“In politics, nothing happens by accident. If it happens, you can bet it was planned that way.”

– Franklin D. Roosevelt

 

 

Introduction

On the 3rd of January 2024, a commemorative ceremony organised by ‘the Shia-Ochlotaric’[1] Islamic Regime to pay homage to Qasem Soleimani, the former head of the Quds Force—an overseas branch of the notorious Islamic Revolutionary Guards—unfolded at his gravesite in the eastern province of Kerman, Iran. This occasion was abruptly disrupted by two explosive devices, leading to the loss of 103 lives and leaving 284 individuals injured.

 

The event sought to commemorate the fourth anniversary of Soleimani's death, a consequence of a drone attack authorised by Donald Trump in 2020. While his death invoked profound sorrow among the supporters of the Islamic Regime, a majority of Iranians viewed it as a moment of jubilation, marking the end of one of the regime's oppressors, whose hands were tainted with the blood of fellow Iranians. Iranians, in a derogatory manner, refer to his death as "Kotelt" (a Persian term for "cutlet"), drawing a connection between his smashed and mutilated body after the drone strike and the minced meat used in making cutlets The Times of Israel, 2023).

 

However, the twin explosions were strategically aimed at a procession en route to Soleimani's grave. The initial detonation occurred 700 yards from the grave, while the subsequent blast transpired a further half a mile away, where a significant number sought refuge running away from the first explosion. Among the casualties were three valiant paramedics responding to the initial explosion, only to become victims themselves in the ensuing chaos of the second blast. The preponderance of the fatalities is believed to be attributable to the second explosion, exacerbated by the pandemonium that ensued, resulting in several injuries from trampling during the panic-stricken aftermath.

 

The intricately placed explosive devices demonstrated a calculated design, strategically positioned to evade detection at the security gates. The meticulously orchestrated explosions exhibited a temporal disjunction of approximately 10 minutes, suggestive of a methodical execution. According to reports disseminated through regime-controlled media channels, the assailants deployed two briefcase bombs at the entrance, activated remotely to perpetrate this nefarious act.

 

 

Exploring the Culprits

To establish the culprit, perpetuating a narrative demands careful scrutiny and impartial investigation. The task at hand involves unravelling the complexities surrounding this incident, discerning the true actors involved, and disentangling the web of political motivations that invariably accompany such heinous acts.

 

In the immediate aftermath, the Islamic Regime expeditiously designated these events as a terrorist attack, adhering to a predictable pattern of attribution. Unsurprisingly, the regime promptly attributed responsibility to Israel, while others, such as the United States, pointed the finger at the Islamic State (ISIL) or other Sunni extremist groups. Conversely, some attributed the incident to the Islamist-Communist terrorist group of the Mojāhedin-e-Khalq (MEK), given its historical involvement in such terrorist attacks in Iran.

 

 

1 – Israel

It has become a recurrent theme that the Islamic Regime consistently connects every single event to Israel. While Israelis are indeed behind some incidents, including the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, not every occurrence can be attributed to them. Thus far, Israelis have demonstrated a focus on targeting the regime's nuclear scientists and facilities, as well as its forces outside Iran, particularly in Syria. However, they have never targeted civilians.

 

The second reason stems from the Israelis' experiential knowledge. The elimination of regime members, such as the Revolutionary Guards outside Iran, consistently elicits expressions of support from Iranians towards Israel for dismantling another regime henchman. A recent manifestation of this transpired during an Israeli airstrike outside the Syrian capital, Damascus, on 25th December 2023. This strike resulted in the death of Seyed Razi Mousavi, a senior adviser in the regime's Revolutionary Guards. Iranians, drawing parallels to the manner in which he met his end, akin to Qasem Soleimani, and considering their close friendship, prompted them to dub the strike the "Kotelt Party" (Cutlet Party).

 

Therefore, Israelis are cognizant that they enjoy the support of the Iranian nation and would not jeopardise it by targeting civilians, which would only provoke anti-Israeli sentiments. Not to mention, during the current conflict with Hamas, the singular nation on earth that provided full support to Israel, not the government or regime, has been the Iranian nation. This, indeed, could be the primary reason Israelis were not behind the recent attack on the Kerman ceremony.

 

Nevertheless, this should not be interpreted to mean that Israelis are friends of Iran or of the Iranian nation. On the contrary, over the past three decades Israel has consistently, whether through clandestine operations or overt political discourse, attempted to foster divisions among Iranians and has at times explicitly advocated the fragmentation or ‘balkanisation’ of the Iranian state (Suren-Pahlav, 2021).

