Introduction

As Americans prepare for the upcoming presidential election, it is anticipated that a close race might lead to Donald Trump’s return to the White House for a non-consecutive term, particularly as the Republican candidate’s campaign against Kamala Harris has gained significant momentum in recent weeks. Political observers and experts are contemplating whether the United States will witness major shifts in its policies. Trump victory would likely hinge on key battleground states. Current polling suggests that he could surpass his opponent by a margin of 2 to 3 per cent in these critical areas. If these predictions hold true, the outcome of the election may be determined more swiftly than the prolonged vote count of 2020.

 

 

1. Trump's Comeback: A Strong Possibility?

At the heart of this potential Trump resurgence lies a potent combination of economic discontent and demographic changes. Recent polls indicate that a substantial segment of voters are dissatisfied with rising inflation and the cost of living under Joe Biden’s administration. The well-known political phrase “It’s the economy, stupid” has resurfaced, with many Americans looking back at Trump’s first presidency as a better period (Lachman, 2024).

 

Another surprising aspect of the pre-election polls is Trump’s improved standing among key demographic groups. Trump appears to have gained significant traction with Latino voters, with some polls suggesting he may secure between 40 to 45 per cent of their support, a marked increase compared to previous elections. Even more noteworthy is the possibility that Trump could garner up to 12 per cent of the African American vote, which, while seemingly modest, could make a significant difference in critical swing states (Al Jazeera, 2024). Further unexpected development involves the support of American Muslims and Arab Americans. Voting patterns among these groups seem to be shifting away from traditional Democratic backing. While it remains unlikely that Trump will gain full support from this demographic, any potential split in their votes could severely impact Harris’ campaign. Consequently, although Kamala Harris is still expected to secure a substantial portion of Muslim votes nationwide, potential shifts in key areas have raised questions about the future political loyalties of the American Muslim community.

 

A key factor behind this change is rooted in the discontent of Muslim and Arab American voters regarding the Biden administration’s involvement in the Gaza conflict. Many voters from these communities are not only dissatisfied with the unwavering American support for Israeli military actions in Gaza and Lebanon but are also outraged by the revelation that the US and European governments, particularly the UK under American influence, have provided Israel with unlimited arms and intelligence to carry out what is perceived as genocide and ethnic cleansing and genocide in Gaza (UN News, 2024).

 

The Biden administration’s unconditional support for Israel’s military campaign has also increasingly polarised American public opinion, particularly given the rising number of civilian casualties, especially children, in Gaza and Lebanon. This significant support has sparked concern among educated Americans, especially the younger generation and even former US officials, who argue that such backing tarnishes America’s image amid the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

 

On the other hand, Trump has shrewdly reached out to this segment of American voters, promising to end the Gaza conflict and even visiting areas with significant Muslim populations. This approach seems to resonate with voters looking for an alternative to the Democratic stance on Middle Eastern issues and could have a significant impact in key states such as Michigan, particularly in regions with large Arab-American communities.

 

Ultimately, this unexpected voting trend highlights the complexity of American electoral politics, where traditional assumptions can be upended by current events and targeted electoral strategies, potentially paving the way for Trump’s victory.

 

In any case, it would not be long before not only Latinos, but also Arab and Muslim voters, realised that they had exchanged Idi Amin for Adolf Hitler.

 

 

2. The New Trump

Beyond economic issues, Trump’s unique celebrity style of leadership continues to appeal to a segment of voters. His supporters often cite his unpredictable nature as a deterrent against threats to American interests abroad. Additionally, Trump’s isolationist tendencies and promises to withdraw the United States from international conflicts seem to resonate with voters fatigued by foreign interventions.

 

On the other hand, Harris appears to be striving to distance herself from the weaknesses of the Biden administration. As the flagbearer of the current government, she finds herself in a defensive position, justifying policies that many Americans believe have left them worse off.

