Introduction

On Monday, the 14th of June, Channel 4, a British television network, broadcasted a programme titled 'the Queen and the Coup,' wherein two British historians purported to unveil noteworthy new documents illuminating the events leading to the 19th of August 1953 when Mohammad Mosaddeq was ousted from the premiership (Channel 4, 2020).

 

Channel 4, along with other news anchors such as the BBC, commenced disseminating their narrative, asserting:

‘Feb 1953, the first anniversary of Queen Elizabeth II's reign. Little does she know she is about to be embroiled in a clandestine plot to overthrow Iran's democratic leader in favour of an all-powerful Shah. Orchestrated by MI6 and executed by the C.I.A., the ensuing coup irreparably damages relations between Iran and the West to this very day. The truth was concealed even from the Queen herself. Utilising newly declassified confidential documents, 'The Queen and the Coup' unravels this noteworthy narrative for the first time.’

 

This article engages in a meticulous examination of the claims articulated in the programme. Through an assiduous scrutiny backed by a comprehensive analysis of historical evidence, it discerns that the programme's foundation rests upon a deliberate revision of historical facts.

 

Moreover, within the realm of purported evidence, some documents may superficially exude authenticity, yet a closer inspection reveals a distortion in their presentation. Additionally, a notable proportion of these documents is not only fictitious but intentionally falsified, strategically tailored to harmonise with the overarching objectives of the programme's creators.

 

This article posits that the incorporation of these misleading elements within the programme contributes to an overarching narrative that inaccurately portrays historical events. The ensuing sections will expound upon this assertion, shedding light on the implications and motivations behind such revisionism.

 

 

Who created the programme

The programme 'The Queen and The Coup,' directed and written by Paul Elston, features presentations from two relatively unknown British academics, Richard J. Aldrich, a Professor of Global Security at Warwick University, and Rory Cormac, an Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Nottingham. The programme is purportedly grounded in their alleged research.

 

Furthermore, Scott Lucas, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Birmingham, is enlisted for additional support. The programme also includes insights from various guests, among them Dr. Mehrdad Khonsari, former Cultural Attaché at the Imperial Embassy in London, and Farrokh Negahdar, a former leader of the communist terrorist group known as 'Fadaiyan-e Khalaq (majority).' It is noteworthy that Farrokh Negahdar, a committed communist and ardent anti-monarchist advocating for republicanism, currently holds a position at BBC Persian.

 

 

Unveiling Financial Opacity: The Hidden Funding Dynamics Behind 'The Queen and Coup' Production

The source of funding for the production and broadcast of the 'Queen and Coup' programme remains undisclosed. Channel 4 Britain, operating as a 'publisher-broadcaster,' commercialises its programme hours and advertising slots, relying on private film or advertising companies to develop content in response to orders from individuals, organisations, or governmental entities. These productions, encompassing films, advertisements, or documentaries, are subsequently broadcast on channels such as Channel 4.

 

A case in point is Channel 4's decision in 2008 to delegate its annual Christmas message to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the president of the Iranian regime, noted for his anti-Israeli stance and Holocaust denial. This instance implies a message commissioned and financed by the Islamic regime. Consequently, Channel 4's ethical standing and dependability are brought under scrutiny.

 

Furthermore, 'The Queen and the Coup' was produced by Brave New Media, a British private company based in the United States. The entity behind the financial backing for the programme's production and acquisition of broadcast hours from Channel 4, especially during 'Prime Time,' remains undisclosed. Consequently, the endeavour to gauge and infer the funding source, amounting to several hundred thousand pounds, and its ultimate purpose poses a formidable challenge.

 

 

Truth Behind Trumpery

The inaugural step in exposing the fallacies embedded within this programme mandates the meticulous extraction of extraneous narratives, directing our attention towards the documentary's essence. Situated prominently within the documentary is the alleged correspondence, a telegram directed to the late His Imperial Highness Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the sovereign of Iran. Notably, the monarch misinterpreted its contents, perceiving it as an entreaty from Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, beseeching him not to capitulate.

 

Cormac and Aldrich assert that this newly discovered document has been a closely guarded secret within the State Department archive in Washington for 67 years, and they purport to have acquired it.

 

Presently, it is challenging to accept that they have obtained a document designated as a closely guarded secret and subsequently declassified, which now lies before them unredacted and devoid of blackened paragraphs and lines. It is widely acknowledged that governmental agencies frequently employ redaction as a security measure to selectively obscure details, such as names, locations, methods, or classified data, before declassification. The decision to redact information is informed by the necessity to strike a balance between transparency and the imperative of safeguarding sensitive content, particularly when divulging certain details could potentially elicit adverse reactions from the government. Consequently, the obscuration of pages in declassified documents is a purposeful and precautionary measure designed to preserve a delicate equilibrium between public transparency and national security imperatives. For the sake of argument, let us entertain the notion of this purported document existing without undergoing the process of redaction, assuming Cormac and Aldrich are veracious in their assertion.

 

The purported document ostensibly constitutes a telegram dispatched from the British Government to the State Department, serving as a mode of elucidation concerning another alleged Telegram numbered 4847, dated 28th February 1953.

 

In this telegram, the British government communicates a message asserting that the preceding telegram was 'badly drafted' and 'garbled.'