 

 

2 – Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) or other Sunni Terror Groups

Whilst it is understandable why the United States attempted to attribute blame to ISIS/ISIL, colloquially known as ‘Daesh’, or other Sunni groups as a tactical manoeuvre to attenuate tensions between the Islamic Regime in Iran and Israel, and thereby forestall an undesirable conflict between these two nations, the aforementioned assertion is precipitously posited without substantive merit. This is particularly evident when juxtaposed with the available evidentiary corpus.

 

Primarily, the erstwhile menacing spectre of ISIS/ISIL, which once cast its shadow over Iraq and Syria in 2014, now presents itself as a mere vestige. The remaining core members, notwithstanding their proclamations of affiliation and intermittent vocalisations, operate more as lone actors rather than a cohesive, organised entity.

 

Secondarily, the terrorist group found fertile ground exclusively in nations boasting a Sunni majority. Its primary objective has been the destabilisation of regimes with the intent of expeditiously annexing territory (Wright, 2016/2017). Conversely, Iran's Sunni demographic, whilst lacking precise quantification, hovers between 5 to 10 percent (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Predominantly comprising Iranian Baluchi and Kurdish speakers, as well as Turkmen and Arab refugees, they are dispersed across the southeast, northwest, northeast, and southwest provinces respectively.

 

Tertiary to our considerations, the absence of any sanctuary for the terrorist group within Iran is palpable. In the hypothetical event of a lone wolf operative infiltrating Iran's borders, their terrorist activities would inevitably gravitate towards cities in proximity, particularly within the South-Eastern or North-Western regions.

 

Quaternarily, it is imperative to underscore that the modus operandi of ISIS/ISIL's terrorist activities has hitherto eschewed the realm of surgical, high-tech attacks akin to those witnessed in Kerman, where remote detonation of bombs concealed in briefcases transpired.

 

Lastly, notwithstanding the ostensible antagonism of all Sunni groups, including residual elements of ISIS/ISIL, towards the Shia regime in Iran and the broader Iranian populace, a noteworthy refrain from adopting a belligerent stance vis-à-vis Tehran is observed. This abstention is intricately tied to the ongoing conflict between Hamas and Israel. The reluctance to issue statements against the Islamic regime becomes manifestly apparent, unintentionally aligning these groups with the regime in a shared front to fortify Hamas.

 

Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, there looms the prospect of a resurgent core of ISIS/ISIL or other Sunni groups seeking to exploit the prevailing circumstances in the foreseeable future. In this envisaged scenario, the pursuit of acknowledgment through the claim of responsibility for the Kerman bombing surfaces as a plausible stratagem, one foreseen and strategically relied upon by the Islamic regime in Iran.

 

Moreover, individuals predisposed to credulity and condemnation of the terrorist act during the discourse on the reprehensible events in Kerman inadvertently contribute to the regime's consolidation of ground and garnering of support.

 

It is crucial to underscore that the Islamic Regime in Iran and Daesh (ISIS/ISIL) represent two sides of a coin of Islamic terrorism, thriving on bloodshed, fear, and regressive ideologies. This juxtaposition reveals an inherent symbiosis rooted in a shared commitment to extremist practices. The narrative and actions of one entity inadvertently strengthen the other, delineating a symbiotic relationship within the broader context of Islamic terrorism that perpetuates violence, instils fear, and fosters backwardness.

 

 

3 – Islamist Terrorist Group of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK)

The terrorist group known as the Mojāhedin-e-Khalq (MEK) is an Islamist faction whose ideology intertwines with communism, anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism, and anti-American sentiments. It boasts a long history of terrorism within Iran. The terrorist group was initiated through numerous acts of violence, including the murders of Imperial Iranian intelligence and police officers. They also targeted US-owned hotels, airlines, and oil companies in Iran, being responsible for the deaths of six Americans before 1979. Functioning as the military arm of the new Islamic regime, their favoured slogans during that period were "Death to America by blood and bonfire on the lips of every Muslim is the cry of the Iranian people," and "May America be annihilated." These fervent declarations persisted until they yielded in the power struggle against the Mullahs (The Guardian, 2018).

 

Following their defeat in the battle for power against the Mullahs, they aligned themselves with Iraq against Iran. For nearly two decades, under their embittered leader Massoud Rajavi, the MEK orchestrated attacks on civilian and military targets across the Iranian border, aiding Saddam in suppressing his domestic foes. However, after siding with Saddam, who indiscriminately bombed Iranian cities and routinely employed chemical weapons in a conflict that claimed a million lives, the MEK lost almost all the support it had maintained within Iran.

