspective among Iranians, delineating between the Israeli state and the political regime governing Iran. There exists an aspirational hope that Israelis discern this dichotomy, fostering a narrative of solidarity with the Iranian nation, distinct from their government's policies.

 

However, this burgeoning rapport encounters impediments in the form of certain Israeli narratives. Articles penned by elements within Israeli circles, advocating for the Balkanisation of Iran, pose a formidable challenge. Such rhetoric not only undermines the burgeoning goodwill but also exacerbates tensions, veering away from constructive dialogue towards a path of discord and distrust.

 

 

Attacking Iran’s territorial integrity

In an article published on 13th March 2024 by the far-right publication, 'The Jerusalem Post,' titled 'The Secret to Taking Down the Iranian Regime: Iran's Ethnic Minorities,'[1] authored by Mordechai Kedar, a retired Lieutenant Colonel turned academician with pronounced right-wing ideologies, a discourse emerged that garnered attention from numerous Iranians. However, cognizant of the need to navigate the delicate diplomatic landscape and to preserve the ongoing efforts of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi towards fostering reconciliation between the two nations, many observers have chosen to abstain from direct engagement with the content.

 

In a subsequent development less than a fortnight later, the Middle East Forum released an article authored by Michael Rubin.[2] This piece offered a critical appraisal of Kedar’s approach towards Iran, advising against the exploitation of ethnic fault lines within Iranian society.

 

Rubin’s commentary resonated widely within Iranian circles, to the extent that it was promptly translated into Persian by two London-based Persian newspapers. However, it is my contention that the most apt descriptor for Rubin’s critique can be found in the Persian proverb 'عذر بدتر از گناه,' with the closest English equivalent being the Latin phrase 'aegrescit medendo,' suggesting that the remedy may prove worse than the ailment.

 

 

The remedy worse than the disease

To commence, what Mordechai Kedar offered is not a new idea but a recycled claim previously posited by a few Israelis including Brenda Shaffer,[3] Edy Cohen[4] and Meir Dagan former Mossad Chief,[5] as well as Europeans and Americans in the past 20 years, all originating from Bernard Lewis, the British professor of Islamic studies who laid the path for an engineered Islamic revolution in Iran, which Western governments led by the US executed, resulting in the downfall of the Imperial government and the ascent of the Islamo-fascist regime to power.[6]

 

However, the only aspect distinguishing Mordechai Kedar's assertions from those of his predecessors is his level of illiteracy and lack of knowledge about Iran and Iranians apparent in his article. Apart from those pointed out by Rubin in his article, Kedar's article was replete with misinformation and mistakes that even first-year university students of politics would not make, let alone someone purporting to be a professor and lecturer at a university;, perhaps his lack of literacy is owed to his hot-headed military background turned academician, or a more fitting description would be pseudo-academic. Jarheads are not typically known for their level of education, even among Israelis, who are considered one of the most intelligent nations.

 

Now, returning to Rubin's critics, although he wisely advised Mordechai and any of his ilk not to pursue that path, as any such attempt would be futile, he also made several mistakes in his article that need addressing. Yet, one might argue that Rubin's article could in fact be construed as a refined iteration of Kedar’s, subtly advancing the same notion under the guise of realism or, as Iranians would say, 'سر را با پنبه بریدن' (sar rā bā panbeh borīdan), which translates to 'to cut one's head with cotton.'

 

For a start, while Rubin advises Kedar not to play the ethnic card in Iran, he himself throughout his article plays the same card, commencing by backing Kedar, asserting that '[he] is right to note Iran's ethnic (and sectarian) diversity.' This assertion by both is entirely incorrect. Since the tiny 76-year-old Israel with its 6 million population embodies greater ethnic and sectarian diversity compared to the ancient 7,000-year-old Iran with its 86 million inhabitants. Despite the majority being Jewish, Israel's populace comprises various races and ethnicities, encompassing Afro-Asiatic (Cushitic and Semitic, including indigenous Hebrews, Ethiopians, and Arab speakers such as Palestinian, Egyptian, Yemeni, Syrian, and Iraqi Jews), Indo-Europeans (such as Greek and Iranian Jews), Slavs (such as Russians and Ukrainians), and Khazarite Turks, who are ancestors of the majority of European Jews known as Ashkenazi. In contrast, Iran does not exhibit ethnic diversity, let alone sectarian diversity, as the majority of Iranians, apart from Turkmens and Arabs who migrated to Iran during the Qajars (1789–1925), and today, although they constitute less than 4% of Iran’s 86 million population, they also mixed with other Iranians and are distinguishable only by their language, while the remaining 96% majority belong to the Iranian race (Aryan/Iranic People). This notion is supported by scientific and genetic studies conducted by Cambridge University, which confirm that all Iranians are of the same race, despite linguistic diversity, with all of them speaking either Western or Eastern Iranian languages, both of which are major divisions of the Iranic Branch of the Indo-European language family (except for Turkish, predominantly spoken in Northwestern Iran, which was introduced by the Mongols and enforced upon the Iranians as they established their capital in Maragheh).