‘From London to the Secretary of State. Telegram number 4847, February 28th, 1953, 11am. Priority. Repeated information. Tehran. Priority. priority referenced embassies telegram 4844 27th of February repeated Tehran Queen Elizabeth refers of course to vessel and not repeat not to monarch.’

 

Cormac and Aldrich posit the existence of a preceding telegram, ostensibly marred by a mistranslation on the part of the Americans. Within this narrative, they contend that Anthony Eden, the then British Prime Minister, purportedly dispatched a telegram to the State Department, seeking the transmission of a message on behalf of Queen Elizabeth II to Lloyd Henderson, US ambassador in Tehran. The essence of the message was an exhortation for Pahlavi II to resist leaving Iran. However, the crux of the misapprehension lay in the Americans interpreting the communication as originating from Anthony Eden himself while aboard the RMS Queen Elizabeth.

 

Continuing their exposition, Cormac and Aldrich underscore the chronological context, stating:

'. . . that Queen Elizabeth referred not to the monarch but to the vessel. And, of course, at this time, Anthony Eden was sailing to Canada on the RMS Queen Elizabeth to attend a conference.'

 

They further assert, 'The Americans confronted a pivotal decision, whether to acknowledge their error to the British or covertly bury it. The chosen course was one of concealment rather than admission, a decision laden with notable consequence, for Britain would have harboured profound dissatisfaction had the Queen's name been misappropriated in such a manner.'

 

Cormac and Aldrich advance their narrative, maintaining:

'The deception extended beyond this juncture. There was a deliberate effort to shield the truth from the Shah, who believed that his decisions were, in part, influenced by a request from Queen Elizabeth. The Americans were averse to the revelation that this was not the case. They sought to prevent the Shah from realising that, to a notable extent, he had been misinformed, possibly even unintentionally misled. He had been induced to take risks and extend himself based on a false premise.'

 

In a tone marked by sarcasm and condescension, they declare:

'The Shah, seemingly under the impression that he had received a message from one monarch to another, had, in reality, received a message from a vessel. Not precisely synonymous.'

 

In their ultimate assertion, they declare with finality, 'Conclusively, amidst this extraordinary episode, one irrefutable fact emerges. Prior to the purported transmission of the Queen's message, the Shah had resolved to depart from Iran. Subsequent to receiving it from the American ambassador, he reversed his decision and opted to remain.'

 

Cormac and Aldrich further assert that the American Ambassador, Lloyd Henderson, made several attempts to secure an audience with the Shah, but encountered consistent failure. Consequently, he chose an alternative approach by conveying the message indirectly through the Imperial Court Minister, Hossein Ala, subsequent to Ala's assurance that the telephone line was tapped and secure.

 

 

Exposing Fallacies

To commence, it would have been impossible for Anthony Eden to dispatch a telegram to the State Department while aboard the RMS Queen Elizabeth, given that the vessel had been non-operational for over a month. Documents reveal that the ocean liner, in January 1953, was relocated to Southampton for extensive repairs and conversion into a cruise ship, remaining there until its relaunch in 1955 (LiverpoolShips.org, 2020). Consequently, the RMS Queen Elizabeth, in February 1953 or any subsequent month following the commencement of the overhaul and work in Southampton, could not have been afloat for Anthony Eden to transmit a message from its deck.

 

Secondly, both assertions that Anthony Eden was en route to Canada for a conference, during which he purportedly sent the alleged telegram from the deck of the RMS Queen Elizabeth, constitute further inaccuracies. This is contradicted by factual information, as on 26th February 1953, Sir Anthony Eden was in Philadelphia, delivering an address at the Philadelphia Bulletin Forum on the subject of the Soviet Union (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, 1951–1954). Consequently, even if he had indeed been en route to a conference in Canada, there would have been no reason to travel by sea from Philadelphia, particularly aboard a vessel undergoing repairs in Southampton and thus unavailable for transatlantic passage. Both claims, that Anthony Eden was sailing to Canada, and that he dispatched the telegram from the RMS Queen Elizabeth, collapse under scrutiny and must be regarded as demonstrably false.

 

Thirdly, Aldrich asserts:

'In February 1953, Mosaddeq threatens Shah to resign. He says to the Shah, I've had enough of you and the Brits trying to scheme against me and overthrow my government. This unnerves the Shah, and he offers to leave.'

 

In this specific instance, these three individuals, in a strenuous endeavour to promulgate their contrived narrative as historical verity, persist in the distortion and revision of pivotal historical events. The asserted discourse, allegedly transpiring in February 1953, is incongruent with the factual chronology, for in reality, it unfolded on the 16th of July 1952 (25th Tir 1331). Moreover, with regard to the assertion that Mosaddeq accused the Shah of collusion with the British against his interests, such a proposition transcends mere naivety; it constitutes a puerile and fallacious construct. A judicious perusal of the Shah's historical record reveals a stringent adherence to imperial protocols, wherein no entity, regardless of stature, dared to impugn his integrity, let alone accuse him of affiliating with foreign entities while maintaining their corporeal existence. Ergo, the asseveration in question metamorphoses into nothing more than a figment of imaginative discourse, bereft of empirical substantiation.