 

However, two key factors are certain: First, if Trump wins the election, he will be significantly different from the Trump of 2016. In 2016, Trump was merely a businessman with no political experience. However, following four years in the presidency and four years of battling opponents, he has become a harder and more transformed individual with no moral boundaries. This evolution should cause concern for many, particularly European allies, who have exerted considerable effort to weaken him, even going so far as attempting to curtail his freedom.

 

Second, not only will the Democrats do everything in their power to prevent Trump’s return to office, but those who conducted a campaign of vilification against Trump on behalf of the Democrats with the assistance of some European countries and politicians, will continue to mobilise forces to obstruct his path to victory. However, if he does win the election, two concerning scenarios could unfold.

 

In the first scenario, he might face a fate similar to that of John F. Kennedy, with any potential assassination attempt attributed to a foreign power to instigate a new war. In the second scenario, a situation could be orchestrated that drags the United States into an unwanted new conflict, thereby undermining Trump’s agenda for the country. In either scenario, Iran could emerge as the most probable option, especially given that the Israelis are eager to draw the United States into a war with Iran. Therefore, if Trump is elected, it would be prudent for him to adopt a pre-emptive strategy to neutralise the opponents and critics before it has the opportunity to either eliminate him or entangle his administration in a new war.

 

Ultimately, the evidence suggests that economic pressures, demographic realignments, and a growing demand for political change could fundamentally reshape American politics and foreign policy, potentially bringing an end to Petrodollar dominance and United States hegemony. In this context, he may be regarded as America’s Achilles’ heel, a disruptive figure whose rise could, for the United States, mirror the way Hitler’s ascent precipitated the end of German supremacy.

 

 

3. A Seismic Shift in US Foreign Policy

If Trump succeeds in returning to the White House, the global political landscape could witness significant transformations. Trump’s campaign rhetoric indicates that a major reassessment of US foreign policy may occur, potentially influencing international relations for years.

 

3.1 Revenge Against Critics?

Trump’s well-known penchant for personal loyalty and his repeated mentions of “revenge” have caused concern among many foreign leaders. At a recent rally in Ohio, Vance declared, “We have a long memory,” (USA Today, 2024), suggesting a possible review of relationships with nations and leaders who criticised him during his time out of office. In this regard, he will seek total surrender and subservience to his will from those who do not wish to find themselves in front of his bulldozer.

 

Sources close to the Republican campaign have stated that several European leaders who were openly critical of Trump during his previous term are now anxious as his electoral prospects improve, seeking to amend their relations with him. An insider noted, “There is a palpable sense of anxiety in some European capitals; they are worried about potential economic and diplomatic repercussions,” (Tocci, 2024).

 

The likelihood of Trump’s victory has spurred reports of behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts. It is said that several European embassies in Washington are preparing dossiers with the aim of gaining favour with a potential Trump administration by downplaying their role in his previous defeat while highlighting their countries’ contributions to US-led initiatives.

 

 

3.2 Transactional Diplomacy

Should Trump regain power, it is anticipated that he would adopt a more aggressive approach to international relations than before. Countries that maintained their support for him during his absence from office, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey under Erdoğan, and Russia under Putin, may now find themselves in a comparatively stronger position. Conversely, nations that distanced themselves from him or were overtly critical may encounter difficulties in preserving positive relations, unless they are prepared to accept a subordinate role in relation to his foreign policy objectives.

 

A senior campaign adviser commented, “In international relations, as in business, the President believes in rewarding friends and punishing adversaries. The next four years could see a fundamental reshaping of America’s global partnerships,” (The Economist, 2024).

 

This approach could have far-reaching implications for longstanding alliances and international cooperation. Countries traditionally reliant on US support might be compelled to offer more tangible benefits to maintain it.

 

 

3.3 Pressure on NATO

Trump’s stance towards NATO is likely to become more stringent, particularly with member states that opposed him. His long-standing criticism of the defence spending of US allies is expected to intensify. “We cannot continue to support Europe while they refuse to pay their fair share,” Trump said at a gathering in Pennsylvania (Jacobs, 2016).