 

The group and its members are now widely regarded as traitors by the majority of Iranians and are as intensely despised as the regime in power. Despite the MEK having perpetrated numerous terrorist attacks, such as the Kerman attack, most of its members, now in their 60s living in Albania, are relegated to forming a cyber army behind computers. Lacking manpower in Iran to execute such attacks, thus they can also be discounted as candidates (The Guardian, 2018).

 

This leaves the only two plausible culprits: the Islamic Regime itself – or – the United States.

 

 

4 – The Islamic Regime and the False Flag Operation

With the scheduled Legislative elections in Iran on 1st March 2024, a prevailing aura of anticipation surrounds the political landscape. Projections foretell the lowest voter turnout, a manifestation of the prevailing discontent within the nation. This sentiment arises from a burgeoning awareness among Iranians, transcending the historically entrapping narrative of political dichotomy, characterised by the ostensible struggle between conservatives and reformists, reminiscent of the British 'Punch and Judy' theatrics (Suren-Pahlav, 2011).

 

Over the course of 44 years, the Islamic regime has adroitly manoeuvred the Iranian nation, ensnaring them in a political puppetry that juxtaposes conservatives against reformists. This elaborate charade, mirroring the conventional British seaside children's entertainment termed 'Punch and Judy', sought to entice the unsuspecting Iranians into a semblance of participatory governance. It cultivated an illusion that their fate hinged on the act of voting, affording the regime international recognition and asserting the legitimacy of its mandate ostensibly derived from the democratically elected government. This charade unfolds even as the Supreme Leader, an unelected figure, ascends to power through the Shourā-ye Negahbān (The Guardian Council), the same unelected council that sifts through all MPs and presidents, leaving the Iranian nation with a binary electoral choice between 'the evil' and 'the evil’s brother'—a metaphorical dilemma akin to the noose or the guillotine.

 

However, the recent awakening of the Iranian public has finally dismantled this illusion, revealing the inherent duality of reformists and conservatives as two facets of the same political coin (Suren-Pahlav, 2011).

 

This revelation has precipitated an unprecedented period of instability for the regime. The disillusionment, particularly among the traditional supporters of the regime, emanating from rural and religious sectors, has left the Islamic Regime grappling with the spectre of waning influence. In response to this disaffection, even the regime’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei (or his purported body double [2]), has taken to the airwaves, beseeching these segments to "fulfil their duty" by participating in the impending elections.

 

Hence, the regime's conspicuous unease over diminishing public involvement is unequivocally manifested in its conduct, notably accentuated by the glaring absence of pivotal regime figures. Specifically, leaders of the Islamic Regime, senior Revolutionary Guards with historical proximity to Soleimani, local authorities, including the influential Friday Prayer Imam of Kerman, and even Soleimani's family—situated in Tehran during the bombings—all conspicuously refrained from participation.

 

By judiciously maintaining the non-attendance of these key figures at the event, the regime endeavours not only to shield them from potential harm, albeit at the expense of those Iranians who perished or injured in the bombings, but more significantly, to instil a profound sense of fear and vulnerability, within the traditional loyal supporters who have historically aligned themselves with the regime. This calculated abstention from the commemorative ceremony effectively implicates the regime in orchestrating the tragic episode.

 

The synchronicity of the Kerman bombing with the impending elections and the Iranian nation's collective decision to abstain reflects a logical dimension to the regime's actions. By weaving a false flag narrative that implicates external influences, the regime endeavours to stir public sentiment, framing the upcoming elections as a pivotal battleground against perceived external threats.

 

This calculated manipulation of sentiment among the regime supporters not only reveals the regime's adeptness in employing psychological tactics but also signifies a strategic endeavour to secure and consolidate power within the intricate landscape of Iranian politics.

 

Moreover, the Islamic regime, in light of its well-documented history, has attained conspicuous international notoriety, being widely characterised either as a state sponsor of terrorism or as a regime directly involved in acts of terrorism within the region of Western Asia. Following the recent bombing incident, the regime's conspicuous response, marked by the performative shedding of crocodile tears and the orchestration of a narrative portraying itself as a victim.  This calculated narrative seeks not only to deflect attention from its alleged complicity in the tragic event but also to manipulate the perception of global onlookers. The regime, through its rhetoric, attempts to portray itself as an aggrieved party, diverting scrutiny from its own actions and presenting itself as a victim of external machinations.