 

Conversely, on the 16th of July 1952, Mosaddeq tactfully issued an ultimatum to the Shah, soliciting his approval to concurrently hold the positions of Minister of War and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (equivalent to Chief of Staff), while retaining his role as Prime Minister. He articulated that failure to accede to this demand would result in his resignation (Suren-Pahlav, 2002).

 

In accordance with the Iranian constitution prevailing before 1979, the de jure Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces was the sovereign (National Consultative Assembly, 1951). However, in practical terms, the Iranian Government wielded imperial prerogatives, guiding the Armed Forces through the Ministry of War, of which the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces was a constituent. Therefore, the appointment of Mosaddeq as the Minister of War and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, alongside his role as Prime Minister, not only contravened constitutional norms but also naturally instilled apprehension in the Shah.

 

There existed a palpable concern that, even in the event of such a breach, Mosaddeq might orchestrate a coup against the monarch, particularly given his prior appointments of his nephew as the head of the national Police force and his second cousin as the head of the National Gendarmerie. By gaining control of the Ministry of War and assuming leadership of the Armed Forces, Mosaddeq would have indisputably ascended to the apex of military power in Iran. The only remaining component to complete his ascendancy was rooted in his membership in the Qajar family, which had governed Iran before the ascendancy of Reza Shah (Pahlavi I) to power. Notably, Mosaddeq had been one of the few Members of Parliament who opposed the transition of the crown from the Qajar to the Pahlavi dynasty and had actively advocated for the restoration of the Qajar kingship. Consequently, when faced with the Shah's steadfast refusal to accede to his request, Mosaddeq tendered his resignation from the premiership (Suren-Pahlav, 2002).

 

Following his resignation, the pro-Soviet Tudeh Communist Party, the National Front, and Islamic factions led by the branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iran, along with a formidable cleric named Kashani who proclaimed a 'Jihad' (holy war) against the Shah, coalesced into a unified front. This coalition initiated assaults on governmental buildings and banks, concurrently advocating for the 'execution of Mohammad Reza Shah and the Imperial family.' Subsequently, after five days and amidst the toll of over 250 casualties, the Shah, perturbed by the escalating threats to the nation's security and stability, yielded to Mosaddeq's illegal demand. On the 21st of July 1952 (30th Tir 1331), Mosaddeq resumed his mantle as Prime Minister, concurrently assuming the positions of Minister of War and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, excluding the Imperial Guard, which retained its subservience to sovereign control.

 

Therefore, aside from the chronological inaccuracy, it is imperative to underscore that until that juncture, there existed no discernible indication of the Shah's departure from Iran. This renders the assertions thus far as unsubstantiated claims crafted by Cormac and Aldrich. In the fourth instance, Cormac and Aldrich, accompanied by the assertive statement from Scott Lucas, who asserts:

'It is now almost 70 years after that message; the Shah is long past. While I cannot directly delve into his mindset, one must consider the Shah's reverence for royalty, his affinity for ceremonial matters, and the strategic appeal to his ego. Receiving a message from the purportedly most important monarch in the world, instructing him to stay, constitutes a notable boost. This influence serves to maintain his position. There exists a pertinent English phrase, albeit somewhat archaic for an American such as myself: 'be a man, George.' Originating from the 18th century, it embodies the notion of standing up to challenges posed by the pesky Americans or confronting the French. In this context, the message to the Shah can be perceived as a 'be a man, George' directive, believed to be emanating from the Queen. The question looms: Was he truly prepared to defy such counsel and decline?'

 

Responding to this claim, it is imperative to acknowledge that the Shah harboured enduring distrust and resentment towards the British due to the forced abdication of his father following the invasion of Iran by British and Soviet forces during WWII. Despite early interactions with the Queen during their tenure as a young crown prince and crown princess at Buckingham Palace, fostering mutual respect and friendship that endured until 1979, suggesting that the Shah considered Queen Elizabeth 'the most important monarch in the world,' as posited by Lucas, appears rather supercilious and self-inflicted pretentious, reflecting an assumption of unwarranted importance or superiority. This assertion is particularly noteworthy given the state of post-World War II Britain in disarray, with the United States emerging as the prominent global power. The Shah, gravitating towards and admiring formidable nations, was a pivotal factor in his burgeoning affinity with the United States. Regrettably, the sagacious counsel of Dr Henry Kissinger, warning that ,it may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal, had not yet crystallised until late November 1968. Ultimately, this amicable association proved detrimental to him, as the Carter administration, in a deleterious turn of events, facilitated his relinquishment to the Muslim extremist Ruhollah Khomeini and his fervent adherents.

His Imperial Highness Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi receiving Her Royal Highness Queen Elizabeth II as the guest of honour in Tehran during the 1960s.

His Imperial Highness Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi during a state visit to the UK. Pahlavi II was among the select few world leaders visiting the United Kingdom, receiving an esteemed welcome from the British Royal Family.