 

This new pressure could lead to a reevaluation of US military presence in Europe and potentially strain transatlantic relations with countries that have openly opposed him. Concerns have emerged that a Trump victory could result in a two-tier NATO, where countries meeting the 2% GDP defence spending target receive preferential treatment. This scenario could initially create divisions within the alliance and potentially weaken its collective defence capabilities. Yet, while NATO member states would ultimately reject the two-tier framework, but they would be forced to escalate defence spending from the 2% threshold, possibly to 4% or even higher–to please Trump.

 

 

3.4 From Unwavering to Uncertain: Changes in US-Israel Ties

The relationship between the United States and Israel may experience subtle shifts that reflect both Trump’s historically pro-Israel stance and evolving American public opinion. While Trump is likely to maintain support for Israel, he might adopt a more pragmatic approach, potentially increasing pressure for concessions in peace negotiations.

 

At a recent rally in Florida, Trump made an extraordinary declaration about the latest Gaza conflict: “I will resolve it within 24 hours,” (Times of Israel, 2024). Although such statements may appear to oversimplify the complexities of Middle Eastern politics, they could indicate potential changes in his policies should he secure victory in the upcoming election. These shifts might compel Israel to reassess its expansionist strategies, often carried out under the pretext of self-defence. Notably, this stance could stem from Trump’s lingering resentment towards Netanyahu.

 

The origins of this resentment trace back to November 2020, when Netanyahu promptly congratulated Biden on his electoral victory, a result that Trump staunchly contested as “fraudulent.” Netanyahu’s swift recognition of Biden’s win was deeply unpleasant for Trump, who viewed it as a “ultimate betrayal” and publicly denounced Netanyahu as disloyal and treacherous.

 

Trump remarked, “The first person to congratulate Biden was Bibi [Netanyahu], someone for whom I did more than anyone else... Bibi could have kept silent. He made a big mistake,” and when Netanyahu attempted to justify his congratulatory message, Trump dismissed him with an offensive phrase: “F, k him,” (Ravid, 2021; 2023).

 

Should Trump return to power, his personal animosity, coupled with his tendency for unconventional diplomacy, could significantly alter U.S.-Israel relations. Many Israeli politicians are reportedly apprehensive about potential changes in U.S. policy. A regional analyst remarked, "No one wants to be on the wrong side of the new administration if Trump wins," (Reuters, 2024). Consequently, there is a possibility that Israelis may push Netanyahu out of office before January 2025, viewing him as a liability.

 

However, this course of action may not come to pass, owing to Trump’s critical weakness: the Jeffrey Epstein files. With claims that Epstein operated as a Mossad asset gathering damaging evidence on American politicians, and Trump being both his close friend and a participant in the sex ring, it follows that AIPAC could force him to serve Israeli interests, irrespective of his own agenda. In other words, Trump will do everything in his power to avoid imprisonment by becoming president, and he will follow Netanyahu’s instructions in the hope of pleasing him and making the case disappear, including committing the United States to a full‑scale war with Iran. However, this is a misguided strategy, and even if he attempts to hide, wherever he goes he is ultimately doomed.

 

Trump’s future cabinet picks will be the first proof of this sway. Should Trump select a majority of staunchly pro-Israel individuals, including many possessing direct financial links to AIPAC, it strongly indicate a belligerent trajectory for Iran-Israel relations, virtually ensuring war.

 

Economic Leverage and Unpredictability

Trump has threatened to increase import tariffs, which could be wielded as leverage against countries that have criticised him. His approach to foreign policy, characterised by unpredictability, could lead to sudden changes in relationships based on past criticisms or current stances towards him.

 

Economic experts caution that a new trade war, particularly with China, could have global repercussions. Apart from China, the first victims of this policy will be the allied countries of the United States in Europe, including Britain, as well as Australia and Canada, which, over the past four years, did not hold back in criticising Trump and had mobilised all their media to assist the Democrats and the 'deep state' in permanently destroying Trump.