 

This deliberate strategy of projecting victimhood is not only an attempt to garner sympathy but also serves as a subtle manoeuvre in the intricate realm of international relations. By positioning itself as a victim, the regime aims to influence global perceptions and mitigate the potential diplomatic repercussions that may arise from its association with terrorism.

 

In summation, the regime's response to the recent bombing incident, distinguished by ostentatious displays and a narrative imbued with victimhood, not only fails to mitigate its entrenched international notoriety but rather exacerbates the perception of its involvement in activities prejudicial to regional stability. This meticulously orchestrated reaction stands as a poignant illustration of the regime's adroitness in deploying strategic narratives within the intricate milieu of global politics, albeit with potential ramifications for its position on the international stage.

 

 

5 – The United States

One must entertain the prospect that the recent bombing may not have been orchestrated by the Islamic Regime. Despite the regime's propensity to exploit the situation, as elucidated earlier, there exists a conceivable scenario wherein the United States, rather than the Islamic Regime, orchestrated the terrorist attack. The motive behind such a Machiavellian manoeuvre could be to not only ensnare Joe Biden’s presidency for the second term but also to satiate the voracious appetite of the US war machine, which craves another conflict in the Middle East.

 

In the concise history of the United States, ‘no U.S. president, even an unpopular one, has ever lost a re-election campaign during wartime’, (Wsonn, 2019). It has become apparent from consensus that there is a strong possibility Donald Trump will defeat Biden in the upcoming presidential election in November this year. Furthermore, whenever the US faces economic hardship, it is a war that serves as its salvation. Notably, the US is a military machine that requires warfare periodically, akin to how an addict needs illicit drugs in its veins. The only country that could fulfil such a requirement is the Islamic Regime in Iran, capable of igniting a fresh regional conflict with one of its neighbours, mirroring the contours of the 1980s Iran-Iraq war.

 

Therefore, in this speculative scenario, the bombing might have been executed by clandestine agents of the United States within Iran, operating under the guise of the Taliban or another Sunni extremist faction. The expeditious attribution of blame to the Taliban by the United States could be construed as a calculated move, given the understanding that the Islamic regime in Iran is prone to volatility and might react irrationally. Such a calculated response would ensnare Iran into a potential conflict with Afghanistan under Taliban control. Anticipating this, the United States, much like its historical strategy in the Iraq-Iran conflict, could arm the Taliban, maintaining a strategic stalemate while siphoning resources from both nations.

 

Nevertheless, the potential reaction from the Islamic Regime could be far-reaching, leading to ill-considered actions that may draw Pakistan into a conflict where Iran's chances of survival would be minimal.

 

Presently, the Iranian armed forces stand in stark contrast to their 1980s counterpart, having devolved under the aegis of the Islamic regime. Bereft of the imperial government's training and cutting-edge weaponry, the current Iranian military is ill-equipped to contend with Afghanistan, let alone confront a nuclear-armed Pakistan boasting advanced military capabilities and sustained financial backing from Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf Arab states. Should the regime recklessly pursue such a course, it portends the irrevocable dissolution of Iran as a sovereign entity, with regional powers inevitably entangled in a conflict that would consume the nation in its entirety.

 

Furthermore, in the culmination of its seemingly desperate course of action, the regime may opt to execute a salvo of missiles directed towards Israel. This audacious manoeuvre, while inflicting harm not solely upon the Israeli populace but also precipitating the United States into a direct and consequential conflict with Iran, underscores the profound gravity of the prevailing circumstances.

 

In appraising the feasibility of such a scheme, due consideration must be given to the plausible convergence of military forces mobilised by the United States and its allies, akin to the coalition assembled during the second Persian Gulf War. This conjectural scenario posits a substantive impetus underlying the bombing incident in Kerman.

 

 

Conclusion

In light of the intricate web of political machinations and the apparent correlation between the timing of the Kerman bombing and the upcoming elections, it is plausible to assert that the terrorist attack was not an external act but a meticulously executed false flag operation perpetrated by the regime. This conclusion aligns with a historical pattern of the Islamic Regime resorting to such manipulative tactics to bolster its faltering grip on power. The reverberations of this orchestrated tragedy linger as a stark reminder of the lengths to which the regime is willing to go in its desperate bid to maintain control, strategically employing psychological tactics to secure and consolidate power in the complex landscape of Iranian politics.