Furthermore, in response to Lucas' commentary on 'the Shah's reverence for royalty, his affinity for ceremonial matters, and the strategic appeal to his ego,' it becomes evident that Lucas lacks the necessary education in the realm of history. His oversight lies in the failure to acknowledge that while the current British rites of royalty can only be traced back to the 19th century and the reign of King Edward VII (Queen Elizabeth's great-grandfather), the Imperial monarchy in Iran boasts a historical lineage extending back at least 3,000 BCE. The Shah's convictions were not mere superficial mimicry but were in continuation of the ancient tradition and deeply rooted in a fervent sense of patriotism and a distinctive form of pronounced xenophobia. In identifying himself as the legitimate heir to the formidable previous Empires, particularly the Achaemenid Empire as the world’s first superpower, he drew notable inspiration from historical luminaries such as Cyrus the Great. This ideological commitment underscores a profound historical consciousness, shattering any notion of a mere strategic ego appeal. The introverted disposition is discernible within the iconography of the Pahlavi dynasty, intricately interwoven with indelible vestiges of the ancient Iranian imperial legacy. This imbues the Shah's perspective with historical profundity and legitimacy. From the act of self-coronation in the Iranian ancient ritual, wherein the King of Kings assumes the mantle of divine glory, permitting only him to orchestrate his own coronation, to the ceremonial coronation of his Empress, a tradition upheld for over two millennia, the Shah encapsulates the essence of the divine. Furthermore, the commemoration of the 2500th anniversary of the Iranian monarchy's continuity and the observance of the Founding of the Persian Empire in October 1971 epitomise the grandeur and historical resonance embedded in the Pahlavi dynasty's iconography. Thereby, in expounding upon these historical intricacies, it is imperative to underscore the Shah's role as a custodian of a venerable legacy. This necessitates a departure from diminishing his convictions by directing his focus outward to countries that are comparatively youthful in the annals of history.

His Imperial Highness Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi crowning Empress Farah in accordance with Persian coronation rites, a ceremonial tradition dating back to the Sasanian Dynastic era (224-637 CE)

In the Kennedy instance, a critical historical oversight is evident in the discourse of these three individuals, despite their academic titles. Had they possessed expertise in modern Iranian history before crafting this narrative, they would have been cognizant of the fact that the Shah left on 16th August 1953 as a result of a coup d'état orchestrated by Mosaddeq. He fled the country via Baghdad to Rome. While in Baghadad, Mosaddeq’s foreign minister requested the Iraqi king Faisal to extradite him publicly for execution by hanging, a request that was refused. Three days later, the Iranian army, with the support of the nation, intervened, arrested Mosaddeq, his cabinet, comprised mostly of his immediate family (Suren-Pahlav, 2002), along with mobs, Soviet agents, including members of the Tudeh Communist Party, on 19th August 1953. The Shah returned to Iran, sparing Mosaddeq's life, who should have been executed for treason and collaboration with foreign forces, namely the Soviets. Instead, Mosaddeq was sentenced to house arrest.

 

Consequently, the assertion positing that the Shah opted against departing Iran due to an alleged message from Queen Elizabeth, coupled with the subsequent termination of Mosaddeq's premiership resulting in the dissolution of his democratically elected government, constitutes an unequivocal fabrication (Suren-Pahlav,  2002; Keddie, 2003).

 

This concocted narrative, woven from the threads of deceit involving spurious events and the manipulation of certain documents masquerading as securely guarded artefacts for nearly seven decades, stands as a reprehensible affront to the sanctity of scholarly research and historical integrity.

 

Thereby, it is imperative to engage in a thorough examination of the underlying motivations propelling this historical revisionism and document falsification. Such scrutiny is paramount for unveiling the obscured objectives clandestinely embedded in the genesis of this programme. This nuanced exploration will shed light on the intricate webs of intent that weave through the tapestry of this questionable historical narrative, thereby contributing to a more profound understanding of the forces at play behind the scenes.

 

Nevertheless, before delving into the aforementioned concerns, and in light of the meticulous scrutiny undertaken earlier, it is imperative to delve further into another notable focal point of the programme. This particular facet demands critical examination, the deliberate misrepresentation of Mohammad Mosaddeq as the legitimately elected Prime Minister of Iran and the alleged last bastion of democratic governance in the nation.

 

The need for this extended inquiry arises from the broader implications surrounding the portrayal of Mosaddeq, a key historical figure, within the context of the purported democratic history of Iran.

 

By elucidating the deceptive nature of the narrative surrounding Mosaddeq's premiership, it is essential to dismantle the foundation upon which the programme has constructed its claims. This deeper exploration will provide a comprehensive understanding of the historical context and the nuanced dynamics at play during Mosaddeq's tenure, thereby exposing the fallacious nature of the depicted democratic narrative in Iran.

 

 

Mosaddeq: A Hero or a Wolf in Sheep's Clothing

The phrase 'democratically elected' conveys the notion that an incumbent has procured their political standing through the procedural tenets of democratic governance. Within this semantic framework, the adverb 'democratically' functions descriptively, signifying strict adherence to democratic principles. This linguistic nuance accentuates the veracity and justifiability of the politician's elevation to office, elucidating their participation in a transparent and equitable electoral procedure wherein constituents have exercised their franchise in accordance with democratic norms.

 

Now, since 1979 we have heard and read over and over from the Islamic Regime, communists, pro-Russians, socialists, globalists and Iranophobes that Mohammad Mosaddeq was an elected Prime Minister and was ousted by the Shah, who was a totalitarian and despot.