 

He continues by crediting Brenda Shaffer, a corrupt pan-Turkic American pseudo-academic who shares a similar Iranophobic stance with Kedar.[7] According to the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), she is identified as a lobbyist who received bribes (using oil money to bolster her academic credentials)[8] from Stalin's Azerbaijan (formerly the Iranian province of Arran) to promote Baku's interests and agendas through multiple newspaper op-eds, media appearances, congressional testimonies, numerous think tank events, and scholarly publications. The Baku or the pan-Turkic agenda is, in fact, the continuation of Stalin’s dream of annexing the historical Azarbaijan provinces of Iran, located south of the Aras River, to the Soviet Union. This was initiated by changing the name of 'Arran’ to the Soviet Republic of Azarbaijan and propagating that people south of the Aras and north of the Aras are of the same people, which is totally false. Modern DNA research confirms, in fact, that Arranis are a mixture of Iranian, Turkic, and Slavic ancestry, contrasting with the Iranian Azarbaijanis who share the same DNA as the rest of Iranians. Therefore, in a way, Brenda Shaffer is doing the bidding of the defunct Stalinist Soviet regime.

 

However, Shaffer, like many pan-Turks, insists on the existence of a hoax 'Persian ethnicity.' Pan-Turks or any other separatist groups, which without exception are linked to foreign states, by fabricating or exaggerating the existence of the hoax 'Persian ethnicity', serve to vilify and oppress minorities in Iran. By portraying Persians as the oppressors, those promoting this hoax seek to justify their own actions or policies against minority groups within Iran. This tactic can also be used to manipulate public opinion, garner support for discriminatory measures, or sow discord within society for political gain. Yet, in Iran, being Persian is not a race or an ethnicity but rather defined by their language, i.e., Persian speakers, as even asserted by Rubin himself stating “across the Middle East, mother tongue largely defines ethnicity.”

 

Therefore, Rubin, referring to Shaffer as a credible source, 'hopefully unknowingly', not only bolsters her agendas but also perpetuates misinformation and distortion of historical and genetic facts regarding the hoax Persian ethnicity.

 

In the subsequent paragraphs, Rubin in the article rightly addresses some historical facts and accurate information, including Iranian nationalism, which is inherent to every Iranian. Iran differs from its neighbours, which were created in the 19th or 20th century, many carved out from former Iranian provinces, including Afghanistan, the Republic of Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Iran, however, is millennia old, and therefore, her people possess a shared historical identity as a nation, which is not defined by language, provincial borders, or even religion. He refers to Persepolis and Shahnama (the Book of Kings) as the pride of all Iranians, including Azarbaijanis and Kurds, and uses the Iran-Iraq war as an example to illustrate that when Iranians perceive their country as threatened by foreign aggressors, they unite to defend their ancestral land and repel their enemies.

 

However, Rubin's article, characterised by a partisan tone, ultimately advocates for the implementation of federalism in Iran, indicating a potential gap in his comprehension of federalist principles.[9] It is apparent that Rubin lacks adequate education on the nuances of federalism as a political system. Federalism typically emerges when fragmented states endeavour to unite under a cohesive governance framework, as demonstrated by nations such as the USA, Switzerland, India, Germany, Nigeria, and the former Yugoslavia. This system is inherently unsuitable for countries like Iran, which boasts a millennia-old history and has never been composed of fragmented states.

 

Consequently, Rubin's proposal overlooks the historical and political context of Iran and the impracticality of applying federalist principles in such a setting, indirectly advocating for the balkanisation of Iran. Since any federal country has the right to dismantle and form individual independent states, akin to what occurred with Yugoslavia.

 

In simpler terms, 'federalism for Iran' can be understood as being essentially interchangeable with 'balkanisation', implying a potential fragmentation of the country. It is crucial for Iranians who distribute Rubin's article to understand the consequences of their actions and not to be swayed by the alluring title of 'Don't Play the Ethnic Card in Iran'. They must be vigilant and discerning, reading between the lines to grasp the true implications of Rubin's argument.

 

 

Conclusion

In summary, from a devil's advocate standpoint, Rubin's article can be interpreted a refined, and tactful rendition of Mordechai Kedar's narrative. While Kedar's rhetoric may be likened to that of a disruptive force, akin to a bull in a china shop, brash and confrontational, Rubin appears to espouse comparable ideologies albeit with a more nuanced and understated approach. This suggests a strategic dissemination of similar concepts through subtlety and refinement.