 

 

3.5 Russia and Ukraine

Trump's stance on the ongoing war in Ukraine continues to generate considerable speculation. At a public event in New Hampshire, he asserted his ability to swiftly resolve the conflict, stating: "I will have Putin and Zelensky at the negotiating table within a week," (Sanger, 2023).

 

While foreign policy experts approach such claims with scepticism, the possibility of ending the war has raised concerns among many European NATO members. This is particularly true for those who, in fact, instigated the Russia-Ukraine conflict and have made substantial investments, expecting significant returns following Russia's defeat.

 

However, the United States and Germany, which were not involved in initiating this reckless venture but have thus far borne the costs of the war, may bring an end to this situation if Trump wins the election.

 

Since the conflict's onset on 24 February 2022, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than $174.2 billion in supplemental funding for the American response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Notably, of $75 billion in military aid, 90% remained within the United States, primarily benefiting American defence contractors and creating jobs across at least 38 states (Yale School of Management, 2024; Blinken, A. (2023).

 

On the other hand, Germany has incurred the greatest economic losses due to the war. Between February 2022 and the end of 2023, the conflict and its repercussions cost Germany approximately 4% of its GDP, equating to around €160 billion ($171 billion). This figure excludes Germany's military aid to Ukraine, which constitutes more than one-third of the total European contribution. Furthermore, for each year the war persists, Germany is projected to lose an additional $15 billion to $20 billion (Reuters, 2023).

 

Consequently, while Germany and France may welcome any negotiations aimed at ending the war, other European countries might perceive such efforts as potentially harmful to their economic interests and long-term influence. This concern is particularly significant considering that Germany and France were once the key players in Europe; their positions have now diminished, and the ongoing conflict may prevent them from regaining their former stature.

 

Notwithstanding, European nations are well aware that Ukraine alone cannot defeat Russia, and for any prospect of victory, NATO must become directly involved. Without the United States, NATO remains essentially a paper tiger. Consequently, Trump recognises this strategic reality and, should he win the election, is likely to seek to prevent these European states from leveraging United States resources to advance their own geopolitical agendas. In this context, his intention to bring the war to a close may involve the de facto sacrifice of Ukraine’s sovereignty, an outcome that Germany might tacitly accept. Yet NATO and European governments, having helped to catalyse the Russian‑Ukrainian conflict and having committed substantial financial and military resources to it, may be inclined to obstruct such a peace initiative in order to prolong the confrontation in the hope of ultimately weakening Russia.

 

Furthermore, Trump has not only indicated that he would end the war if he were to regain power, but he has also stated his intention to lift the sanctions imposed on Russia, citing their negative impact on the U.S. economy. This statement has raised concerns among some Europeans, as lifting the sanctions would not only result in the loss of tens of billions of dollars in seized and frozen Russian assets within their countries but would also eliminate hundreds of millions in annual revenue from the purchase of sanctioned Russian oil in international waters (at the outer port limit, also known as designated ship-to-ship transfer areas). For example, the United Kingdom, a significant player in purchasing sanctioned Russian oil, acquires it at a price below USD 50 per barrel, which is then sent to India for refining before being re-imported for sale at British airports and petrol stations. Interestingly, all Russian oil tankers carrying sanctioned oil are insured by Lloyd's of London, further enhancing revenues for the United Kingdom.

 

 

4. A New World Order?

Should Trump return to the presidency, the international community will undoubtedly need to brace itself for significant shifts in US foreign policy. The world that Trump would inherit in January 2025 would be markedly different from the one he left in 2020. How he navigates this new landscape, especially in relation to those who opposed him, will have profound implications for global stability and US leadership.

 

A former US diplomat has stated: “The message is clear. Those who stood against Trump may face repercussions, while those who supported him are likely to be rewarded. This marks the dawn of a new era of personal diplomacy on a global scale” (Financial Times, 2024).