 

To commence, it is imperative to clarify that Mosaddeq's assumption of the prime ministership did not transpire through a democratic electoral process akin to that observed in the United Kingdom or other democratic nations. Instead, he was appointed as the Prime Minister at the behest of the Iranian parliament, an act executed by the late Shah in accordance with the tenets of the Iranian constitutional monarchy (National Consultative Assembly, 1951). Mosaddeq's tenure was curtailed when he dissolved the parliament in response to the Members of Parliament's reluctance to endorse his consolidation of authority over the three pillars of the Iranian constitution, namely the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Members of Parliament harboured the apprehension that, armed with control over these three fundamental forces and already vested as the Supreme Commander of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mosaddeq might contemplate the annulment of the constitution. Such a potential scenario could involve a declaration of Iran as either a republic under Soviet influence or the reinstatement of the Qajar dynasty, to which Mosaddeq himself belonged.

 

It is noteworthy that during the 134 years of Qajar rule, Iran experienced a nadir in its historical trajectory. While Europe underwent transformative changes spurred by the Industrial Revolution, the Qajars remained entrenched in a stagnant past. Furthermore, Iranians harbour enduring sentiments of resentment towards the Qajars for ceding half of Iran to the Russians and British, resulting in the creation of Bahrain, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, the Republic of Azerbaijan, and Armenia from its territories.

 

In consequence, the Shah promulgated a decree effecting Mosaddeq's removal from office, subsequent to which he delivered a declamation. On the 16th of August 1953, Mosaddeq, persisting in his insubordination, declared martial law. He issued orders for a segment of the army, infiltrated by officers affiliated with the Soviets and members of the Tudeh Communist Party (Milani, 2011), to apprehend former Members of Parliament who had not acquiesced to his entreaties. Additionally, he directed them, with the backing of mobs and Tudeh party members, to storm the imperial palace and effect the arrest of the Shah, instigating a formidable confrontation with the resolute Imperial Guard.

 

Despite the ensuing intense clash, the Shah astutely managed to elude the scene, orchestrating his escape via Baghdad and ultimately seeking refuge in Rome. Hossein Fatemi, Mosaddeq's confidant and foreign minister, under the misapprehension that the monarchy and Pahlavi dynasty had concluded in Iran, ordered mobs to topple all statues of Pahlavi emperors throughout the country. However, this directive encountered resistance and resentment from the nation.

 

Subsequently, within three days, Mosaddeq's position as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces was relinquished. The army, now turned against him, meticulously orchestrated his arrest, thereby paving the way for the Shah's triumphant return to Iran.

 

Therefore, the assertion that Mosaddeq was democratically elected, and his government represented the final democratic administration in Iran, is baseless and constitutes a fabrication of historical revisionism. Regrettably, many individuals, ensnared by mass propaganda and lacking a comprehensive understanding of Iranian history, succumb to this misrepresentation. It is noteworthy that such narratives, designed to bolster falsehoods and fictitious accounts, are perpetuated by programmes deliberately crafted to perpetuate a distorted historical narrative.

 

In concluding this section, it is imperative to address an accusation levelled against the late Miss Ann Lambton OBE, who regrettably is not here to defend herself.

 

Cormac and Aldrich, in a derogatory tone, make reference to an article published on 22nd March 1951 in The Times newspaper, where Miss Lambton exposed the nature of Mosaddeq and his government. The article, which portrayed Mosaddeq as corrupt, unpatriotic, economically incompetent, and pro-Soviet, is summarily dismissed by Cormac and Aldrich as false, attributing it to British propaganda.

 

Acknowledging Miss Lambton's familial connection to Harold Macmillan, a prominent figure in Churchill's wartime administration and a future prime minister, is imperative (Pearson, 2003, p. 12).

 

Furthermore, her prior service as an MI6 operative stationed in Tehran, followed by her transition to academia at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, where she contributed to the realms of Persian Language and Modern Iranian History, adds depth to her credentials. It is the synergy between her involvement in the intelligence sector and her academic pursuits that truly positions her as an authority in deciphering the complexities surrounding Mosaddeq. Additionally, the events culminating in August 1953, leading to the removal of Mosaddeq from power, serve as a validating backdrop to Miss Lambton's insightful analyses. Her discernment of Mosaddeq's true nature and the potential ties to Islamist ideologies supported by Soviets reflects a nuanced understanding that sets her apart as a discerning British official of that era.

 

The subsequent attempts by Cormac and Aldrich to discredit Miss Lambton through a calculated smear campaign, falsely implicating her in a populist manner, become not only an affront to her legacy but also a disheartening reflection on the integrity of academic discourse. This reprehensible act, particularly when the subject is no longer present to defend herself, underscores a breach of scholarly ethics and intellectual integrity.

 

Now, the pertinent question arises: who commissioned the creation of this programme, who funded Channel 4 to broadcast it, and ultimately, who stands to gain from this propagandistic endeavour?