 

Nevertheless, the regime has grossly miscalculated a pivotal element. This egregious undertaking not only serves to exacerbate animosity towards the regime, given its orchestration of a heinous act, but concurrently instils a lingering trepidation of potential bombings during the electoral proceedings. Such a grim prospect acts as a deterrent for individuals who had hitherto contemplated active participation in the imminent electoral process. However, the regime might seek redress by deploying an alternative stratagem.

 

On the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the regime's foundation, slated for the 12th of February, a conspicuous absence of explosive incidents is anticipated. This strategic decision is poised to reassure the regime's steadfast supporters, affirming the safety of attending voting stations. Paradoxically, the regime will exploit this tranquillity to rationalise the anticipated low turnout in commemorating the regime’s foundational event.

 

Noteworthy is the historical precedent set in February of the preceding year, wherein the meagre attendance at the regime's meticulously organised celebrations compelled resorting to the falsification of attendance figures through the manipulation of images via Photoshop. Foreseeing a potential replication of diminished enthusiasm this year, the regime may resort to sophisticated cinematic technologies, including 'deepfake' technology, image synthesis, audio synthesis, and various software tools, in an audacious attempt to deceive the discerning public.

 

 

Footnotes:

1 – The political terminology 'Shia-Ochlotarian' was coined by this author in 2012 to encapsulate the multifaceted nature of the Islamic regime in Iran. The term encompasses autocracy, Shi'ism, Islamic fundamentalism, totalitarianism, Islamic extremism, ochlocracy, kleptocracy, mafiaocracy, and kakistocracy. See Suren-Pahlav, (2012)

 

2 – For the avoidance of ambiguity, the individual presently presented by the regime as Ali Khamenei is treated here as a body double. There exists a non-negligible possibility that the original Ali Khamenei died in late 2022. Nevertheless, in the absence of conclusive evidence confirming such a development, and for the purposes of terminological consistency, the present analysis refers throughout to the individual in question as Ali Khamenei. A discussion of this claim is provided in Suren-Pahlav (2022).

 

 

References:

• Suren-Pahlav, S. (2011) ‘Reformism and the Green Movement: Factional Constructs in the Islamic Regime’s Strategy of 'False Opposition'’, suren-pahlav.com (22 February). Available at: https://www.suren-pahlav.com/en/the-reformist-movement-a-false-opposition-strategy-of-iran-s-totalitarian-theocratic-regime. html (Accessed: 04 January 2024).

• Suren-Pahlav, Sh. (2012) ‘The “Shia-Ochlotarian”: The predominant political paradigm in occupied Iran’. Available at: https://www.suren-pahlav.com/en/the-shia-ochlotarian-the-predominant-political-paradigm-in-occupied-iran.html (Accessed: 04 January 2024).

• Suren-Pahlav, S. (2021) ‘Brenda Shaffer and FDD’s ‘Iran Is More Than Persia’ and the Weaponisation of Iran’s Linguistic Diversity’, suren-pahlav.com (05 May). Available at: https://www.suren-pahlav.com/en/brenda-shaffer-fdd-iran-is-more-than-persia-weaponisation-of-linguistic-diversity.html (Accessed: 04 January 2024).

• Suren-Pahlav, S. (2022) ‘Khamenei Dies at 83: Power Vacuum, Predatory Struggle and an Impending National Catastrophe’, suren-pahlav.com (11 September). Available at: https://www.suren-pahlav.com/en/khamenei-dies-at-83-power-vacuum-predatory-struggle-and-an-impending-national-catastrophe.html (Accessed: 04 January 2024).

• The Guardian (2018) ‘Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK’. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/nov/09/mek-iran-revolution-regime-trump-rajavi (Accessed: 4 January 2024).

• The Times of Israel (2023) ‘Iran jails celebrity chef who posted cutlets video on Soleimani killing anniversary’. Available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-jails-celebrity-chef-who-posted-cutlets-video-on-soleimani-killing-anniversary/ (Accessed: 4 January 2024).

• U.S. Department of State (2022) 2022 report on international religious freedom: Iran. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State. Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/iran/ (Accessed: 4 January 2024).

• Wright, R. et al. (2016/2017) The jihadi threat: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and beyond. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. Available at: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf (Accessed: 4 January 2024).

• Wsonn (2019) ‘No U.S. president has ever blown re-election during wartime’. Medium. Available at: https://wsonn.medium.com/no-u-s-president-has-ever-blown-re-election-during-wartime-7648e5413638 (Accessed: 4 January 2024).