 

As noted above, with the elections approaching, foreign capitals are abuzz with activity as diplomats and leaders seek to recalibrate their approach towards a United States that could once again be under Trump’s leadership. The coming months are likely to witness a flurry of diplomatic manoeuvres as nations strive to secure their positions within Trump’s potential vision for America’s global role.

 

The implications of a Trump victory, however, would extend far beyond bilateral relations. International organisations such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation, both originally created to safeguard Western interests and hegemony (Suren-Pahlav, 2015), and both of which faced Trump’s criticism during his first term, are preparing for potential challenges to their authority and efficacy.

 

While the world watches with apprehension for the outcome of this decisive election, one thing remains clear: a Trump victory would herald the beginning of a new era in US foreign policy, one that could reshape the global order for years to come.

 

 

5. Trump and Iran: His Potential Victory Would Spark Hope and Uncertainty Among Iranian Opposition?

The prospect of Trump winning a second term in the White House has prompted a wave of complex reactions among the Iranian diaspora and, more broadly, among opponents of the Islamic regime. Many are supporting him in the upcoming election, hoping to defeat Harris. This alignment with and support for Trump stems from the belief that if he were to win, he might assist them in toppling the regime and replacing it with a free, democratic government, particularly through the restoration of a constitutional monarchy in Iran.

 

However, whilst many delude themselves with the optimistic belief that Trump will dismantle the regime on their behalf, his actual Iran policy, what he truly wants, will starkly differ from what Israel orders him to do.

 

 

4.1 Rising Support

Trump’s hard-line stance against the Islamic regime has garnered significant support from segments of the Iranian opposition. Groups such as “Iranians for Trump” have been actively mobilising support, believing that Trump’s return to power could increase pressure on the Islamic regime and potentially lead to regime change. Iran’s Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, the exiled heir to the Iranian throne, has also declared his support for Trump and proposed cooperation against the Islamic regime.

 

This move underscores the hope among certain opposition figures that a Trump presidency could prove a pivotal turning point in Iran’s political landscape. Yet a grave danger lurks in Prince Reza Pahlavi’s cooperation with Israel: he imagines that travelling there has secured Netanyahu’s backing to topple the regime, but this is a fatal strategic miscalculation. Netanyahu, whatever he does, relentlessly pursues the illusion of Greater Israel, an ambition that demands Iran’s destruction be one of the last obstacles to be swept aside (Suren-Pahlav, 2021; 2024).

 

 

4.2 Historical Context and Iranian Distrust Towards the Democrats

One of the significant factors influencing the support of many Iranians for Trump is the historical distrust that Iranians hold towards the Democratic Party. This sentiment stems from events related to the 1979 so-called Islamic Revolution, which occurred during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, a Democratic president. Many Iranians have neither forgotten nor forgiven the Democrats, along with the support of countries such as Britain, France, Germany, and Israel, for their role in instigating and orchestrating the engineered Islamic revolution that led to the overthrow of the imperial government and its replacement by Khomeini’s fundamentalist regime.

 

As a result, this historical backdrop has fostered a persistent sense of scepticism towards Democratic administrations among opponents of the Islamic regime, including the majority of the Iranian-American community. Furthermore, many Iranians have criticised the Democrats for adopting an excessively conciliatory approach towards the Islamic regime, a stance that has naturally stood in stark contrast to Trump’s more confrontational policies.

 

Moreover, the appeal of Trump to many Iranian dissidents lies in his previous campaign known as the “maximum pressure” strategy. This approach, characterised by severe economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, is viewed by some as an effective tool for weakening the power of the Islamic regime. Nevertheless, if re-elected, not only would he intensify the ‘maximum pressure’ strategy to unprecedented levels to subdue the regime and extract deals for the United States—perhaps a new Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) pact crafted to let him claim victory and indulge his egotistic narcissism, yet, as noted, his desires diverge sharply from Netanyahu’s. Ultimately, he must yield to Israel’s blueprint for war with Iran, where he would gain the support of Persian Gulf Arab states, who currently endure mounting pressure from their populations to abandon the Abraham Accords, since this could ignite war with Iran.