 

 

US Endeavours: Exploiting Susceptibility for Strategic Agendas

To address the initial question, did Richard Aldrich and Rory Cormac falsify the documents? I am disinclined to believe that is the case. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that these two fell prey to their self-indulgent arrogance and exhibited a level of naivety, rendering them susceptible to manipulation. In the first instance, it is apparent that they are not experts in contemporary Iranian history, as evidenced by numerous mistakes regarding the chronology of events. Furthermore, it is evident that they lack the investigative acumen necessary to ascertain and examine even the most minute details to confirm authenticity and credibility before presenting their findings, a quality essential for one to be deemed a meticulous and thorough historian. This lack of thoroughness is underscored by their failure to inquire about the whereabouts of RMS Queen Elizabeth or Anthony Eden before placing them in incorrect locations. Hence, the pivotal question arises: who manipulated them, and to what end?

 

One of the paramount quandaries afflicting contemporary society pertains to its reluctance to subject matters demanding scrutiny to well-contextualised interrogation, coupled with an unwarranted embrace of ideas that inherently necessitate skepticism. This phenomenon is indicative of a pervasive Americanisation, a cultural paradigm that has cast an all-encompassing shadow over the global landscape. This cultural shift is characterised by the ubiquity of fast food, the shallowness of interpersonal engagements, an ethos of self-indulgence, self-centrism, aggression, and a conspicuous detachment from tangible realities. The conduit for this pervasive influence predominantly emanates from Hollywood.

 

I contend that, alongside the looming spectre of Islamic Extremism, these cultural forces constitute the most precarious threats to civilisation, human cultures, and perhaps to the very essence of humanity as a whole, portending potential peril. Notwithstanding, due to prevailing naivety, the pronouncements of the United States government are often venerated akin to quasi-divine directives, reminiscent of the revered Ten Commandments, despite an increasing scrutiny regarding the existence of a higher power and mounting doubts cast upon the truthfulness and sincerity of the United States. Nevertheless, one of the best examples is the release of so-called secret documents by the US.

 

On the 15th of June 2017, the US National Security Archive declared the release of secret documents pertaining to the events of 1953 in Iran. As the news unfolded, a myriad of individuals rushed to peruse these documents without questioning the authenticity thereof. The imperative query that eluded the collective consciousness was whether these documents, hastily consumed by readers, could be deemed genuine. This prompts a fundamental introspection: since when has the United States been unequivocally regarded as a paragon of truthfulness, sincerity, and honesty? It becomes imperative for anyone delving into these documents to critically assess the potential motivations behind their release and ponder whether they might have been manufactured to manipulate the prevailing state of affairs in Iran.

 

Sometimes, there are instances in history where certain events don't necessitate explicit evidence to substantiate their veracity, as the evidence is so overwhelming that only a fool would question it, consider, for instance, the Holocaust perpetrated by the Nazis. In this context, there exists an abundance of compelling evidence, including photographs, testimonies from thousands of survivors, tangible and historical records, and physical confirmation, all converging to confirm the horrifying and shameful reality that unfolded in human history.

 

Therefore, when scrutinising the released documents, the pivotal question arises: beyond the assertions of US officials, which independent body or entity possesses the capacity to meticulously and autonomously authenticate their veracity? The unequivocal response is none. This necessitates a refusal to embrace information uncritically, compelling one to pose a series of additional pertinent inquiries, which, regrettably, fall beyond the purview of this review article.

 

However, it can be posited that among these alleged declassified documents, the Obama administration, perceiving the downfall of the Islamic regime as detrimental to their interests, may have falsified this telegram. They could have purposefully left it accessible for someone sufficiently susceptible and credulous to seize upon, thereby instigating a misguided crusade. In this instance, the onus of nomination fell upon Cormac and Aldrich, who, perhaps in a precipitate manner and without scrutinising its authenticity, initiated the propagation under the guise of a documentary.

 

The subsequent inquiry ought to address why this programme was conceived, produced, and broadcasted at this particular juncture.

 

 

The Veiled Machinations of Malevolence

Since 2019, a wave of protests has unfolded in Iranian cities, marked by fervent calls for the overthrow of the Islamic regime. The protests initiated as peaceful gatherings swiftly proliferated to 21 cities within a matter of hours. Videos capturing the intensity of the protests circulated widely online, eventually crystallising into the most potent anti-regime unrest witnessed since the revolution of 1979.

 

These protests epitomise an augmentation and perpetuation of a series of nationwide demonstrations and civil unrest dating back to 2016. Notable antecedents include the 2016 Cyrus the Great Revolt, the 2017–2018 protests, the 2018–2019 Iranian general strikes and protests, culminating in the January 2020 protests subsequent to the tragic incident involving Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752.

 

However, a conspicuous shift in the protesters' demands has emerged as a noteworthy factor in these protests. Initially, predating 2016, the focus centred on the call for the removal of Ali Khamenei and the termination of the 'Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist' in Iran. However, since 2016 the focus has unequivocally shifted towards a direct call for regime change. Consequently, as the demands have evolved, so too have the slogans echoed by the protesters. Notably, sentiments embracing monarchical ideals have surfaced, with calls for the restoration of the Pahlavi dynasty to Iran. Slogans expressing sentiments such as 'the country that has no king doesn't have checks and balances,' 'Reza Shah, bless your soul (Rez Shah, may your soul be joyful),' 'The king of Iran, return to Iran,' 'Freedom, democracy, constitutional monarchy,' and akin expressions have resonated among the protesters, instilling a palpable sense of apprehension within the regime and its faction commonly known as 'reformists.' Many of the latter, having exported by the regime under the guise of refugee to the Western countries, are perceived as conduits for the regime's influence abroad. Many among the latter, having been exported by the regime under the guise of refugees to Western countries as part of a strategy of ‘false oppositions’ (Suren-Pahlav, 2011), are perceived as conduits for the regime's influence abroad. Groups such as Farashgard, which are offshoots of the regime’s ‘reformist’ faction, exemplify this phenomenon (Suren-Pahlav, 2018).