 

As an Iranian, it may initially seem astonishing, but I am inclined to embrace viewpoints akin to those espoused by Mordechai Kedar. Such perspectives signify that our adversaries have sourced their information from a marginalised faction of separatists, who are vociferous but lack considerable influence. Consequently, any conclusions drawn and policies formulated based on their misinformation inevitably lead to misconceptions regarding the Iranian psyche. It is paramount to note that when our adversaries possess an inadequate understanding of our nation, their capacity to inflict harm is notablely diminished. One of the reasons why the despotic regime of the Mullahs has managed to retain power for the past 45 years in Iran is precisely because they have adhered to the same principles that the Mullahs have preached from the minbars (pulpits).

 

For the past two centuries, the Mullahs have disseminated their teachings from the summits of their seminary pulpits, meticulously observing the Iranian nation and assimilating an intricate understanding of their psychology. This insight enabled them to infiltrate the collective consciousness and adeptly manipulate it to their advantage. However, the young generation, unlike their predecessors, have never occupied the lower echelons of these pulpits. Consequently, the Mullahs lack insight into their psyche, rendering them ineffectual in exerting control over them. Conversely, the young generation has taken it upon themselves to study the Mullahs and discern their vulnerabilities. Armed with this knowledge, they have become formidable adversaries, making life for the regime unbearably challenging. These dynamic underscores the profound shift in power dynamics and signifies the potential for transformative change in Iran's socio-political landscape, which will undoubtedly play a pivotal role in bringing the regime to its knees.

 

However, figures such as Mordechai Kedar only serve the Islamo-fascist regime in power, as rightly observed by Rubin, who asserted: 'To signal to Iranians, however, that the goal of the West is dismantlement of their country is to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.' The regimes strategically leverage Kedar’s article to garner the support of Iranians apprehensive about the potential threat to their nation's territorial integrity. Conversely, figures such as Mordechai Kedar or Brenda Shaffer may harbour a vested interest in the preservation of the existing regime. In the hypothetical scenario of Iran undergoing a transition towards democracy, particularly with the ascendancy of a constitutional monarchy, there emerges the tantalising prospect of not merely stabilising Iran but also fostering regional tranquillity. Such an evolution could herald the cessation of belligerent entities like Hezbollah or Hamas, alongside other Islamist extremist groups. This, in turn, might precipitate the discontinuation of military and financial support from the United States to Israel.

 

Henceforth, the prevailing Islamic regime in Iran, akin to numerous despotic regimes throughout history, is destined to crumble, paving the way for Iran's resurgence. In its stead, an emancipated, democratic Iran has the potential to emerge as a steadfast ally to Israel. This prospect is particularly notable considering Israel's status as the most vilified nation globally, especially within the Islamic world. What Israel truly necessitates amidst such hostility is a bona fide companion, not another formidable foe.

 

 

Footnotes:

1 – Kedar, M. (2024) ‘The secret to taking down the Iranian regime: Iran's ethnic minorities, opinion’, The Jerusalem Post (13 March). Available at: https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-791633 [Accessed 25 March 2024].

 

2, Rubin, M. (2024) ‘Don't play the ethnic card in Iran’, Middle East Forum (25 March). Available at: https://www.meforum.org/65715/dont-play-the-ethnic-card-in-iran [Accessed 25 March 2024].

 

3 – Mamedov, E. (2020) ‘How a hawkish Washington "think tank" is promoting ethnic strife in Iran?’, Responsible Statecraft (23 July). Available at: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2020/07/22/how-fdd-is-promoting-ethnic-strife-in-iran [Accessed 25 March 2024].

 

4 – Elaph (2017) ‘[Title unavailable]’, Elaph (November). Available at: http://elaph.com/Web/Opinion/2017/11/1177819.html [Accessed 25 March 2024].

 

5 – The Guardian (n.d.) ‘US embassy cables: Israel grateful for US support’. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/120696 [Accessed 25 March 2024].

 

6 – Suren-Pahlav, S. (2018) ‘Bernard Lewis Dies At 101, But His Cartographies Endure: Zionism, Eurocentrism, And The Engineered Balkanisation Of Iran’, (20 May). [online] Available at: https://bit.ly/4n4BZph [Accessed 25 March 2024].

 

7 – Farrokh, K. (n.d.) ‘Pan-Turanism takes aim at Azerbaijan; a geopolitical agenda Part VI: Geopolitical interests & petroleum diplomacy’, CAIS Online. Available at: https://www.cais-soas.com/CAIS/Iran/pan_turkism_takes_aim_at_azarbaijan/part_vi.htm [Accessed 25 March 2024].

 

8 –  Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (2015) ‘How to build yourself a stealth lobbyist, Azerbaijani style’ (22 June). Available at: https://www.occrp.org/en/corruptistan/azerbaijan/2015/06/22/profile-of-an-undercover-lobbyist-for-azerbaijan.en.htm [Accessed 25 March 2024].

 

9 –  Suren-Pahlav, S. (2013) The federalist trap: the blueprint for balkanisation of Iran [online]. Available at: https://bit.ly/45vB4bJ [Accessed 25 March 2024].

 

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