 

 

4.3 A Complex Political Calculation

Despite the enthusiasm shown by some Iranians, both in exile and within Iran, who oppose the Islamic regime, regarding Trump's potential victory in the upcoming elections, and their assertions that such a victory would lead to the regime's overthrow. At the same time, if he is victorious, it is likely that one positive outcome would be the end of the influence of the terrorist group, the People's Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI/MEK), on Trump's policy towards future Iran. This is because Mike Pompeo (former Secretary of State), John Bolton (former National Security Adviser) and Mike Pence (former Vice President) would not have roles in his new administration.

 

During Trump's presidency from 2016 to 2020, his relationship with them was marked by tension and conflict, with Bolton's departure being particularly contentious. After leaving the administration, Bolton published his memoirs, in which he heavily criticised Trump, resulting in Trump accusing him of betrayal. This conflict has rendered any consideration of Bolton for a position in a future Trump administration highly improbable.

 

Although Pompeo had a more stable relationship with Trump, several factors make his return problematic. Despite being known as a compliant figure, his cooperation with Bolton in countering some of Trump's diplomatic instincts, particularly regarding Iran, has left lasting impressions on Trump. Bolton's memoirs revealed that both men actively sought to prevent Trump's diplomatic overtures towards Iran.

 

Pompeo, Bolton and Pence were not only known for their hardline stances towards Iranian opponents of the regime, particularly those with nationalist views such as supporters of the monarchy and Prince Reza Pahlavi, but also for their support of anti-Iranian factions, especially the terrorist group MEK. Pence's support for the MEK is especially concerning in light of his previously expressed ambitions. He has indicated that, were he to attain high office, he would actively work towards supplanting the current Islamic regime in Iran with the MEK. Foreign policy experts have voiced scepticism about this position, opining that such a strategy might engender more regional turmoil than that presently emanating from the ruling establishment in Iran.

 

The MEK, a cultic Marxist-Islamist jihadi group, is deeply loathed by Iranians for its ideological stance and for betraying the Iranian people by supporting Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. It is also worth noting that, according to leaked reports, both Pompeo and Bolton were on the payroll of the MEK and maintained close relationships with figures dispatched abroad by the regime as part of its ‘false opposition’ strategy—individuals such as Masoumeh Qomikala (known as Masih Alinejad). These regime agents, masquerading as opponents of the Islamic regime, have acted in ways that advance its objectives and have thereby contributed to its survival.

 

As a result, given past conflicts and public criticism from the three of them, it seems unlikely that any of them would be invited to join a new Trump administration, should he win the election.

 

 

5. Iran-Israel Conflict

The question of whether there is clandestine cooperation between the regimes in Iran and Israel, or whether their conflict is merely a 'political circus' often dismissed as a conspiracy theory, falls outside the scope of this article. However, if we consider the prevailing narrative presented by the Western media, that the two regimes are fiercely opposed to one another, intent on mutual destruction, then, should Trump win the election, he may attempt to resolve the conflict by employing psychological tactics aimed at undermining the Islamic regime and compelling it to abandon its pursuit of Israel's destruction. Simultaneously, he might seek to curtail Israel's 'crying wolf' posture, which serves to facilitate its expansionist policies at the expense of human tragedy and the loss of Palestinian lives. Nonetheless, there is a significant risk that such a strategy could backfire, resulting in devastating consequences for Iran and potentially jeopardising Israel's existence.

 

Therefore, if Trump were to return to power, he might appoint pro-Israeli Republicans to his cabinet who have historically advocated for military action, including the potential for Israel to attack Iranian nuclear facilities. This could include individuals such as Mike Huckabee, Marco Rubio (Senator from Florida), Elise Stefanik, J.D. Vance, Nikki Haley (former UN Ambassador under Trump), Lindsey Graham (Senator from South Carolina), Tom Cotton (Senator from Arkansas), and Ron DeSantis (Governor of Florida). Such appointments would signal to the Islamic regime in Iran that the US and Israel are preparing for a full-fledged war. If this strategy which is part of ‘maximum pressure tactic’ that mentioned above were implemented, there could be two possible outcomes:

1. Although implausible, one outcome would see the Islamic regime retreat, recognising that Trump differs fundamentally from Biden. When Trump threatens military action against Iran, he is demonstrably serious, particularly given his unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which starkly illustrated his approach to Iran.