 

In the first instance, when the US released the so-called secret documents regarding the events of 1953 and the removal of Mosaddeq from power back in 2017, the Islamic regime and reformists, with the backing of these documents, initiated a series of attacks on Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi. Since the rise of the totalitarian regime, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi has fervently advocated for its replacement with a government based on freedom, democracy, and secularism. Furthermore, these attacks were directed at the heart of the monarchy in Iran, where a segment of the demonstrators fell victim to the regime's propaganda, reinforced by the so-called declassified documents released by the US. They created such a fear in them that caused them a portion of demonstration to be turned off. They instilled such a sense of fear that it caused a segment of the demonstrators to be swayed away.

 

However, following a series of articles and interviews aimed at exposing the nefarious union between the US and the Islamic Regime, with the intention of dissuading Iranians from achieving the government they truly deserve, the demonstrations returned with even greater strength. Alongside this resurgence, more potent slogans emerged, unequivocally calling for the return of the Pahlavi dynasty and the establishment of constitutional monarchy in Iran.

 

Since then, various entities, including the regime, communists, Islamists such as MKO/MEK (The People's Mojahedin Organisation),  terrorist group, globalists, and those opposed to witnessing the emergence of a free and democratic Iran, have persistently sought to manipulate these purportedly declassified documents. Nevertheless, the passage of time has witnessed a decline in their exertions, as Iranians astutely discern the orchestrated nature of these manoeuvres and consciously opt to disregard such manipulations. The prevailing level of scepticism has culminated in Iranians dubbing the so-called ‘declassified documents’ from the US as 'Ayatollah papers,' insinuating the involvement of the CIA in propagating this narrative (Suren-Pahlav, 2017).

 

Henceforth, without a semblance of doubt, the programme titled 'The Queen and the Coup' emerges as the most recent and ostentatious assault on the Iranian constitutional monarchy. Its objective appears twofold: to fortify the current regime's grasp on power and to lay the groundwork for a second republican regime. Consequently, the plausible origins of this programme trace back to either the Islamic Regime's Reformist faction or the MKO terrorist group (espousing an amalgamation of Islamic and Marxist ideologies), with Mosaddeq revered as a hero by both entities as well as the ‘Shia-Ochlotarian Regime' (Suren‑Pahlav, 2012), in Iran.

 

Nonetheless, in the impending weeks and months, their declared intention extends beyond a mere translation of the programme into Persian for dissemination within occupied Iran. Instead, they envision leveraging it as a strategic instrument to undermine the legitimate demands of the Iranian nation. Nonetheless, the existing body of evidence intimates that their pursuits are poised for recurrent frustration, rendering the conceptualisation of numerous programmes of analogous nature inconsequential.

Left: Maryam Rajavi, leader of the MKO/MEK Islamist Terrorist Group, Commemorating the Era of Mosaddeq.

Right: Two stamps issued by the Islamic Regime to commemorate Mosaddeq and Kashani.

The Mirage of Proxy Politics: Iran and the Cold War West

The Mirage of Proxy Politics: Iran and the Cold War West

This brings into sharper relief a deeper epistemological concern: the selective invocation of foreign intervention as a discrediting factor in political legitimacy.

 

Iran's geopolitical positioning, bordering the former Soviet Union, rendered it uniquely vulnerable to both territorial encroachment and ideological infiltration. Soviet ambitions extended beyond influence and into concrete territorial claims, particularly in the provinces of Āzarbāyjān, Ardabīl, and Gilān (Rubin, 1980; Ramazani, 1982). Concurrently, the ascendancy of communist ideology, embodied in the Tudeh Party, posed an existential threat not only to Iran’s sovereignty but also to the broader regional order. Communism was outlawed in both Iran and the United States, and the Mosaddeq government’s growing reliance on the Tudeh Party, widely recognised as a Soviet proxy, was rightly viewed as a strategic liability by both domestic authorities and Western analysts (Gasiorowski, 1991). The Imperial Government required no instruction from abroad to grasp the gravity of this threat, nor did the West need to fabricate a justification; it lay embedded in the ideological architecture of Mosaddeq’s support base.

 

Ultimately, whether one accepts or rejects the CIA and MI6 accounts of the 1953 events depends on the degree to which these institutions are seen as credible, impartial, and historically disinterested (Suren-Pahlav, 2017; Andrew and Mitrokhin, 2000; West, 2010).

 

Their depiction of Iran’s Imperial Government as a mere Anglo-American appendage reflects less a detached reading of events than a projection of institutional self-importance. The reality is more prosaic, though no less consequential: what existed was not subordination, but a strategic convergence, most notably in the shared imperative to contain Soviet expansionism (Kinzer, 2003; Byrne, 2014). That alignment must be analysed through the prism of realpolitik, not ideological caricature.