 

2. The second outcome involves the backfiring of Trump's strategy. The regime is unlikely to yield to his bellicose rhetoric, especially if it perceives concession as exposing fatal vulnerabilities to the Iranian nation, potentially catalysing change from within. Consequently, the regime might instead choose war aimed at annihilating Israel, even accepting Iran's own destruction and the massacre of its citizens, demonstrating its disregard for both the country and its nation. This latter scenario could bifurcate into two further possibilities:

 

2a. This path could enable Israel to militarily decapitate the regime's key regional proxies, notably Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. Furthermore, a tacit agreement between Russia, the US, and Israel is conceivable, leading to Russia withdrawing support for Assad’s regime. This would precipitate its collapse and terminate the Islamic regime's influence in Syria.

 

2b. Israel could launch a direct pre-emptive strike on Iran. While potentially yielding a tactical military victory, this risks catastrophic underestimation of the regime’s ballistic capabilities, potentially bringing Israel to its knees. In this scenario, the regime would likely seize the justification to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and declare Iran a nuclear weapons state. Possessing not only the capability to develop nuclear arms but also potentially access to weapons allegedly procured from former Soviet states (in the 1990s) and North Korea, the regime might employ them in an attempt to "erase Israel from the map".

 

This would fulfil the hardliners' aspiration to enter history as 'the entity that cleansed the region of Zionism'.

 

 

6. Conclusion

While the coming months may reveal whether these hopes materialise into tangible support, Iranians must recognise that their future primarily rests in their own hands. Regardless of the election outcome, whether it results in a Trump victory or otherwise, the people of Iran must remain realistic about the extent of foreign influence on their domestic affairs.

 

Trump’s previous term from 2016 to 2020 demonstrated his limited interest in actively pursuing regime change in Iran, a stance likely to be repeated if he regains the presidency, unless ordered by Israel to lead the United States into another Middle Eastern war, thereby repeating the pattern that led to the destruction of Iraq and Libya. This serves as a clear reminder that electoral promises often differ considerably from the actual execution of foreign policy, particularly in the intricate landscape of Middle Eastern politics.

 

Despite groups such as Farashgard (Suren-Pahlav, 2018), propagating an ‘external liberation’ strategy (Suren-Pahlav, 2016; 2017), the belief that the regime would fall only if an external force imposes war on Iran, the Iranian nation should act far wiser by rejecting misplaced hope in foreign powers and concentrating their efforts on internal action. The lesson from Trump’s four-year presidency, marked by unrealistic expectations from Iranian regime opponents that ultimately led to four years of fruitless effort, should not be forgotten. Rather, the Iranian nation must urgently unite nationalists and opposition groups committed to Iran’s national sovereignty and its integral territory into a national movement to serve as ‘operational leadership’ (Suren-Pahlav, 2019); a unified political force ready to spearhead the next uprising, deliver transformative change from within, and ultimately secure the regime’s collapse and the liberation of Iran and its nation. While maintaining hope for international support and cooperation is important (Suren-Pahlav, 1999; 2008; 2019; 2023), but Iranians must ultimately rely on their resilience, determination, and collective action to shape their country’s future and, if desired, challenge and overthrow the current regime.

 

The power to shatter this regime lies solely in Iranian hands, not in the treacherous capitals of the West or Israel. They will never liberate Iran out of altruism; had they intended to, they wouldn’t have installed this tyranny in 1979. No, their endgame is brutally clear: igniting the final act of Bernard Lewis’s sinister playbook, the balkanisation and obliteration of Iran itself (Suren-Pahlav, 2018). Rise, or be carved apart.

 

 

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