 

Even if, for the sake of argument, one were to concede that Western agencies assisted in the Shah’s return under that strategic alignment, such support cannot reasonably be construed as proxy control, as the programme purports to suggest. By that logic, American efforts to restore various European monarchs during the Second World War would likewise render them little more than clients of Washington. Would we, then, be expected to classify Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, King Haakon VII of Norway, Grand Duchess Charlotte of Luxembourg, King Peter II of Yugoslavia, or even King Leopold III of Belgium, all of whom returned to their thrones with Allied support, as mere extensions of American will? The proposition is as historically groundless as it is intellectually unserious (Cox, 1997; Colley, 2005; Bosworth, 2005).

 

Additionally, the claim that the removal of the Mosaddeq regime was a Western-engineered ‘coup’ warrants far closer scrutiny.

 

There is no ambiguity surrounding the events of 19 August 1953: the Iranian national army, acting under royal command, removed Prime Minister Mosaddeq from office. This act, far from being extralegal, was carried out in accordance with the constitutional authority vested in the Shah by the 1906–07 Fundamental Laws. If this is to be described as a 'coup', then consistency would require one to categorise Charles de Gaulle’s dismissal of the Vichy regime and restoration of republican governance in France as a coup d’état. Yet in Western narratives, de Gaulle is lionised as the liberator of France, a national hero who restored order and legitimacy, while the Shah is cast as a foreign-imposed tyrant dismantling a fragile democracy. Such historiographical asymmetry is not incidental; it reflects a deeper tendency within Western political culture to mythologise its own interventions while delegitimising analogous actions by non-Western sovereigns.

 

This rhetorical inversion serves a dual purpose. On one level, it aggrandises Western strategic influence, portraying its intelligence services as omnipotent architects of world events. On another, it obscures the reality that many of these same services have more often destabilised lawful governments than upheld them. In Iran, the Shah’s dismissal of Mosaddeq did not usher in chaos; it halted it. What was restored was not tyranny, but constitutional order, however imperfect. Yet the dominant Western narrative persists: one in which chaos, when restored by European hands, is ‘liberation’, and law, when enforced by an Eastern monarch, is ‘repression’.

 

Indeed, an examination of the post‑war record of Western intelligence services, particularly the CIA, reveals an institution that, by the very criteria routinely applied by Western governments to non‑Western actors that challenge their strategic dominance, operates in essence as a state‑sponsored terrorist organisation: one whose interventions have repeatedly relied on covert violence, regime destabilisation, and the deliberate erosion of sovereign order, producing chaos rather than stability. From the dismemberment of Libya to the prolonged unravelling of civil war in Syria, these agencies have repeatedly intervened not to uphold sovereignty, but to dismantle it when inconvenient to Western strategic designs. Their operations, often justified as bulwarks against tyranny, have more reliably produced failed states, power vacuums, and humanitarian catastrophe. Within this context, it becomes intellectually untenable to portray the 1953 events in Iran as a coup orchestrated by these agencies. The removal of Mosaddeq regime was not imposed from without; it was executed by domestic institutions, chiefly the army, under the direct and lawful authority of the reigning sovereign. To continue framing this as a CIA-led overthrow is not merely a historical error but a deliberate act of narrative laundering, serving both the ideological interests of the Islamic Republic and the self-exalting mythology of Western omnipotence.

 

 

Conclusion: Historical Invention as Political Instrument

The programme ‘The Queen and the Coup’, far from unveiling a hidden chapter of diplomatic history, exemplifies the calculated use of historical fiction in service of contemporary political engineering. Presented under the guise of documentary rigour, it is built upon an amalgam of factual distortion, chronological error, and speculative conjecture. The attempt to recast Mohammad Mosaddeq as the final custodian of Iranian democracy, ousted by royal intrigue with transatlantic complicity, is not merely historically unsubstantiated but ideologically purposeful.

 

As demonstrated, the documentary relies heavily on a telegram of dubious origin, entwined with implausible claims involving Anthony Eden and the RMS Queen Elizabeth. These fabrications are reinforced by academics whose apparent unfamiliarity with Iranian modern history leaves them vulnerable to manipulation. The result is a televised artefact that masquerades as research, whilst advancing the narratives of hostile interests, those intent on delegitimising the Iranian constitutional monarchy and sanitising the record of Mosaddeq's unconstitutional ambitions.

 

The timing of the documentary's release, in the context of rising anti-regime protests in Iran and renewed calls for the restoration of monarchy, is far from incidental. It appears intended to discredit the monarchy's legacy at the precise moment its political symbolism regains traction among Iranians disillusioned with both theocratic rule and republican alternatives. The recycling of declassified American documents, unverifiable and strategically released, serves not historical transparency but the objectives of regimes and factions that fear a sovereign, post-Islamist Iran governed by constitutional legitimacy.

 

This case illustrates a broader epistemic danger: the ease with which public understanding of history can be reshaped by those with access to broadcast power, institutional authority, or political motive. It is not merely a matter of correcting factual inaccuracies, but of resisting the instrumentalisation of historical memory in the service of soft power and ideological obfuscation.

 

Ultimately, ‘The Queen and the Coup’ should not be mistaken for a work of historical inquiry. It is a propagandistic artefact, cynical in conception, manipulative in method, and corrosive to the historical record it purports to illuminate.

 

 

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